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Human Security Assemblages in Global Politics: The Materiality and Instability of 
Biopolitical Governmentality in Thailand and Vietnam 
ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis investigates the implications of human security on global politics. While it 
adopts a Foucauldian analytics of governmentality and biopolitics, the thesis differs from 
biopolitical accounts of human security. These accounts tend to reduce human security to 
a coherent, totalizing, and inadvertently successful mode of governance, deemphasizing its 
situatedness and instability. In contrast, by complementing the Foucauldian approach to 
the study of human security with a Deleuzian lens of machinic assemblage in which 
materiality is particularly emphasized, the thesis argues that the governmental logic of 
human security gives rise to a multiplicity of open-ended vernacular assemblages and 
associated orders of governance. Though these assemblages are particular, messy, 
contingent systems which vacillate, undermine themselves, clash and hybridize with 
surrounding assemblages, this does not render them ineffective. When the object of 
analysis is the global, a focus on the materiality of events helps to explore how the global is 
localized. A focus on materiality opens up the opportunity to explore how the local 
materializes. This interplay between localizations and materializations disrupts the logics 
that underlie governmental processes. In this way, the thesis demonstrates how the 
intransigence of life constantly escapes and readjusts the biopolitical imperative. 
Empirically, the thesis traces the way human security materializes as a situated 
governmental strategy in emerging assemblages for managing pathogenic and illicit 
circulations relating to global migrant communities in Thailand and Vietnam. It shows the 
way the intricate and productive as well as destructive interplay of human and nonhuman 
elements inherent to the assemblages helped to constitute two vernacular orders of 
human security and associated political subjectivities.  
 
 
Keywords: Human security, governmentality, assemblage, materiality, complexity, global 
governance, migrant health, human trafficking 
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HUMAN SECURITY ASSEMBLAGES AND GOVERNING ORDERS 
 
 
 
In recent post-Cold War international relations, the concept of human security has 
increasingly influenced the governance of conflict and poverty in the world. Set against the 
traditional geopolitical programme of state security, the human security agenda to 
promote life over states and their means of destruction has been presented as more 
suitable to manage the complex interdependency and transnationality of insecurity 
associated with contemporary violence and underdevelopment. This has led many of 
those debating human security to argue that its agenda to secure life as an end itself, and 
not as a means to the end of the state, is eroding the state and state sovereignty. Yet, in 
contrast to this, the thesis finds, the state and what falls within its competency remains 
central to the governance agenda associated with human security. What, then, is the 
distinctive political logic associated with human security as a means to govern 
contemporary insecurities? In answer to this question, in this introduction, the thesis 
turns first to the agenda-setting document that initially introduced the concept of human 
security: Human Development Report 1994 (UNDP, 1994). It then suggests reading the 
governance agenda around human security emerging from this document in terms of a 
governmental logic which is giving rise to security practices that are constituting specific 
forms of political subjectivity including the ‘human’ and ‘the state’ that are making up a 
curious global political order. In order to trace and analyse this effect of human security in 
the world, it proposes a method to approach both the text of large-scale national and 
international policies as well as, and in many ways more importantly so, the vernacular 
micropolitics of human security. Finally, it sets out the way the thesis proceeds to show 
how human security manages contemporary insecurities.  
 
THE BIRTH OF HUMAN INSECURITIES 
 
In 1994, a range of issues concerning the everyday life of people including unemployment, 
famine, diseases, air pollution, earthquakes, flooding, industrial and traffic accidents, rape, 
and gun crimes were the subject of a chapter entitled ‘New Dimensions of Human Security’ 
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published by the UNDP in that year’s Human Development Report (HDR 1994).  The 
authors presented these issues as threats to human security. Human security was to 
represent a profound transition in thinking about security, namely from “an exclusive 
stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security”. Rather than 
taking the state as the security referent as was hitherto customary in security thinking 
(see e.g. Buzan, 1991), they took life itself as the referent of security. The end of the Cold 
War, they argued, afforded recognition that many conflicts happened within countries 
rather than between countries with their origins lying in increasing socio-economic 
hardship and inequalities, threatening the ability of people in both developing and 
developed countries to live fulfilling lives (see e.g. Kaldor, 2006). Secondly, they reasoned, 
under conditions of globalization, these everyday deprivations and disparities are not only 
interdependent but also transnational in nature: they are “no longer isolated events, 
confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe”. States alone, they 
noted, are incapable of managing issues relating to the transnationalization of human 
insecurities. On this basis, they challenged the obsession with military threats and military 
responses in late Cold War and early post-Cold War security studies and security policy, 
arguing that security in post-Cold War life means protection from everyday threats such as 
disease and crime more than “from the dread of a cataclysmic world event” (UNDP, 
1994:22). Indeed, they questioned the state-centrism in both security and development 
discourses, noting that states too can be perpetrators of human insecurity.  
In order to emphasize the variety and complexity of perceived threats to people’s security 
in contemporary daily life, the authors of the HDR 1994 quoted men, women, and children 
from around the world on their views about security. A man in Namibia is quoted as 
saying: “Robberies make me feel insecure. I sometimes feel as though even my life will be 
stolen”. A shoe-mender in Thailand is quoted as saying: “When we have enough for our 
children to eat, we are happy and we feel secure”. A fourth-grade schoolgirl in Ghana is 
quoted as exclaiming: “I shall feel secure when I know that I can walk the streets at night 
without being raped”. A man in Ecuador is quoted as noting: “What makes you feel 
insecure above all is violence and delinquency – as well as insecurity with respect to the 
police. Basic services are also an important part of security” (UNDP, 1994:23). From the 
long list of perceived threats to people’s security, the authors identified seven main 
categories from which, they claimed, people everywhere, “in rich nations and poor,” must 
be freed to achieve human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, 
community, and political insecurity. In their equation, the threat of physical violence was 
only one of many elements which render people insecure including those threatening 
people’s welfare and quality of life more generally. Though their intensity may differ in 
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different parts of the world, the authors noted, “all these threats to human security are 
real and growing” (UNDP, 1994:22-5).  
Economic insecurity was associated with a lack of job security, unemployment, lack of a 
social safety net and social security, precarious employment opportunities, disability. Food 
insecurity referred to a lack of access to food, poor food distribution, malnutrition.  Health 
insecurity involved poor nutrition, diet and lifestyle, environmental causes such as 
pollution, lack of access to health services, the circulation of communicable diseases such 
as associated with HIV and SARS. Environmental insecurity pertained to the degradation of 
local and global ecosystems, lack of clean water, air pollution, deforestation, catastrophes 
such as Chernobyl, drought, migrations to cyclone-, earthquake- or flood-prone areas. 
Personal insecurity was associated with threats from the state such as physical torture, 
interstate war, ethnic tension, rape, domestic violence, child abuse, suicide, drug use, 
(violent) crime, industrial or traffic accidents, workplace, sexual harassment. Community 
insecurity concerned dynamics in a family, community and/or organisation including 
genital mutilation, discrimination against indigenous peoples, interethnic strife. Finally, 
political insecurity related to violations against human rights, political repression, 
systematic torture, ill treatment, disappearance, press unfreedom. The authors of the HDR 
1994 suggested, there are considerable links and overlaps between these different forms 
of insecurities. In their words, “A threat to one element of human security is likely to travel 
– like an angry typhoon – to all forms of human security” (UNDP, 1994:25-33).  
Secondly, in order to stress the transnationality of the different interdependent forms of 
human insecurities identified, the authors suggested that advanced technology, instant 
global communication, travel, and finance, while widening people’s choices and increasing 
their participation in emerging world events, also made possible the globalization of 
insecurities. In the words of the authors (UNDP, 1994:1): 
The threats to human security are no longer just personal or local or national. They 
are becoming global: with drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, nuclear proliferation. 
Global poverty and environmental problems respect no national border. Their 
grim consequences travel the world. 
They pointed out, for example, environmental threats like land degradation, deforestation 
and the emission of greenhouse gases affect climatic conditions around the globe. They 
noted, for example, that the trade in drugs in turn draws millions of people in different 
corners of the world, producers and consumers, into a linked cycle of violence and 
dependency. Similarly, according to them, inequalities between countries encourage 
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people to migrate whether or not they are welcomed at their destinations. Frustrations 
over inequalities may also, they claimed, foster religious fundamentalism, even terrorism. 
Pathogens, they noted, can travel with migrants, bringing incurable diseases to any corner 
of the world.  
In essence, the report attempted to demonstrate that the security priorities of a 
globalizing post-Cold War world marked by global flows, complex interdependency and 
transnationality are notably different to those of the bygone bipolar world of the Cold War, 
thus necessitating a profound shift in thought. Based on their comprehensive definition of 
security, the authors surmised that the real threats in the 21st century will “arise more 
from the actions of millions of people than from aggression by a few nations”. From their 
point of view, in 1994, human security everywhere or what they referred to as ‘global 
human security’ is threatened by unchecked population growth, disparities in economic 
opportunities, excessive international migration, environmental degradation, drug 
production and trafficking, and international terrorism (UNDP, 1994:34). Noting the 
absence of global safeguards against the complex and interdependent threats to global 
human security, they concluded their analysis with recommendations for how to enhance 
global human security in the 21st century. In order to meet the threats to contemporary 
global life, they argued, not only was a conceptual shift in security necessary, in fact, a new 
“edifice of global security” driven by this people-centred formulation of security was 
required.  
Ultimately, the ambitious objective of the HDR 1994 was to make the case for bulding an 
intergovernmental global security framework that would respond to “the threat of global 
poverty travelling across international borders in the form of drugs, HIV/AIDS, climate 
change, illegal migration and terrorism” (UNDP, 1994:24). In the authors’ view,  
Over the past five decades, humankind gradually built up an edifice of global 
security – an edifice of nuclear deterrents, power balances, strategic alliances, 
regional security pacts and international policing through the superpowers and 
the United Nations. Much of this global security framework now needs change. In 
its place – or, at least, by its side – must be raised a new, more encompassing 
structure to ensure the security of all people the world over. 
What they had in mind specifically was an “institutional framework of global governance” 
oriented around development and led by a strengthened United Nations (UN) system and 
the Bretton Woods institutions that would “[defend] the new frontiers of human security” 
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(emphasis added, UNDP, 1994:81).1 These afforded an approach which sought to secure 
life itself and not as a means to secure the end of the state. In the end, the authors asserted, 
“The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives” (UNDP, 
1994:1-11).  
 
THE DIFFRACTION OF HUMAN SECURITY 
 
As presented in the HDR 1994, human security was not only put forward as a new way of 
thinking about issues affecting the everyday life of people under contemporary post-Cold 
War conditions of globalization. It was also introduced as a way to manage what were 
presented as threats to global human security, namely, and most overtly, by promoting an 
ambitious intergovernmental framework of global governance. In fact, the HDR 1994 was 
written as a basis for the UNDP’s contribution to the World Summit for Social 
Development held in the following year, 1995, in Copenhagen, at a time when the UN was 
to celebrate its 50th anniversary and was to review and define its goals for the coming 21st 
century (UNDP, 1994). Concurrently that year, the UN-funded Commission on Global 
Governance (CGG) published its report, Our Global Neighbourhood, in which it made 
recommendations to reform the UN in order to “build a more effective system of world 
security and governance”: global governance (1995:359). Though the concept of human 
security has since had considerable effect on thinking and action within and outside the 
emerging UN-led architecture of global governance, in fact, the comprehensive 
formulation as developed in the HDR 1994 initially faltered at the World Summit where 
delegates preferred a vague language absolved of concrete financial and political 
commitments (MacFarlane and Khong, 2006:149, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:23). 
Indeed, for a time, and in view of  compelling physical threats to people in the 1990s in the 
onset of civil conflicts around the world shortly after the Cold War, a narrow formulation 
of human security concentrating mainly on people’s rights and the protection of people 
from personal and political insecurities especially in conflict situations took precedence.  
                                                             
1 This new ambitious institutional framework was to adopt a range of measures that included 
drawing up a new world social charter, new objectives for development, the reduction of military 
spending, disarmament, and the reallocation of resources from the peace dividend to development, 
a global human security fund to finance international responses, and an economic security council 
alongside the existing Security Council. UNDP, The. (1994) Human Development Report 1994. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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In terms of advocacy for narrow conceptualizations of human security, the campaign 
against landmines is seen as a successful example. Under the leadership of Lloyd 
Axworthy, then Canadian Foreign Minister and a champion advocate of human security, in 
partnership with the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (CALM), a coalition of 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) launched in 1992, the Ottawa Treaty - Convention 
on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on their Destruction – came into force in 1999. That same year, an alliance of ‘like-
minded’ countries – Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, Slovenia, Thailand, with South Africa as an observer – 
emerged from the landmines campaign to form the Human Security Network (HSN). Their 
collective efforts helped to promote the creation of the International Criminal Court 
(Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:23). In this sense, the invocation of human security helped 
to assemble transnational networks comprising governments and non-governmental 
organizations to respond to common concerns. In fact, the HSN’s concerns have fallen 
between the narrow and broad formulations of human security including the protection of 
children in armed conflict, the control of small arms and light weapons, the fight against 
transnational organized crime, human development and human security. Yet, between 
2001 and 2003, the narrow formulation of human security took precedence again in the 
debate on the ‘responsibility to protect’ led by the Canadian International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which recommended humanitarian 
intervention to respond to gross and systematic violations of human rights.  
On the other hand, concurrently, at the end of the 1990s and in response to the ongoing 
transnational repercussions of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Japanese Government 
began reinitiating discussions around the ‘responsibility for development’ as argued for in 
the HDR 1994 (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:23). In 1999, together with the UN 
Secretariat, it launched the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), 
initially to fund general UN development initiatives in areas such as health, education, 
agriculture and small-scale infrastructure development (HSU, 2011). Meanwhile, in 2000, 
at the UN Millennium Summit, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, once again echoing 
the HDR 1994’s sentiment regarding the globalization of insecurities, campaigned for a 
framework of global governance premised on a people-centred form of security (Annan, 
2000). These activities culminated in the establishment of the independent international 
Commission on Human Security (CHS) in 2001. The CHS was formally established by the 
Government of Japan and informally endorsed by Kofi Annan (Chen et al., 2003:viii). Co-
chaired by former UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Madame Sadako Ogata, 
and Nobel Prize economist, Professor Amartya Sen, both of whom had previously also 
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advised the CGG, the CHS sought to clarify the concept of human security by drawing on 
the HDR 1994, advance public discussion on security in people’s lives, and propose actions 
that governments, international agencies, and other institutions might take to further 
human security. It released its own report in 2003, Human Security Now.  
Human security, as the CHS explained, is about the inclusion of people and their everyday 
concerns for security in processes of (global) governance (CHS, 2003:149). Towards this 
purpose, in 2004, the Human Security Unit (HSU) was established at the UN Secretariat in 
the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to manage the UNTFHS 
with the overall objective of mainstreaming the concept of human security throughout the 
UN bureaucracy and translating it into concrete UN associated activities (HSU, 2009). It is 
in this sense that the then Chief of the HSU, Kazuo Tase, suggested in 2007, “Human 
security is a logic!” The task of the HSU is to institutionalize the human security logic within 
the UN system.2 To date, the UNTFHS has committed over USD 350 million to UN-
associated human security projects managed by UN and UN-associated agencies in over 
seventy countries, disseminating and embedding the human security outlook with variable 
effect – as I go on to demonstrate in two case studies in chapters four and five – to South 
and Central America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, South 
Asia, Southeast and East Asia. 3 The aim of these projects is the management of threats to 
human security arising from diverse issues, most generally to do either with conflict, 
underdevelopment, and/or transnational issues. As the CHS writes, “The existing 
international security system is not designed to prevent and deal effectively with the new 
types of security threats” (CHS, 2003:23). In a world of ‘growing interdependence and 
transnational issues,’ a new global alliance is needed in which “the institutional policies 
that link individuals and the state – and the state with a global world” are strengthened 
(CHS, 2003:2-5). As this thesis will demonstrate, this attempt to link individuals and the 
state, and the state with a global world constitutes a central feature in the logic of human 
                                                             
2 Interview with Kazuo Tase, Chief, HSU, New York (October 3, 2007) 
3 The UNTFHS has funded human security projects in South and Central America (including Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Peru), Subsaharan-Africa 
(including Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, The Gambia, Uganda 
Zambia, Zimbabwe), the Balkans (including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo), Eastern 
Europe (Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), Middle East (Lebanon occupied Palestinian 
territories), Central Asia (Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), and 
Southeast and East Asia (Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, 
Philippines, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam). HSU. (2011) 'Untfhs' Activities around the World. 
New York: United Nations. 
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security as practiced by UN agencies and affiliated organizations in UNTFHS-funded 
activities. 
Since the popularization of human security in the HDR 1994 and in spite of continuing 
definitional disagreement, an extensive bureaucracy of (inter-) government agencies and 
networks, non-governmental organizations, academic centres, international commissions, 
financial institutions, and grassroots and civil society groups eager to define, fund and 
realize human security, has emerged within the UN-led architecture of global governance. 
Generally, while human security advocates can agree in principle that the vulnerability 
associated with physical violence and abuse constitutes elementary human insecurity, in 
other words, human security is ‘freedom from fear,’ disagreement exists over the extent to 
which other vulnerabilities associated with contemporary life can also be considered 
security issues. Some, such as agencies associated with the UN, maintain the necessity to 
address structural inadequacies such as poverty and to take into consideration 
transnational issues contributing to people’s insecurity. In this extended understanding, 
human security means also ‘freedom from want’. For these advocates, the concept of 
human security is an umbrella term for the set of issues associated with community, food, 
economic, environmental, health, personal and political insecurities as first raised by the 
HDR 1994. Despite this intellectual discord about what constitutes human security, as 
Hampson et al have argued, “[i]n reality, many human security initiatives, […] tend to fall 
somewhere between the narrower and the broader definitions of human security” 
(Hampson et al., 2002:5).  
 
AN EMANCIPATORY OR INTERVENTIONARY CONCEPT? 
 
Reflecting the dynamic oscillation between a narrow and broad conceptualization of 
human security in the security and development policy worlds, much of the scholarly 
debate around human security has concentrated on defining and refining the meaning of 
human security (cf. Acharya, 2004, Alkire, 2004, Axworthy, 2001, Axworthy, 2004, Buzan, 
2004, Evans, 2004, Hampson, 2004, Hampson, et al., 2002, Hubert, 2004, Leaning, 2004, 
Liotta, 2004, MacFarlane, 2004, Newman, 2004, Paris, 2004, Pettman, 2005, Suhrke, 2004, 
Thakur, 2004, Thomas, 2004, Uvin, 2004). Many scholars still believe the definitional 
obscurity of human security renders the concept analytically and practically limited (cf. 
Hampson, et al., 2002, Krause, 2004, 2002, Thomas and Tow, 2002). Others, like Jolly and 
Ray, have argued that the elasticity of the concept enable different communities to adopt 
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human security according to their own cultural contexts (Jolly and Ray, 2006). Yet, as 
Grayson has argued, the search for a ‘workable’ definition of human security itself ought to 
be examined since it is suffused with relations of power (Grayson, 2004, 2008).  
Considering its political implications, human security has been heralded as an 
emancipatory and empowering concept which puts individuals and their needs rather 
than state interests at the centre of international policy making. Much like the HDR 1994, 
Jolly and Ray (Jolly and Ray, 2006) have argued that human security addresses newly 
emerging security challenges which traditional state-centric approaches with their formal 
commitments to non-intervention and sovereign immunity are increasingly unable to deal 
with (cf. Bellamy and McDonald, 2002, Jolly and Ray, 2006, Roberts, 2010). Within this 
context, for example, a number of scholars have also emphasized the space for gender 
sensitivity that human security is said to create such as in relation to human trafficking 
and girl and boy soldiers in international security (see also Clark, 2003, Fox, 2004, 
Hoogensen and Stuyvoy, 2006, Jonsson, 2008, O'Connell Davidson, 2008, Truong et al., 
2007). As such, as others have observed, human security signifies the democratization of 
security and international relations in so far as people become partners in the pursuit of a 
common global security (Axworthy, 2001, Evans, 2004, Hampson, 2004).  
On the other hand, it has been criticized as being used to justify intervention and introduce 
harsh foreign and domestic policies in order to achieve human security (see e.g. Bain, 
2000). Chandler and McCormack and others have argued that human security authorizes 
geopolitical interventions on the basis not of vulnerability but of threats to the interests of 
powerful Western states, thereby reinforcing rather than challenging the existing  
distribution of power in international politics (Chandler, 2008:465-6, McCormack, 2008). 
Resonating with this argument, biopolitcal accounts of human security, which I consider in 
more detail in chapter 2, go further in presenting human security as a governmental 
technology which works to set up an environment in which communities particularly in 
the global South can live according to the need to govern that specific narratives about 
global security necessitate (see e.g. Alt, 2011, Berman, 2007, de Larrinaga and Doucet, 
2008, Duffield and Waddell, 2006, Elbe, 2009, Grayson, 2008, Roberts, 2010).  
Human security has also been argued to challenge the precepts of international order by 
questioning the role of the sovereign state as principal provider of security. The impetus to 
control civil populations through human security justifies intervention by the 
international community when a state fails to fulfil its obligations. Some scholars argue 
that  a fast changing world necessitates adjustments to the international order such as the 
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recognition that security is now the responsibility of a multiplicity of actors including the 
state (Liotta, 2005, Mack, 2002, Paris, 2001). More often than not, however, the debate 
about the erosion of the state and state sovereignty has raised alarmist accounts about 
international security as such.  In response to this, however, Buzan has noted that while 
human security challenges the role of the sovereign state, it retains a state-centric outlook 
(Buzan, 2004). Taking this further, some biopolitical accounts of human security argue 
that it is reconstituting and consolidating a global order in which the state and sovereignty 
remain central (see e.g. Duffield, 2007, Voelkner, 2010).  
 
HUMAN SECURITY AS GOVERNMENTALITY 
 
Human security is a governmental logic that is concerned with the management of conflict 
and underdevelopment through mechanisms of global governance. Implicit in human 
security is an aspiration to shift political authority away from the traditional centre of the 
nation-state to multilayered, networked configurations with, and through, a host of 
(inter)governmental, para-governmental, nongovernmental, and private organizations. 
Indeed, accounts of global governance including human security often rely on the idea of a 
shift in the locus of political power and authority. However, they fail to capture a 
significant aspect of the functioning of power in contemporary world politics, namely, how 
the discourse of global governance also reconstitutes existing political subjectivities 
including the state giving rise to new iterations of the latter. Within this context, studies of 
governmentality have offered a critique of, and an alternative to, theories and discourses 
of global governance, firstly, by critically examining the connection between the notion of 
governance and its associated political imaginary, secondly, by drawing attention to the 
diverse governmental assemblages that seek to order political reality, but which are 
occluded by the global governance paradigm. I consider these in more detail in chapter 
one. The English publication of Foucault’s lectures series, Security, Territory, Population 
and The Birth of Biopolitics, has opened up a number of new directions for such critical 
analyses of governmental assemblages and their relation to broader questions of power 
and world order. Considering this, in this thesis, I adopt a Foucauldian analytics of 
governmentality to the global governance of human security.  As a governmental 
assemblage, human security produces, disseminates, consumes, and refines meaning and 
understanding of how to interpret and, consequently, how to do things that then govern 
conduct in the world.  
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FOUCAULT’S GOVERNMENTALITY 
 
The concept of governmentality must first be understood in terms of Foucault’s 
understanding of power as productive. According to Foucault (Foucault, 2002:120),  
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it 
doesn’t only weigh on us a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things, 
it induces pleasures, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be 
considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much 
more than as a negative instance whose function is repression. 
Power is understood here not as an exclusively repressive quality that can be possessed 
and controlled by the will of an a priori institution or subject but as an all-pervasive 
enabling as well as disabling process, in which subjects and objects are constituted. It 
applies itself to the immediate everyday life, categorizing individuals and communities, 
imposing regimes of truth on them (Foucault, 2002:331). These regimes constitute 
governmental assemblages4 that are “thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble[s] consisting of 
discourses, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and 
philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid” (Foucault, 
1980:194) that make individuals subjects, that is, “subject to someone else by control and 
dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault, 
2002:331). Recounting Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari note, power exists in the 
‘micrological fabric’ “as diffuse, dispersed, geared down, miniaturized, perpetually 
displaced, acting by fine segmentation, working in detail and in the details of detail” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:247). Thus, Foucault’s conception of power shifts attention 
away from actors and institutions brandishing sovereign power to their constitution 
through micro-practices of power. 
While Foucault’s work mostly dealt with ‘relatively local and microscopic analyses’ of 
power, towards the end of the 1970s, he became interested in the state and power. He 
concluded the 1977 lecture series, Security, Territory, Population, with the note that all he 
wanted to do that year was “a little experiment of method” that would show how starting 
from the microphysics of power it was possible to return to “the general problems of the 
                                                             
4 Throughout his work, Foucault used the terms assemblage, dispositif, apparatus, ensemble, and 
complex interchangeably to refer to the whole which comprises the set of heterogeneous elements 
which come to gather around a specific problem such as human security, migrant health, and 
human trafficking. I use the term assemblage throughout this thesis in order to draw a sustained 
link to the Deleuzian notion of machinic assemblage. 
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state”. The state and inter-state order were not a “transcendent reality whose history 
could be undertaken on the basis of itself”. They are not already given subjects but are 
formed by practices. Accordingly, it was “on the basis of men’s actual practice, on the basis 
of what they do and how they think” that Foucault developed his account of the 
constitution of the modern state and European order (Foucault, 2007:358).5 Putting it 
differently, instead of “starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for 
certain concrete practices,” Foucault started with the practices. What if the state and inter-
state order do not exist? Assuming they do not exist, then, what can we make of these 
different events and practices which seemed to have organized around what is supposed 
to be the state and the early modern inter-state order? As he later noted: “I do, I want to, I 
must do without a theory of the state, as one can and must forgo an  indigestible meal” 
(Foucault, 2008:76-7) 
Reflecting on Foucault’s method, Veyne argues, “we tend to overlook the practice and see 
only the objects that reify it in our eyes” (Veyne, 1997:156). We need to stop believing in 
the self-evidence of objects such as ‘states’ or ‘the governed,’ he contends; we need to 
reduce these objects to ordinary experience.6 “Things, objects, are only correlatives of 
practices. The illusion of a natural object conceals the heterogeneous character of 
practices” (Veyne, 1997:166). A practice is what people do. Objects emerge from practices 
to which they correspond. Since practices are anchored in the realities of the moment, the 
same applies to the objects to which they give effect. Ultimately, for Foucault, the focus on 
practices had the aim of “grasping the conditions that make [a specific set of practices] 
acceptable at a given moment” (Foucault, 2002:225). He believed that sets of more or less 
organized practices are “not just governed by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, 
guided by pragmatic circumstances” but “possess their own specific regularities, logic, 
strategy, self-evidence, and ‘reason’” (Foucault, 2002:225).7 
                                                             
5 Similarly, recounting Gabriel Tarde, Deleuze and Guattari note, “what one needs to know is which 
peasants, in which areas of the south of France, stopped greeting the local landowners” Deleuze, 
Gilles, and Félix Guattari. (2004) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translated by 
Brian Massumi. London: Continuum. 
6 For example, as Veyne argues, “rather than taking for granted the existence of a body called the 
governed, in relation to which a body of ‘governors’ proceeds to act, let us consider the fact that 
practices for dealing with ‘the governed’ may vary so widely over time that the so-called governed 
have little more in common than the name” Veyne, Paul. (1997) Foucault Revolutionises History. In 
Foucault and His Interlocutors, edited by Arnold I. Davidson, pp. 146-82. Chicago/London: 
University of Chicago Press.. 
7 Indeed, Foucault’s methodological reflections were inspired partly by Paul Veyne’s study of 
euergetism in Bread and Circuses ———. (1990) Bread and Circuses: Historical Sociology and 
Political Pluralism, translated by Brian Pearce. London: Allan Lane, Penguin Press. 
23 
 
Specifically, the analytical perspective Foucault adopted in his study of the state and the 
early modern European inter-state order, as indeed also already in his studies of madness 
(1965), incarceration (1979), sexuality (1998) and war (2004), was what he referred to as 
an “extra-institutional, non-functional, and non-objective” analysis (2007:119). Foremost, 
this involved “the attempt to free relations of power from the institution”, be this the 
psychiatric hospital, the prison or state institution. Foucault sought to move outside the 
institution or away from the ‘institution-centric approach’ towards a view of the workings 
of power. “We need to cut off the king’s head. In political theory that has still to be done,” 
he famously argued (Foucault, 2002:22-3). He proposed an analysis instead which, 
according to him, necessarily extends beyond the limits of the state. After all, as he 
continued to argue, the state, “for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses,” is hardly able to 
cover the entire field of power relations (Foucault, 2002:22-3). In Foucault’s 
understanding, the institution can be understood only based on something external and 
general like public hygiene, penal or mercantilist order. By “reconstructing a whole 
network of alliances, communications, and points of support” and showing how “a whole 
battery of multifarious techniques” are developed to govern including, for example in the 
context of psychiatric order, the education of children and assistance of the poor, it is 
possible to see how assembled practices are coordinated by a specific general order. Is it 
possible, Foucault asked, that “we talk about something like a ‘governmentality’ that 
would be to [states] what techniques of segregation were to psychiatry, what techniques 
of discipline were to the penal system and what biopolitics was to medical institutions” 
(Foucault, 2007:117-20)?8 
Since his first mention of governmentality and governmental power in his lecture course 
in 1977, however, neither Foucault nor those subsequently writing about governmentality 
has been consistent in the way they have used the concept. For that reason, it makes sense 
to clarify the meaning of governmentality on which this thesis is based. For Foucault, “the 
modern political problem” of government begins to emerge in sixteenth century Europe 
when “a significant series of treatises” no longer “present themselves as advice to the 
prince” but as arts of government or governmentalities (Foucault, 2007:88).  The problem 
of government was the problem of “governing things,” an exercise of power, articulated 
not just in political but also in philosophical, religious, medical and pedagogic texts 
                                                             
8 According to Tully, Foucault’s reflections on government and governmentality are indicative of a 
general shift in Western thinking in the twentieth century that might be described as “a move away 
from the search for an essence hidden behind human activities to the surface aspects that give them 
meaning and significance”. Foucault turned away “from the routines, institutions, conditions, 
explanations and theories of politics to the activity or game of politics itself – what citizens do and 
the way they do it” Tully, James. (1999) The Agonic Freedom of Citizens. Economy and Society 
28:161–82. 
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(Foucault, 2007:96). Government is a problematizing activity which relates to “how to 
govern oneself, how to be governed, by whom should we accept to be governed, how to be 
the best possible governor?” (Foucault, 2007:88). Foucault understood government 
generally as ‘the conduct of conduct’: a form of activity aiming to “affect the actions of 
individuals by working on their conduct – that is, on the ways in which they regulate their 
own behaviour” (Hindess, 1996:97). It comes in many forms and involves many people, for 
example, “the father of a family, the superior in a convent, the teacher” so that “there are 
many governments in relation to which the Prince governing his state is only one 
particular mode” (Foucault, 2007:93). As such, government is “much more than 
sovereignty” (Foucault, 2007:76). It does not replace sovereignty (sovereign power) or 
discipline (disciplinary power) as he had analysed in Discipline and Punish. Rather, 
sovereignty and discipline become but two, though important, ways of dealing with the 
problem of government.  
For Foucault, it was the governmental problematization of political sovereignty in the 
nascent discipline of political science at the turn of the sixteenth century that gave rise to 
the state and European inter-state order. This was not to say that the set of institutions we 
call the state originate from this period of 1580 to 1650. Rather, to return to the series of 
treatises concerned with the problem of government, according to Foucault, it is at this 
time that the state begins to enter into reflected practice and present “a schema of 
intelligibility for a whole set of already established institutions, a whole set of given 
realities” (Foucault, 2007:286). For Foucault, then, the state is “nothing more than a way of 
governing [...] nothing more than a type of governmentality” (Foucault, 2007:248). It is the 
reflected way of accommodating the emerging desire to govern the population (Foucault, 
2007:108-9):  
the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very 
complex, power that has the populations as its target, political economy as its 
major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument. 
While Foucault traces the historic emergence of one specific form of governmentality, 
namely (neo)liberalism, it has also been understood to refer more generally (Dean, 
1999:2) to  
any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of 
authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of 
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knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, 
aspirations, interests and beliefs, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse 
set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes. 
To be sure, either way, governmentality does not refer to “the way in which governors 
really governed”. Rather, it is “the reasoned way of governing best, and, at the same time, 
reflection on the best possible way of governing” (Foucault, 2008:2). As such, it is a 
changing discursive field within which, according to Miller and Rose, “the exercise of 
power is conceptualised, the moral justifications for particular ways of exercising power 
by diverse authorities, notions of the appropriate forms, objects and limits of politics” are 
justified (1992:175). It is the logic according to which a regime of practices poses 
problems of rule, who can govern or is governed, what or how is to be governed (Gordon, 
1991:7). To be sure, by logic, I do not mean the ‘formal analysis of propositions’ so that we 
determine whether they are valid or true. Logic, as Coward notes, “is not a mathematical 
function or algorithm, but rather a grammar into which different meaningful, and yet 
contingent, elements can be put” (Coward, 2009:135, see also Glynos and Howarth, 2007).  
While one of the attractions of governmentality has been to interpret neoliberalism in new 
ways, I share Pat O'Malley et al.’s contention that this has also become a disadvantage. 
There is a tendency in the governmentality literature to take neoliberalism for granted as 
a metanarrative to understand a wide variety of political programs (e.g. O'Malley, 1996, 
Ruhl, 1999). Although I do not deny that aspects of neoliberal thinking are present in most 
contemporary governing processes including human security, it seems to give a wrong 
impression that they are simply variations of neo-liberal philosophies (O'Malley et al., 
2006:97). In fact, describing certain mechanisms as neoliberal, as O’Malley et al. note, 
reduces the force of governmentality as a theoretical and methodological account whose 
strength lies in identifying the specificities of governmental formulations. Accordingly, I 
take seriously Foucault’s cue to start with the practices which seem to organize around 
human security rather than starting with universals like neoliberalism or the state as a 
grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices. Accordingly, assuming neoliberalism is 
not the only form of governmentality, then, what can be made of the different events and 
practices which are associated with human security? I revisit the question of neoliberalism 
and human security in the conclusion of the thesis.  
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CONCEPTUALIZING HUMAN SECURITY ASSEMBLAGES 
 
Accordingly, in this thesis, rather than focusing only on formal agencies, authorities, 
institutions and processes of human security, I analyse the way in which practices of 
human security rely on a specific governmental logic. This logic is much broader in scope 
and more subtle in its creation, maintenance as well as transformation of order in and 
beyond formal institutions including the state, international organizations as well as 
people themselves.  After all, traditional categories like the state embody specific 
assumptions about political life such as the division inside/outside in international 
relations that I wanted to avoid from the outset so as not to over-predetermine my 
research outcome. Notwithstanding the compelling critiques of human security as a site of 
biopolitics and governmentality already advanced, if controversially, by scholars drawing 
also on Foucault (e.g. de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008, Dillon and Reid, 2000, Duffield and 
Waddell, 2006, Elbe, 2009, Grayson, 2008, Roberts, 2010, Truong, 2006), little has been 
said about how human security takes concrete form. As I mention in chapter two, by 
reflecting only on programmatic rationalities and top-down flows of power, 
deemphasizing the incoherence and contingency of power as well as the invention of 
governing practices from below, these critiques tend to present human security as a 
totalizing and inadvertently ‘successful' rather than situated, instable, adaptive, 
unpredictable, and sometimes ‘failing’ mode of governance. 
Since human security interventions have taken or are taking place in multiple, dispersed 
and different vernacular sites (see e.g. UNTFHS, 2010),  I felt it was necessary to design my 
research in such a way that would also shed light on the variability as well as the 
incoherence and contingency of human security flows. 9 Thus, as I will demonstrate, rather 
than investigating the power of human security only in the sites from which power is 
thought to emanate, namely, the headquarters of international agencies, I also traced the 
sites of practice where power operates and human security is performatively produced – 
at the micropolitical or molecular level (see also Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:224). Put 
differently, I chose to trace the  
infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, 
their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power 
have been – and continue to be – invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, 
                                                             
9 Here I am also inspired by Appadurai’s suggestion to consider “modernity to be rewritten more as 
vernacular globalization and less as a concession to large-scale national and international policies.” 
(Appadurai, 1996: 10) 
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transformed, displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by 
forms of global domination (Foucault, 1980:99).  
Considering the instability of practices, I adopted a flexible or qualitative research strategy 
which would evolve in the process of gathering the dynamic empirical material (Robson, 
2002:163-200). This way, I would allow for the space to be surprised and led by what I 
encountered on the research path. In the field, I observed the way human security 
emerged as a messy, contingent and at times absurd political strategy which was in the 
process of setting up and arranging a set of heterogeneous elements around specific 
problems such as migrant health and human trafficking including situated histories, 
(knowledge) cultures and expertise, experiences and desires, local habits and 
programmes, technocratic processes, mechanisms of ordering, recording, presenting, and, 
crucially, their materiality.  
Indeed, having read Latour’s Aramis or the Love of Technology (Latour, 1996)10 on my way 
into sites of human security practice, I was sensitized to the possibility of material objects 
playing a role in the way human security is practiced and shaped. In this context, although 
such things as small arms, carbon dioxide emissions, viruses and airplanes are emphasized 
in the human security discourse, they tend to appear only as raw, brute or inert objects 
that either benefit or risk (global) human security. Rather than seeing them as the passive 
backdrop of human security’s imperative, I came to see them as giving the struggle 
concrete form. Indeed, human security comprises assemblages of ‘men and things’ 
(Foucault, 2007:96) in which material objects, just like human beings, play a constitutive 
role. For example, I was struck by the importance of information technologies including 
global telecommunication networks like the internet (emails) and mundane paraphernalia 
(electricity, submarine communications cables, computers, monitors and printers, office 
furniture), databases (servers, software as well as filing cabinets) and spatial 
arrangements including buildings (UN headquarters, local health centres) as well as 
viruses (HIV, SARS), air pollutants, weather dynamics and, last but not least, human bodies 
with their materiality in setting up and, importantly, shaping human security 
interventions.  
Though Foucault (1971, 1998, 2007) implied the composite role of all elements – human 
and nonhuman – in giving rise to power effects such as governmentalities, others have 
                                                             
10 In Aramis, Latour demonstrates the way the machines (the cars) and the material forces 
(electricity, magnets) of an experimental Parisian guided-transportation system acted out agential 
capacity in a heterogeneous collectivity comprising human bodies, words, and regulations.   
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more decidedly, if controversially, expressed the way in which the interrelation between 
differential – human and nonhuman – elements produces dynamic and mobile forces that 
help to constitute specific sciences, politics and subjectivities (Barad, 2007, Bennett, 2010, 
Coward, 2009, de Landa, 2006, de Landa, 1991, Deleuze and Guattari, 2004, Hinchliffe, 
2007, Latour, 2004, Mitchell, 2002). Considering this, drawing on Deleuze and Guattari 
(Deleuze, 1992, Deleuze and Guattari, 2004) and Jane Benett (2005, Bennett, 2010), I 
interpret the human security assemblages as ad hoc collectivities that are always in the 
process of (un-)becoming, absorbing, discarding, pulling together or assembling, and 
transforming disparate human and nonhuman elements. In fact, a range of social entities, 
from stem cells, electrical power grids and Earth to persons, cities and nation-states (de 
Landa, 2006) can be treated as assemblages whose circumstantial and historical origins 
render them contingent though not ineffective.  
The move to consider nonhuman materialities not as social constructions but as actants 
has led to the re-conceptualization of agency (see e.g. Barad, 2007, Bennett, 2010, Coole 
and Frost, 2010, Latour and Woolgar, 1986). As I go on to discuss in chapter three, in the 
distributive and composite form of agency proposed by Bennett, agency emerges not from 
human intentions or behaviour but from the uncertain and unpredictable interplay of the 
human and nonhuman elements comprising an assemblage. In Bennett’s ‘naive realist’ 
account, within an assemblage each element or actant exudes ‘a life force’ of its own which 
enters into friction with other elements thus giving rise to a dynamism immanent to the 
collective whole (see e.g. Bennett, 2004). As Coole and Frost have noted, according to this 
new materialism, matter is “active, self-creative, productive, unpredictable” (Coole and 
Frost, 2010:9). It is partly in this way that assemblages like human security are by default 
circumstantial, instable, and unpredictable. 
With the objective to control and the central question of ‘how best to govern’ human 
insecurity, human security assemblages are, in the spirit of Foucault, governmental 
(Foucault, 2007:88). Considering the multiplicity of actants involved, human security 
assemblages are not governed by any one central power. Government, following Rose, is 
not “a process in which rule extends itself unproblematically across a territory 
[geographical or otherwise], but a matter of fragile relays, contested locales and 
fissiparous affiliations” (Rose, 1999:51). While local government institutions remain one 
of the key elements in these assemblages, activities are negotiated with and through 
various other elements including international (non)governmental organizations and, last 
but not least, material objects. It is in this sense that human security assemblages can be 
understood as “web[s] of uneven topography” in which governmental power is unevenly 
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distributed. While the assemblages as wholes and their elements are doing things, 
governmental power is not equally strong everywhere (Bennett, 2005:448). Of the various 
points at which the trajectories of elements cross each other, those relating to human 
security are more heavily trafficked in some target areas than others. Here, the people 
targeted are more determinedly rendered governable and brought under governmental 
control.  
Indeed, much hard work, as Li argues, goes into “drawing heterogeneous elements 
together, forge connections between them and sustain these connections in the face of 
tension” (Li, 2007:264). Focusing on community forest management in Indonesia, Li 
identifies six ‘practices of assemblage’ which bring the heterogeneous elements together 
and forge connections between them that she argues are generic to any assemblage 
including forging alignments, rendering technical, authorizing knowledge, managing 
failures, anti-politics, and reassembling (Li, 2007). Her concern is precisely to find a way to 
explore the practices which bring into sharper focus the gap between what is intended in 
governmental programmes and the ‘refractory processes’ which make governance 
difficult. In fact, as I go on to discuss in chapter three, looking specifically at the 
constitutive role of material objects, it is the tensions that are “the energies and 
countercultures,” which Bennett contends, “exceed and confound” an assemblage 
(Bennett, 2005).     
 
TRACING EMERGING GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES 
 
In terms of the empirical material, since human security is an elusive concept which has 
attracted an array of definitions, interventions, and politics, I decided to concentrate on 
the work of UN and affiliated agencies. How and to what effect does human security 
understood in this way matter concretely? I visited the Human Security Unit (HSU) at the 
United Nations headquarters in New York to begin to understand the governing practices 
involved in the programming of human security. To reiterate, the HSU administers the UN 
Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) which, to date, has committed over USD 350 
million to human security projects managed by UN and UN-associated agencies in over 
seventy countries. Judging by the work of the HSU, human security interventions have 
taken or are taking place in multiple, dispersed and shifting vernacular sites. As a 
consequence, rather than interpreting human security only in terms of the text of large-
scale national and international policies and programs, I began tracing human security to 
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its micropolitics in a few selected sites (Voelkner, 2011). Specifically, by conducting a 
multi-sited field study, I sought to draw out the power relations flowing where power is 
applied concretely rather than only from where it is thought to originate. Though human 
security brought about changes to each of the vernacular sites, there seemed to be an 
inevitable gap between what was programmed and what was eventually accomplished 
(see e.g. Li, 2007). Thus, by venturing into the field and studying the workings of human 
security concretely, it became possible for me not only to see how the application of 
human security varies from the program as well as between vernacular contexts. It also 
allowed me to examine the manner in which the micropolitics of human security are 
linked to the broader rationalities, processes and power assemblages associated with the 
macropolitics of human security in the struggle to manage global insecurities.  
I decided to trace the micropolitics of human security relating to two UNTFHS-funded 
projects tackling issues arising specifically from (forced) migration. Migration, and 
specifically forced migration, brings into sharper focus the question of political order. 
Forced migration, as Dillon has noted, raises “the fundamental ethical question of the 
membership of a political community, so also reflecting on the character of its justice, as 
well as the technical question of ordering and disciplining large mobile or potentially 
mobile populations” (1995:327). Indeed, it problematizes the very distinction between the 
inside and outside as a way of enframing political issues such as state security programs. 
Specifically, I looked to human security projects tackling insecurity relating to (forced) 
migration including human trafficking inside and outside Southeast Asia. The current 
increased human mobility within the region is considered a key element in the rise of 
global migration. Southeast Asian governments, which operate under a diversity of 
political orders including liberal and communist regimes, have responded by attempting 
to manage the problem of migration and related issues with varying strategies and efforts 
including human security (Regional Thematic Working Group on International Migration 
including Human Trafficking, 2008).  
The first project in which I sought to trace the human security flows dealt with the double 
circulation problematic embodied by Burmese migrants in Thailand whose travelling 
bodies are both desired for the labour to be yielded as well as being repulsed and 
criminalized for the diseases and illegalities they are said to carry. The second project 
dealt with the circulation problematic relating to Vietnamese women and children at risk 
of human trafficking whose travelling bodies were both desired in a booming pleasure, i.e. 
sex, industry as well as being repulsed for the ‘social evil’ and lack of traditional 
Vietnamese femininity that they are believed to represent. In order to capture the 
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infinitesimal shifts in political order associated with human security as applied to issues of 
forced migration in Thailand and Vietnam, I followed Foucault’s cue and focused on the 
“incessant transactions which modify, or [...] insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of 
investment, decision-making centres, forms and types of control, relationships between 
local powers, the central authority and so on” (Foucault, 2008:77).  
In order to locate these “incessant transactions” and given also the multi-scalar character 
of human security, I decided to trace human security transactions by employing, not only 
traditional semi-structured interviews with relevant groups of people involved in the 
networks that were established and examining relevant primary and secondary literature, 
but also following the material objects that were produced or appropriated in the name of 
human security. For example, I was interested in the emails sent from New York to 
Bangkok to Ranong, the management tools employed, the software developed in Geneva 
and transferred to Bangkok where it was reconfigured and transferred to Samutsakhorn 
and so on. As mentioned, things like emails, tools, as well as bodies, tend to appear only as 
inert objects. Rather than seeing them as passive, I took them as giving human security’s 
struggle to manage transnational insecurities concrete form. For example, the 
interrelation between the material objects dropped by the circuits of human security 
governance and the bodies of Burmese or Vietnamese migrants “with their materiality and 
their forces” helped to bring forth and shape the vernacular micropolitics of human 
security in Thailand and Vietnam (Foucault, 1979:26).  
As implied, governmental notions which invoke the ‘global’ such as human security 
operate along dramatic distances. When the object of analysis is the global, a focus on the 
materiality of events helps to explore how the global is localized. At the same time, a focus 
on materiality opens up the opportunity to explore how the local materializes. Not only 
does it show the way governmental logics are performed, it also demonstrates their 
inherent situatedness and instability. Thus, the interplay between localizations and 
materializations disrupts the logics that underlie governmental processes. By looking at 
the emergence of the global assemblages that human security comprises, tracing the 
multiple transactions and relations that assemble the heterogeneous elements including 
the material objects into nearly stable organizational and institutional practices, it 
becomes possible to capture where and how power operates and where human security is 
performatively produced. It helps to understand the distinctive interplay between the 
micro- and macropolitics of global human security.  
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Specifically, in order to grasp the ways subjects of global order such as the ‘human’ and the 
‘state’ are formed, I looked to the ways of seeing, understanding and managing (forced) 
migration. My position as researcher and my endeavour to understand was made known 
to the research subjects from the outset. The advantage of this approach lies in the 
possibility of gaining a deeper understanding of the complexity of particular social 
phenomena (see e.g. Geertz, 1973) otherwise unobtainable through conventional methods 
such as questionnaires (see e.g. Atkinson et al., 2001). The challenge of adopting this 
approach, however, lies in understanding to what extent I as a researcher affect the 
situation under observation. This is especially so in the case of research in a sensitive 
political area such as forced migration where migrants are seen either as illegal or morally 
doubtful and knowledge is not easily or safely come by. Moreover, the primary material 
collected will be the interpretation of the researcher. There is the problem of bias and the 
potential for distortion of research findings (see e.g. Haraway, 1988). Indeed, security is an 
expression for what and how to protect in the world that is particular. In the case of 
migrants in both Vietnam and Thailand, the meaning and proposed activities of (human) 
security differed from the proposed UN programs. It thus required an open mind to 
deviate from agenda-setting parameters.  
How does tracing assemblages in the way suggested above matter to critical analyses of 
global relations? Tracing the workings of human security through the material objects it 
produces or appropriates allows for (better) appreciating the variability and contingency 
as well as the complex interplay between differently levelled governmental flows. It is 
possible to see the way the micropolitics of governance and macropolitical rationalities 
and processes relating to international and global governance are intimately related. By 
adopting a flexible research design strategy, the contextual particularities of governance 
can be considered. The researcher remains open to unexpected encounters with the 
research field. The differences in interpretive environments can be taken into account and 
creatively utilized towards finding new avenues of research otherwise obscured. For 
example, not only do ‘global’ programmes only tangentially become adaptable to ‘local’ 
settings but governance is frequently also invented from below, producing hybrid forms of 
governance in which ‘global’ and ‘local’ governance cultures become intertwined. 
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THE ARGUMENT 
 
What are the implications of human security on global politics? In order to investigate the 
governmental logic underlying the global governance of human security, in chapter one, I 
begin to investigate the discourse of global governance more generally in terms of a 
governmental logic whose emerging processes constitute the specific global political order 
which comes to be governed in and through these same processes. Specifically, I develop 
my narrative concerning governmental logics by advancing Foucault’s own considerations 
about the way a governmental logic concerning inter-state relations materialized in 
Western Europe in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Crucially, Foucault 
demonstrated the way orders of governance and associated political subjects (the human, 
the modern state and inter-state relations) comprising emerging governmental 
assemblages are co-determinant. These linked effects of governmental logics change as the 
dynamics of governing processes change. In this respect, they are contingent on 
perpetually evolving governing processes. I then demonstrate the way the contemporary 
‘international’ can similarly be interpreted as an assemblage by drawing particularly on 
the arguments put forward by poststructuralist scholars concerning the regimes and 
associated knowledge practices which helped to constitute the theory and practice of 
International Relations. Building on this, I review the literature on ‘global’ 
governmentalities. Finally, I investigate the way global governance itself can be taken to 
constitute a governmental logic comprising an assembled set of political imaginaries, 
theories, subjects and objects, problems and solutions, facts, forces and dynamics which 
produces a ‘complex’ reality of the contemporary global political order that advocates of 
global governance take to be the real and, crucially also, act upon. Here, I am particularly 
interested in the way orders of governance and the political are framed vis-a-vis the 
metanarrative of complexity.  
Chapter two examines the way the policy discourse of human security begins to set up an 
emerging governmental assemblage whose arrangement is circumscribed by the 
intersections between a contemporary biopolitical problematization of life and the logic of 
‘complexity’ as adapted to global governance. Specifically, the chapter explores, by 
drawing on recent critical accounts of human security, the way it constitutes and manages 
a biopolitical imaginary in which ‘life’ is taken as the ontopolitical object of governance. 
This ‘complex’ reality that it presumes to exist not only defines the limits of the kind of 
human life to be protected and promoted but also determines the kind of 
problematizations, correlative spaces, agents, and mechanisms through which human 
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security operates. Specifically, the governing processes of human security proceed on a 
metanarrative concerning the complex interdependency of security, in which, according to 
some scholars, the security of ‘humanity’ itself is threatened. In this narrative, managing 
human insecurity involves, I contend, constituting and acting upon a heterarchical (de-
territorialized) rather than geopolitical (territorialized) order of networks which does not 
involve the eclipse of the state and state sovereignty eroding as some scholars of human 
security have argued. Rather, the governmental logic of human security involves the 
governmentalization of the state and sovereignty. Moreover, the self-governance of 
systems that it engineers involves ‘human’ subjects as constitutive parts.  
These taken-for-granted assumptions constitute human security assemblages which 
comprise an order of governance and associated political subjectivities including the 
individual, the state, and global order that pass through sites of practice in which this 
reality is enacted. Indeed, they take on definite material forms in the assemblages which 
can be traced as consequently emerging in the world, as I go on to demonstrate 
particularly in the migrant health assemblage in Thailand and the human trafficking 
assemblage in Vietnam in chapters four and five. Notwithstanding the compelling critiques 
of human security as a site of biopolitics and governmentality, little has been said about 
how human security takes concrete form. Accordingly, this chapter begins to trace human 
security at the ‘molecular’ level. In contrast to biopolitical accounts of human security 
which tend to present human security as a neat, closed, totalizing, and successful mode of 
governance, it can be argued that human security assemblages are in fact open, contingent 
systems which continually vacillate, backfire, undermining themselves, clashing and 
hybridizing with other assemblages. Accordingly, I discuss the significance of the logical 
framework as a governmental object that sets out to arrange the distribution of human 
security assemblages in the field.  
In chapter three, I discuss the way human security assemblages can be conceived of as 
embodied and existing in a myriad of material objects dispersed around the world 
including emails, computers, the internet, managerial tools, and the spatial arrangements 
in sites of intervention. Specifically, the chapter theorizes the way these objects play a 
constitutive role in (un)making human security politics in largely de-territorialized 
locales. In keeping with the argument that human security constitutes orders of 
governance and political subjectivities, this chapter examines the part human security 
objects play in bringing about mutations in the contemporary global order. In this context, 
the chapter advances Foucault’s materialism by particularly drawing on Deleuze’s 
conception of the machinic assemblage. Specifically, it draws out the distributive agency in 
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assemblages. A Deleuzian assemblage is characterized by an open-endedness which 
always somehow escapes the dominant strategic imperative within it, e.g. a biopolitical 
rationality. I proceed in this manner, firstly, to demonstrate, through Foucault’s 
materialism, the ways in which human security is not only partly generated by the 
intermingling of dispersed ‘global’ and situated material and other (e.g. spatiotemporal) 
processes but is also dependent on the corporeal world which it comprises. Secondly, I 
want to emphasize, through Deleuze’s materialist conception of assemblage, the way 
human security’s relation with material and other forces renders it, and the intended 
effects produced out of it including political subjectivities, state forms, and world orders, 
always transient and subject to unintended and unforeseen change. 
Chapters four and five are two field-based analyses of the way human security emerges as 
a situated political strategy within the Thai migrant health and the Vietnamese human 
trafficking assemblages. Chapter four traces the emergence of human security in the 
struggle to manage the circulation of pathogens relating to Burmese migrant communities 
in Thailand. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the intricate and productive interplay of a 
range of human and non-human elements that helped to bring forth and shape the 
vernacular micropolitics of human security. It documents the biopolitical mechanisms of 
the human security intervention in two of Thailand’s provinces. By enframing, ordering 
and depoliticizing the complex health world of Burmese migrants in terms of simple 
dichotomies in which ‘unruly’ nature (pathogens, diseases, bodies) is contrasted with 
human techno-scientific ingenuity (scientific evidence, technological innovations, 
managerial effectiveness), these mechanisms arrange the elements of the assemblage in 
such a way that renders the circulation of pathogens amenable to biopolitical governance. 
It is here argued that, on the one hand, the struggle to manage pathogenic circulation 
through human security transforms the issue of migrant health into a technical matter 
concerned with the (self-)management of bodies and the governmentalization of the Thai 
state to the exclusion of important but difficult questions concerning a violent politics of 
exclusion. On the other hand, the tensions, contradictions and practical difficulties in 
biopolitical encounters arising from the interplay inherent in the assemblage attest to the 
productive power of human-nonhuman alliances in the manufacture of political decisions 
and subjectivities. They remind us of the contingent and therefore precarious nature of 
human intentions and strategies encapsulated in initiatives like human security.  
Chapter five similarly analyses the emergence of human security as a situated political 
strategy for managing illicit circulation relating to the trafficking of women and children in 
and beyond Vietnam. Specifically, it focuses on the dynamic assemblage that helped to 
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bring forth and shape the vernacular micropolitics of human security in this site of 
practice. Much like in Thailand, this involved a multiplicity of forces including market, 
social, international, governing, viral and chemical forces which mutually interacted, 
helping to shape the emergence of the human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam. Here too, 
biopolitical mechanisms were developed to prevent the occurrence of human trafficking. 
The complex world of Vietnamese women and child migrants was enframed, ordered and 
depoliticized in terms of simple dichotomies in which the ‘unruly’ life of those earmarked 
as at risk of human trafficking is contrasted with human techno-scientific managerialism. 
In so doing, these mechanisms attempted to arrange the elements of the assemblage such 
that the illicit circulation of women and children were made amenable to biopolitical 
governance. Yet, in contrast to the Thai migrant health assemblage, not only was the 
intervention at first resisted by the Vietnamese state authorities and central elements to 
the rearrangement of the assemblage either escaped or were discarded from the 
assemblage, but the assemblage clashed and, consequently, hybridized with the situated 
precepts of ‘social evil’ which emerged in Vietnam prior to human trafficking.  
Drawing on the field-based analyses carried out in chapters four and five, chapter six 
concludes the thesis with a reflection on the political implications of human security for 
global politics. By constituting orders of governance comprising a set of political 
subjectivities, human security is reconstituting global order at the molecular level. 
Specifically, the chapter analyses the sets of biopolitical processes which aimed to render 
dangerous circulations manageable and the implications these have for the understanding 
of global order. These include processes of technicalization and depoliticization, ordering, 
enframing and mapping, authorizing knowledges, and training. By drawing out the 
differences between the biopolitical enframing of human security prepared at the outset 
and the processes and effects in the materialization of human security, the chapter notes 
how a focus on assemblages of power allows for an understanding of human security at 
the molecular level.  
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1 FOUCAULT AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
 
 
 
This chapter begins to examine the discourse of global governance as a governmentality 
whose processes constitute the specific global political order which comes to be governed 
in and through these same processes. It draws on and advances Foucault’s cursory 
comments on the ‘international’ as presented mainly in the lectures, Security, Territory, 
Population. Not unlike his lectures, Society Must Be Defended, where he showed the way 
the idea of the battle constituted both inter-state relations and domestic societies 
(Foucault, 2004), Foucault interrogated the way key political subjects and objects – human 
subjectivity, the early modern state and European inter-state order – mutually developed 
in and through processes associated with specific emerging governmentalities between 
the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. I review the relevant literature on International 
Relations and governmentality which has drawn inspiration from Foucault before 
discussing the way global governance can similarly be taken to constitute a governmental 
regime of truth (a set of subjects and objects, problems and solutions, facts, interests, 
forces and dynamics) that produces a reality of the contemporary global political order 
that advocates of global governance take to be the real and, crucially also, act upon. I take 
this further in chapter two by looking at the particularities of global governance specific to 
human security. Examining global governance (and human security) as a governmentality 
entails beginning by drawing out the unspoken, tacit presuppositions about governing the 
contemporary state of the world which pass through and constitute sites of practice in 
order to understand how it has been possible to shape the debate in certain and not other 
ways. What are the terms and conditions under which global governance is debated in 
academic and policy circles? Put differently, how is thinking about global governance 
framed?  
 
FOUCAULT ON INTER-STATE GOVERNMENTALITY 
 
Foucault himself dealt with issues pertaining to international political life – in contrast to 
claims to the contrary (see e.g. Chandler, 2009, Selby, 2007). Already in the lecture series 
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Society Must Be Defended which he gave in 1975-76, he engaged with modern political 
theory in his investigation of the discourse of war and demonstrated the precariousness 
and relative novelty of the inside/outside divide (Foucault, 2004). Here, he showed the 
way the notion of modern war encapsulated both political imaginaries of inter-state 
relations as well as racial lineages in the domestic. It is in this sense that Foucault argued 
that war is embedded in the everyday of modern life. In the lecture course Security, 
Territory, Population he gave in 1977, Foucault examined the way the regime of truth and 
exercise of power associated with the governmentality of reason of state constituted both 
the state and inter-state relations during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in 
Europe. In this context, Valverde has suggested that Foucault was beginning to reflect on 
“Genealogies of European States” (cf. Devetak, 2008, Valverde, 2006).  
Although Foucault seemed to have relied on only a few very select references, 
consequently cutting out from his analysis important nuances and historical developments 
in inter-state relations at the time, his notes on how key historico-political subjectivities – 
the sovereign state, the modern individual, and inter-state relations – were mutually 
constitutive in their development is instructive for analysing the relation between the 
global governance of human security and the constitution of contemporary political order 
carried out here. For Foucault, the phenomenon of the ‘governmentalization of the state,’ 
in which the nature, logic, means and ends of contemporary political rule are continually 
redefined, was tied in important ways to strategic reflections about inter-state relations 
including the existence of a plurality of states in competition and the development of the 
‘diplomatic-military techniques’ in Europe from the sixteenth century (cf. Leira, 2009). In 
relation to this, it can be said that critical scholars such as Richard Ashley and scholars 
drawing on Ashley such as David Campbell have taken Foucault beyond Foucault by 
advancing compelling narratives for the co-constitution of modern ‘Man’, the state and 
state system in the twentieth century through International Relations theory and foreign 
policy (Ashley, 1989, 2005, Campbell, 1998).  
Foucault developed his line of argumentation concerning the relation between the state 
and international relations in his explication of the emergence and transformation of 
reason of state, a governmentality, which comes to replace the dominance of the Church’s 
pastoral governmentality and economy of salvation (Foucault, 2007:231). For Foucault, 
the formation of reason of state begins during the sixteenth century when the concept of 
the state begins to enter into reflective practice. That is, when the state becomes an object 
of knowledge and analysis, when it becomes “part of a reflected and concerted strategy,” 
and begins to be “called for, desired, coveted, feared, rejected, loved, and hated” (Foucault, 
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2007:247). This is not to say that the institutions still associated with states today such as 
the army, taxation, and justice only began to emerge at this time. Quite the contrary, it is at 
this point that these already existing institutions began to be subsumed and identified in 
terms of states. For reason of state, the state is both its foundation and its aim, and it is the 
projected result of governmental interventions which aim to preserve the state. Unlike 
contemporary interpretations of reason of state which take Machiavelli’s manuscript The 
Prince as embodying the essence of this political rationality, Foucault argued that it was 
theorised through, and not by, Machiavelli. Machiavelli, according to Foucault, belonged to 
the period of princely rule before the emergence of government: “What Machiavelli sought 
to save, to safeguard, is not the state but the relationship of the Prince to that over which 
he exercises his domination,” that is, his principality (Foucault, 2007:243). 
Initially, the goal of state preservation embodied by reason of state was negotiated in 
terms of territorial expansion. With the introduction of the notion of ‘economy’ into 
governmental discourse, however, this gradually shifted to a preference for the 
development of the state’s forces (Foucault, 2007:349). The historical context within 
which this modification of reason of state took place, according to Foucault, is the end of 
the age of dynasties in Europe, the constitution of American colonies, the withdrawal of 
the Church, and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Crucially, the imperative to develop a 
state’s forces emerges in parallel with the realisation that a plurality of states exists in a 
space of competition. Again, this is not to say that struggles and wars between different 
ruling entities only emerged at this point, but that the state, now conceived of as one of 
many, could not be thought without reference to its competitive interplay with other 
states. In this sense, according to Foucault, “The state only exists as states, in the plural” 
(Foucault, 2008:5). As such, the prevalent notion of inter-state competition led to the 
imperative to develop a state’s forces but also to maintain a balance between forces, a 
political thought which, Foucault argued, led to the drafting of the treaties of Westphalia. 
In Foucault’s reading, the Peace of Westphalia sought the balance of power in Europe in 
terms of “the impossibility of the strongest state laying down the law to any other state” 
(Foucault, 2007:299).  
The objective of the balance of power in Europe is universal peace, notes Foucault, which 
is a way for different states to co-exist with each other without one state dominating 
others. In this sense, “Universal peace is the stability acquired in and through a balanced 
plurality” (Foucault, 2007:260). To both develop and maintain a balance between forces in 
Europe, Foucault noted the creation of two important governmental assemblages: on the 
one hand, a military-diplomatic assemblage, on the other hand, the police assemblage. The 
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military-diplomatic assemblage evolved to govern the balance of power in Europe and 
might be considered inchoate antecedents of contemporary foreign and international 
policy. If states exist alongside each other in a competitive relationship, Foucault argued, 
then “a system must be found that will limit the mobility, growth, and reinforcement of all 
the other states as much as possible” while still allowing each state to develop its own 
forces (Foucault, 2007:299). This system involved the creation of “practically permanent 
negotiations and a system of information concerning the state of forces in each country” 
that was supported by statistical knowledge (Foucault, 2007:275). It involved also 
considerations about defining juridical relations between “the states of Europe, coexisting 
in a new space, or society of nations” (Foucault, 2007:302-3). Finally, it called for setting 
up a permanent military apparatus and defining war as an instrument for preserving the 
balance of Europe.  
While the diplomatic-military assemblage concerned the external relations of states in 
terms of European equilibrium, the police assemblage was concerned with the set “of laws 
and regulations that concern the interior of a state and which endeavour to strengthen 
and increase the power of this state” (Foucault, 2007:322). Specifically, in order to 
enhance the state’s forces from within, police aimed to control for men’s co-existence with 
each other and the circulation of goods. Its aim was “the management of a whole social 
body” (Foucault, 2008:186) in ways which also determined the emergence of a specific 
state form, namely, the police state (cf. Foucault, 2002:341, Lemke, 2000:2-3). In other 
words, it fashioned specific subject-citizens in response to the tenets of reason of state.11 
Apart from the material network that allows the circulation of goods, police power was 
concerned with circulation itself, that is, “the set of regulations, constraints, and limits, or 
the facilities and encouragements that will allow the circulation of men and things” within 
and beyond the state (Foucault, 2007:325). It sought to discipline in the areas including 
religion, morals, health and subsistence, public peace, the care of infrastructure, the 
sciences and arts, commerce and manufacture, the care and discipline of the poor. As such, 
police concerned not just the ‘being’ but also the ‘well-being’ of its subject-citizens. 
Statistics became indispensable to police in order “to know the population, the army, the 
natural resources, the production, the commerce, and the monetary circulation” of one’s 
own state as well as that of other states (Foucault, 2007:315).  
                                                             
11 Devetak has suggested that it might yield interesting results if Foucault’s historical research into 
confinement, discipline, and governmentality were brought together with intellectual histories and 
state-building literatures to develop a more comprehensive account of the historical emergence of 
the early modern states-system’s distinctive political rationality and its relation to the production 
of subject-citizens p.271 Devetak, Richard. (2008) Foucault, Discipline and Raison D’etat in Early 
Modern Europe. International Political Sociology 2:270-72. 
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The important point to make here is that, in Foucault’s narrative, the two ‘great’ 
governmental assemblages, the one concerned with the governance of domestic society, 
the other concerned with the governance of inter-state relations, were mutually 
constitutive insofar as the military-diplomatic assemblage sought inter-state balance by 
ensuring that “each state has a good police that allows it to develop its own forces”. Put 
differently, the nature, logic, means and ends of state rule were transformed, partly 
through the development of a series of techniques and knowledges including statistics and 
political economy, in order to govern the space both inside a state’s territory, namely by 
seeing to it that subjects’ conduct is brought into line with broader objectives to do with 
inter-state relations, and ‘outside’ in inter-state relations. Put differently, the state was 
governmentalized in terms of reason of state. The political implication of this 
governmental reflection was what Foucault referred to as the ‘weak’ state thesis: the 
existence of a state with ‘bad’ police was seen as risking unbalancing Europe, therefore, 
giving the set of European states “the right to see to it that there is a good police in each 
state” (Foucault, 2007:314-5). Here, then, Foucault had developed an account of 
international relations in which imaginaries of the ‘outside’ such as inter-state competition 
and the ‘inside’ such as fostering the circulation in men and things associated with the 
governmentality reason of state mutually determined each other’s development. In this 
sense, the ‘outside’ or foreign is folded into the domestic and links the inside to the 
outside, thereby simultaneously constituting both the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (cf. Campbell, 
2005).  
It should be noted here that the historical accuracy of Foucault’s account has come under 
some serious criticism. From the outset, however, it should not be forgotten as well that 
both Security, Territory, Population and The Birth of Biopolitics are transcripts of lectures 
Foucault gave that he did not want to be published. In these lectures, he explored ideas 
and hunches. Some of these are excellent, some embryonic and in need of further 
development, some to be discarded altogether. In this context also, Foucault was a 
“somewhat fragmentary and experimental thinker, pragmatically crafting concepts to 
undertake particular analytical tasks but unafraid to dispense with them should they 
outlive their usefulness” (Haahr and Walters, 2005:289). As such, though the handling of 
the governmentality lecture notes does indeed require some critical distance, I maintain 
that Foucault’s important insight that governmentalities co-constitute key political 
subjectivities remains instructive. In terms of the criticism of Foucault’s account of reason 
of state and the relationship between the state and other states, this has revolved around 
his selective choice of literature which led him to omit important nuances and historical 
developments in inter-state relations.  
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Amongst other things, Foucault is charged with underestimating the continued 
importance of religion and overestimating the importance of the Peace of Westphalia as 
well as the extent to which reason of state actually dealt with external relations during the 
time on which he lectured (cf. Leira, 2009:486). Foucault would have us believe that God 
was taken out of governmental reflections around the time between 1580 and 1750 and 
that the state and state system were codified in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia. Yet, if 
we take seriously the historian Koselleck, then, the major conceptual shifts in Europe did 
not take place until the period between 1750 and 1850 when politics was de-theologised 
in order to establish a civil and secular government as supreme authority. Koselleck 
identifies Hobbes as the central figure in this decoupling of politics and religion (Devetak, 
2008:271, Koselleck, 1988). Moreover, in terms of the treaties of Westphalia, Teschke and 
others have developed compelling arguments for why 1648 must be understood as a 
historical myth (Teschke, 2003). 12  In this respect, as Bartelson has noted, the 
‘international system’ did not emerge as an object of knowledge until centuries after 
Westphalia (Bartelson, 1995:137-39). In terms of reason of state, Bartelson has also noted 
that it was first a governmentality that applied itself to the inside of states and not to 
governing external relations between states. In this context, ‘foreign policy,’ in the sense of 
regularised and planned interaction does not really arise until the nineteenth century 
(Leira, 2009:489n). Finally, I take seriously the postcolonial critique that the development 
of the modern European political order developed on the backbone of the exploitation of 
colonial societies. Foucault’s narrative fails to take into account this important relation of 
Europe at the time with the rest of the world.13  
Notwithstanding these criticisms, one of the more important points to emphasise here and 
carry forward from Foucault’s eclectic narrative about the development of the modern 
state and inter-state relations in Europe is the idea that the political subjectivities central 
to modern political rationalities (the identities of individuals, states, and their relation 
with thoughts about international/global order) are mutually constituted in and through 
the governmental assemblages which emerge from these rationalities. Put differently, 
political identities and their emergence and transformation as well as the material fabrics 
they comprise are not independent of the wider currents of historical thought which give 
rise to the assemblages in which they are embedded. Although the lectures in which 
                                                             
12 Teschke challenges the reification in International Relations of the Treaty of Westphalia as giving 
rise to the modern state system, instead demonstrating the way ‘international politics’ remained 
under dynastic rule and absolutist political entities which emerged from feudal property regimes 
long after Westphalia. 
13 For a more detailed critical account of the historical accuracy of Foucault’s narrative of reason of 
state, see for example  Leira, Halvard. (2009) Taking Foucault Beyond Foucault: Inter-State 
Governmentality in Early Modern Europe. Global Society 23. 
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Foucault began to tackle the workings of power as they relate specifically to the problem 
of inter-state relations were not made widely available until recently, namely in Security, 
Territory, Population (Foucault, 2007) and The Birth of Biopolitics (Foucault, 2008) as well 
as Society Must Be Defended (Foucault, 2004), nonetheless, his analysis of 
knowledge/power more generally and subsequently of governmental rationalities or 
governmentalities have provoked intriguing critiques which have taken Foucault beyond 
Foucault, examining both the core assumptions underlying contemporary International 
Relations and the historical lineages and (though less represented) empirical vicissitudes 
of contemporary international/global life. It is to some of these that I turn to next. 
 
THE ‘INTERNATIONAL’ AS GOVERNMENTAL ASSEMBLAGE 
 
Global relations are constituted in a myriad of complex governing processes including, but 
by no means exclusively: the formulation, negotiation, and implementation of treaties, 
policies, doctrines and academic theories. These processes continuously enact distinct 
governmental regimes of truths such as those which make up the governmentality of 
global governance more generally, and human security more specifically. In the practice of 
international relations, at the forefront of these processes have traditionally been those 
comprising the military-diplomatic assemblage (see also Miller and Rose, 1992:178). That 
is, processes developed in response to diplomatic and military issues operating under a 
state-centric objective of international order embodied, most prominently, according to 
Foucault (Foucault, 2007:299) and indeed to much of the International Relations 
literature, in the Peace of Westphalia. These processes have materialized, on the one hand, 
in the establishment of permanent embassies, in ongoing bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations in and through international institutions, and analyses concerning the state of 
a world comprising a plurality of discreet and self-contained nation-states. On the other 
hand, in the professionalization of soldiers, the building of permanent national and 
international armed structures, and ongoing reflection on military matters and bygone or 
possible wars between, and more recently within, states. Within this assemblage, the 
(nation-) state has come to codify and delineate the possibilities and limits of political 
order in international relations. Put differently, in much of international relations, the 
state embodies the solution central to resolving the problem of political order in the face 
of an imagined external, disorderly (anarchic) realm.  
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Much like Foucault who was interested first in understanding the conditions which made 
possible particular governmental assemblages, a number of critical scholars drawing 
inspiration from Foucault and others (e.g. Derrida, Heidegger) have also interrogated the 
core assumptions underlying theories and practices of International Relations. Put 
differently, they have sought to denaturalize and historicize knowledge of the 
‘international’ including sovereignty, security, citizenship, and diplomacy, examining the 
way such elements are produced in and through practices associated with specific regimes 
of truth or governmentalities. From this perspective, the state and its attributes such as 
sovereignty appear not as having a transcendental functionality or essential necessity in 
the world. Rather, they are complex and mobile effects produced of the same particular, 
context-bound and spatiotemporal (governing) processes which constitute international 
or global relations more generally. Again, as in Foucault’s narrative retold above, this is 
not to say that these effects do not constitute very specific material fabrics comprising 
institutions, infrastructures, technologies, and paper trails in and through which they 
necessarily take effect. It can be argued however, much like the way that the institutions of 
dynastic rule later became subsumed in and identified with the state under the logic of 
reason of state, shifts in political reason bring about mutations in the political identities to 
which we relate specific material fabrics.   
In terms of relevant critical scholarship in International Relations, one of the first and 
most compelling critiques of the ‘International’ put forward comes in the work of Richard 
K. Ashley. Writing at the end of the 1980s, Ashley argued that realist texts of International 
Relations do not mirror a given reality of discreet states co-existing in an anarchical space 
but are enacting a specific modern regime of truth concerning international politics which 
they take to be real (Ashley, 1989). At the core of this regime, he claimed, is the taken-for-
granted truth/knowledge that sovereign territorial states are the containers of political 
community (cf. O'Tuathail, 1996:135-6, Walker, 1993). Specifically, Ashley was concerned 
with the practices which inscribe, what he has termed, a ‘paradigm of sovereignty’ in 
global politics. Foremost, Ashley argues, this regime is a “historically fabricated, widely 
circulated, practically effective interpretation of man as sovereign being” (Ashley, 
1989:269). Put differently, the ability of ‘man’ to reason and rationalize – in other words, a 
‘subject that knows’ – forms the point of departure for relating to contemporary modern 
reality.  
According to Foucault, ‘man’ first appeared as a “subject that knows” in the late eighteenth 
century, complementing the long preceding figure of man as an object of knowledge 
(2002:340). In Foucault’s narrative, the appearance of ‘man’ as a ‘subject who knows’ was 
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the time when political discourse began to shift from the dynastic discourse of princely 
rule to the modern discourse of government, of how best to govern oneself, the family, the 
state and so on (Foucault, 2007:76). It was the time when concepts like ‘population’ and 
‘civil society’ began to emerge in response to wider problems of government. As such, the 
modern or ‘reasoning’ subject and problematics of government, for example of how best to 
govern a population within a delineated territory, emerge in the same historic-political 
field. As such, it should be noted here, as Campbell (Campbell, 1998:63) has sought to 
clarify, ‘man’ refers not just to individuals but incorporates  
the form of the ‘domestic’ order, the social relations of production, the various 
subjectivities to which they give rise, the groups (such as women) who are 
marginalized in the process, and the boundaries of legitimate social and political 
action.  
In this sense, as Ashley has argued, the modern subject cannot be understood without 
reference to the modern state which is the second defining feature of the ‘paradigm of 
sovereignty’. As Foucault alluded in his governmentality lectures, the modern subject and 
the modern state are mutually constitutive. For Ashley this translates to modern 
discourses taking ‘reasoning man’ as “the source of truth and meaning” and the state as 
“the site and resources [reserved] for the exercise of force and violence wherever history 
refuses to bow to man’s reason” (Ashley, 1989:268). In this view, domestic society is the 
space in which modern identity is embedded which stands in direct opposition to anarchy, 
that space of “historical contingency and chance that refuses to submit to reason” (Ashley, 
1989:268). More specifically, Ashley has suggested that practices and theories of 
international relations are practices of statecraft which ‘craft the state into being’ by 
inscribing problems and dangers external to the state, thereby enframing the ‘domestic 
population’ in which the state comes to be seen as the legitimate centre of authority and 
ultimate purveyor of security (Ashley, 1989:306).  
In these practices of statecraft, as Miller and Rose have also noted, the limits and 
coherence of the domains of political authority are established, the geographical and 
conceptual spaces of political rule delineated, and the authorities that are deemed able to 
speak for a population constituted (Miller and Rose, 1992:178). These variables are then 
placed in particular ‘external’ configurations with other states such as anarchy and the 
balance of power doctrine or anarchical society and the theory of shared rules and 
institutions among states. Such doctrines and theories constitute foreign policy and 
associated paraphernalia (including diplomatic etiquette, conventions, treaties, and 
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practices of warfare) in which is simultaneously claimed authority over the subjects and 
activities composing a state. In this respect, Hobbes’ Leviathan, as an early modern 
governmental treatise concerned with employing a discourse of danger embodied in the 
hypothetical ‘state of nature’ in order to constitute a political order based on reason and 
rationalism as I discuss in more detail in chapter two in relation to the invocation of the 
Hobbesian state in the global governance of human security, can be read too as an 
inscription of the ‘paradigm of sovereignty’.  
Crucially, sovereign man is centred in the state only through modern narratives of danger. 
Drawing on Derrida, Ashley argues that the discourses of danger in International Relations 
are produced through the logocentric procedures of oppositional structuring and 
hierarchizing. The ‘paradigm of sovereignty’ operates based on a simple dichotomy of 
sovereignty/anarchy. Sovereignty is opposed to anarchy, whereby the differentiation and 
exclusion of the latter helps to define the boundaries or identity of the former. These two 
opposing concepts form the basis for mutually reinforcing dichotomies such as self/’other-
as-enemy,’ rational/irrational, order/disorder, security/insecurity, inside/outside, and so 
on. The hierarchization of the opposing concepts functions to define the superior concept 
by differentiating and excluding the inferior concept. This procedure, in which sovereignty 
is “a center of decision presiding over a self that is to be valued and demarcated from an 
external domain that cannot or will not be assimilated to the identity of the sovereign 
domain,” typifies the knowledge practices of the ‘paradigm of sovereignty’ (Campbell, 
1998:65). In Campbell’s reading of Ashley, they reproduce the “sovereign presence of 
reasoning man” centred in the state through narratives of the dangerous ‘other’ (Campbell, 
1998:66).  
Indeed, the dichotomy of inside versus outside is perhaps one of the most salient divisions 
characterizing International Relations (see e.g. Walker, 1993). It is the product of a 
Cartesian knowledge practice of spatialization which arbitrarily draws “an absolute 
boundary between ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’ where the former is privileged” (Ashley, 
1989:290). The ‘inside’ functions as the space of identity, “the privileged space of the Self”. 
It is opposed by an ‘outside,’ an externalised space of difference beyond the boundaries of 
the Self which escapes rational control (Ashley, 1989:290). The boundaries of the inside 
are produced through its differentiation from the outside. In terms of International 
Relations, ‘man’ at the centre of the ‘state’ is the ‘inside’ in opposition to the ‘outside’ that 
is the ‘international,’ a space usually taken to be anarchical. Thus, ‘man,’ the ‘state,’ and the 
‘international’ are mutually constitutive. As Campbell has suggested in his reading of 
Ashley: “No one authors the other” (Campbell, 1998:60). In this perspective, foreign policy 
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appears less as solving problems and dangers threatening an a priori population but, by 
externalizing problems and dangers, as enframing the domestic population in which “the 
state can be recognized as a center and can secure its claim to legitimacy” (Ashley, 
1989:302) . Thus, foreign policy is a practice of statecraft that constructs the ‘state’ as well 
as the individual and the ‘international’.  
Following Ashley’s argument, interpretations of international relations are framed by the 
knowledge practices of the ‘paradigm of sovereignty’ which takes the modern state as the 
principal locale of political order and hub of security. Put differently, the ‘paradigm of 
sovereignty’ disciplines politicians, academics, civil servants, citizens and denizens, to 
think of political life and the possibilities it entails in distinctly state-centric terms, 
occluding other ways of political being. These practices which, following Dillon, operate on 
what could alternatively be termed the ‘logic of security’, circulate across dispersed sites, 
fixing the limits of what are socially acceptable behaviour, knowledge and research, and 
political practice in global politics. For security is, as Dillon has argued, always 
logocentrically opposed by insecurity: “a package which tells you what you are as it tells 
you what to die for; which tells you what to love as it tells you what to defend” (Dillon, 
1996:33). By knowing what to fear and desiring to control danger, modern ‘man’ at the 
centre of the modern state is constituted through the representations of danger and 
insecurity. Only by reference to this logic of security can it be determined what “states, 
domestic societies, their boundaries, and their historical problems and dangers are” 
(Ashley, 1989:270). Put differently, the paradigm provides “the conditions of possibility 
for reason, the unproblematic, taken-for-granted departure for political practice” in global 
politics (O'Tuathail, 1996:135-6). 
In this sense, the ‘international’ can be interpreted as a governmental assemblage insofar 
as it conducts the (political) conduct of people through a particular regime of truth. For 
example, drawing on three case studies, Weber has shown how the core of just such a 
regime, namely state sovereignty, is enacted in processes of legitimating intervention 
(such as during the Concert of Europe’s interventions in Spain and Naples in the 1820s, 
Wilson’s interventionism in Mexico and Russia in the 1910s, and the Reagan-Bush 
intervention’s in Grenada and Panama in the 1980s) (Weber, 1995). Taking this further by 
drawing on Judith Butler’s notion of performativity, Weber has similarly argued how the 
state, if understood as the effect of ‘complex citational processes’, appears as “a subject in 
process” that is enacted performatively in practices and theories of international relations 
(Weber, 1998:78). Writing also on practices of foreign policy, Campbell has shown in 
relation to this, for example through a discussion of the international war on drugs, the 
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way in which such practices constitute the very identity of one state and its people, 
namely, of the United States (Campbell, 1998, see also in relation to Canada, Grayson, 
2008). Similarly, Doty has shown the way contemporary foreign aid and human rights 
practices enmeshed in North-South relations are steeped in colonial history and constitute 
national identities today (Doty, 1996). In this way too, however, it can be said that the 
state and all that it has come to be associated with including sovereignty and citizenship 
are subject to continual transformation. As Foucault’s discussion concerning the 
emergence of the modern state narrated above suggests, changes in the dynamic of 
governing processes relating to mutations in governmentalities also change the 
cumulative effects they produce.  
Thus, the state effect (along with the subjectivities and imaginaries of international or 
global order) is contingent on the intricacies of perpetually evolving governing processes. 
Writing in the mid 1990s, Dillon reflected on the post-Cold War problematic of ‘new world 
order’, suggesting it is reposing basic questions of political order. He argued that the 
transformation of the political landscape at the time involved “a discursive and epistemic 
change of enormous proportions’ which served to transform the character of political 
subjectivity at the national, regional, and global levels (Dillon, 1995:346). He concluded 
with the reminder that state sovereignty is a peculiar fiction and that all (political) 
identities are always mutable. In terms of contemporary transformations of political order, 
for example, Larner and Williams have suggested analysing the discourse of ‘globalization’ 
as a governmentality which involves both de-territorializations and re-territorializations. 
Drawing on Rose, they advocate a fluid conception of territory in which territorialization 
involves more generally delineating a ‘territory in thought’ and inscribing it in the real 
(Larner and Walters, 2004:498, cf. Rose, 1999:34). For them, geographical territory is but 
one form of territory. In this context, Dean reminds that globalization is but the recent way 
in which the world has come to be encoded, divided, appropriated and populated (Dean, 
2004). It is in a similar sense that I propose to trace the mutations in political order 
relating to the global governance of human security in the assemblages it comprises. 
In fact, over the last fifteen years, there has been a growing body of studies drawing 
particularly on Foucault’s analytics of government to analyse the constitution and 
governance of spaces beyond the nation-state in fields as diverse as colonialism, inter- and 
intra-state conflict, security, global commerce, environment, humanitarian disasters, 
regionalization, development, geopolitics, globalization, and world order. Studies of 
colonial governmentalities (e.g. Mitchell, 2002, Rabinow, 1989, Said, 1978, Scott, 2005, 
Scott, 1999), development and human security (e.g. Agrawal, 2005, Duffield, 2007, 
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Escobar, 1995, Li, 2007), for example, have shown the way particular historical 
assemblages of power/knowledge involving mechanisms of counting and forms of 
expertise not only (re)constitute the colony and spaces of development but also the West. 
The field of critical geopolitics has offered various accounts of the ways in which 
geopolitical thought has divided, encoded and (re)territorialized the world (e.g. Agnew 
and Corbridge, 1995, O'Tuathail, 1996, O'Tuathail and Dalby, 1998). Studies of the 
European Union (EU) have shown the way domestic and international fields relating to 
issues such as security, migration, and technology have become blurred (e.g. Barry, 1996, 
Barry and Walters, 2003, Bigo, 2000). Given the diversity and in an effort to concentrate 
efforts, Larner and Williams have suggested the umbrella concept of global 
governmentality in order “to problematize the constitution, and governance of spaces 
above, beyond, between and across states” (2004:2). On the other hand, Ong, Collier, and 
their anthropology colleagues have concentrated on the study of global assemblages in 
order to examine how new spatial articulations of science, bureaucracy and technocracy, 
capitalism and governmentality constitute globalization (Ong and Collier, 2005). 
 
ASSEMBLING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
  
Several scholars have begun to analyse (global) governance in terms of governmentality 
(see e.g. Dillon and Reid, 2000, Dillon and Reid, 2001, Duffield, 2001, Lemke, 2007, Rose, 
1999, Walters, 2004). They have examined the emergence of the concept of governance 
and its political imaginary and have drawn attention to some of the governmental 
assemblages that are re-territorializing (in the sense of Rose), i.e. re-thinking and thus 
remaking, political authority in contemporary global politics. From a governmentality 
perspective, global governance does not describe an objectively given reality that is 
independent of its analytical categories and explanations. Rather, it appears as a particular 
way of thinking which constitutes the reality that it is concerned with governing. 
Specifically, global governance makes the reality of a supposedly emerging global political 
order thinkable and governable. As this chapter shows, it tames the intransigence of 
reality, breaking it down and subjecting it to the disciplined analysis of thought, and 
clarifies the problematizations of government arising from this reality. In the following, I 
want to first draw out the intellectual and epistemological systems underpinning global 
governance and human security. How is the contemporary problem of the political 
50 
 
discursively codified through global governance? What kind of orders of governance 
(constellations of subjects and objects of governance) does it give rise to?   
The discourse of global governance is argued to have arisen from an analytical and 
theoretical shift from government to governance in political science in the 1980s (see e.g. 
Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). In this understanding, government refers to a fixed centre 
of power like the state which governs in a top-down fashion. Governance, on the other 
hand, refers to the act of governing per se which is much broader in scope. According to 
Rose, it is a catch-all term used to refer to “any strategy, tactic, process, procedure or 
programme for controlling, regulating, shaping, mastering or exercising authority over 
others in a nation, organization or locality” (Rose, 1999:15). Indeed, the shift from 
government to governance can be considered an expression of a “mutation within political 
reason” (Walters, 2004:28) in which also a fundamentally different political order than 
‘the international’ is seen emerging. This supposed political order prompts the set up of 
distinct assemblages of governance principally concerned with problems considered 
‘global’, such as those framed in terms of human insecurity in which key political 
subjectivities (e.g. the individual, the state, and the global) are mutually (re)constituted. In 
this section of the thesis, I want to highlight some of the unspoken and tacit things which 
are generally taken-for-granted in the (knowledge) processes associated with global 
governance and consequently resonate too in the discourse and practice of (the global 
governance of) human security. Here too, it is worth bringing up some of the notes on 
governance already put forward by critical scholars, elements of which, I would argue, 
apply to human security too. Particularly, I am thinking about the critique of the 
metanarrative of ‘complexity’ and the nature of the political associated with the regime of 
truth circumscribing (global) governance. 14 
                                                             
14 Let me point out that there are similarities between the regimes of governance and 
governmentality. This said, there are also important ontological differences worth mentioning here. 
Indeed, the discourses of governance and governmentality share an appreciation for how political 
power is exercised. Secondly, both are interested in what Rose and Miller have referred to as 
‘political power beyond the state’ (cf. Miller and Rose, 1992, Peters, 2000). Specifically, they are 
interested in how governance takes place both ‘above’ or ‘outside’ the state, for example, in regional 
unions such as the EU or ASEAN or global networks and institutions such as the United Nations, and 
‘inside’ or besides the state, for example, in schools, hospitals, community associations, the market 
(cf. Lemke, 2007, Rose, 1999:15-17, Stoker, 1998). In this way too, they challenge the traditional 
geographical assumptions and markers of certainty such as the inside/outside divide underlying 
the practice and discipline of International Relations. Thirdly, they share a broadly relational 
understanding of power insofar as power is understood as resulting from interactions and 
associations in mobile and flexible composite systems, i.e. in networks or complexes and 
assemblages (cf. Ong and Collier, 2005, Rosenau, 1999).  
On the other hand, governance and governmentality studies differ strongly in how they conceive of 
objects of governance (Jessop, 1999:6, Lemke, 2007) as well as the contemporary problem of the 
political (see e.g. Barry, 2001, Mitchell, 2002, Walters, 2004:33-37). For governance, the 
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Let me also note though that global governance comprises a growing and diverse body of 
literature and debates concerned with its definition, composition and practice, necessity 
and political implication. In fact, following Whitman (Whitman, 2005), global governance 
has come to refer to, firstly, the activity of ‘an extended and empowered actor realm’ such 
as the notion of global civil society where civil society groups mobilize in opposition to 
national and international agendas, for example, seeking to redress institutionalized 
norms and governing practices (e.g. Kaldor, 2003). Secondly, it has been used to describe 
‘strengthened multilateralism’ in which various multilateral organizations, institutions 
and other kinds of inter-state alliances collaborate to tackle specific issue areas. Issues 
include financial regulation, standardization of processes, environmental redress, and so 
on. Thirdly, it has been used to describe ‘high-level sectoral governance’ in which actors 
and (governmental and non-governmental) institutions at various levels come together to 
tackle designated sectors rendered problematic, such as the global governance of the 
environment or human (in)security. Finally, it has also been used to describe a ‘summative 
phenomenon’ in which the totality of all forms of governing in the world is seen as 
adequate, “no matter how patchy and contested that sum is,” to secure no less than global 
life itself (Whitman, 2005:40).  
The Commission on Global Governance (CGG), for example, defines (global) governance as 
a summative phenomenon when it declares (CGG, 1995:2) that it is 
the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage 
their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or 
diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action taken. It includes 
formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as 
informal arrangements that people and institutions either have agreed to or 
perceive to be in their interest. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
environment, human insecurities, refugees, the state, the global economy, the globe and so on exist 
prior their coordination in and through the governing processes (Jessop, 1999:6). For 
governmentality, however, these objects (and the agents, identities, and interests involved) are not 
given or fixed but are constituted in and through the way governance is exercised. It is in this way 
too that the state and sovereignty in global governance can alternatively be understood not as 
declining and eroding but as undergoing reconstitution (see e.g. Arts et al., 2009, Cerny, 2010) as 
this thesis goes on to show in relation to human security. Secondly, and relating to this, there are 
important differences in how they understand the contemporary problem of the political. There is a 
drive for inclusion, participation and collective problem-solving in the (global) governance 
discourse (e.g. CGG, 1995, Pierre, 2000, Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance, 
1991) which, however, ends up displacing political conflicts, thereby marginalizing subaltern voices 
and excluding important alternative politics. Similarly, there is an inclination to think of, and thus 
foreclose, the political by rendering it technical, thereby also ironing out political contention, 
dissent, and alternatives. This has been referred to as the ‘anti-politics’ of governance. This 
certainly was the case in the human security projects examined here as I demonstrate in chapters 
four and five.  
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Much like the CGG, for James Rosenau, one of the earliest and most prolific theorists of 
global governance, governance is the result of “a lot of governmental and 
nongovernmental activities that occur in local places [… and that] contribute to the overall 
order of world affairs” (Rosenau, 1994). In the view of both the CGG and Rosenau, 
governance comes in multiple forms including in a market, a civil society (e.g. a 
neighbourhood co-operative), a legislative chamber, a crowded town square, a regional 
intergovernmental initiative, multinational corporations, the global capital market, a 
battlefield. Considering the diversity of shapes of governance unfolding in the world, 
Rosenau has argued that global governance cannot be understood as “a single frontier” but 
is “a host of diverse frontiers” in which “time becomes disjointed, nonlinear patterns 
predominate, organizations bifurcate, societies implode, regions unify, markets overlap” 
(Rosenau, 1997:6-7). As such, global governance refers not to a central authority, that is, a 
world government (see e.g. CGG, 1995:xvi, Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). It is not 
government of the world but refers to the many frontiers which regulate, order, and 
manage in the world including, as I go on to show, the ‘defence’ of “the new frontiers of 
human security” (UNDP, 1994:81). 
Rosenau’s work and the Commission’s report are oft quoted and have been influential in 
setting the intellectual trajectory of the discourse of global governance more generally. 
The CGG was an independent group of 28 world leaders which came together in 1995 to 
develop a way to manage ‘global problems’ (CGG, 1995:xvii) including the problem of 
securing people over states, in other words, human security (CGG, 1995:81-82). Its report 
played a part in the conceptualization of the reform of the United Nations at the centre of 
global governance from which thereafter also emerged the Commission on Human 
Security and the Human Security Unit. In order to highlight the intersections between the 
CGG and Rosenau, it is worth mentioning that the latter wrote three ‘expert papers’ for the 
CGG including ‘Changing Capacities of Citizens 1945-95,’ ‘Changing States in a Changing 
World,’ and ‘Proliferating Organizations in a Changing World’ to which I turn later in this 
chapter (CGG, 1995). Crucially, in describing the alleged evolution of human beings into 
more developed members of the world, capable of governing themselves without 
governments, thereby giving rise to global governance in the first place, Rosenau played a 
part in not only constituting the ‘global subjects’ but also the state form and principles of 
order distinct to the assemblages set up vis-a-vis global governance (CGG, 1995:2, see also, 
Rosenau, 1990:211).  
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THE COMPLEXITY OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
 
It is not a secret that global governance mechanisms such as Rosenau and the CGG 
describe proceed according to a ‘metanarrative’ or governmental logic of ‘complexity’ 
comprising presuppositions and assumptions drawn from the complexity sciences and 
adapted to international politics which frame and limit the possibilities of thinking about 
and acting upon the contemporary world (cf. Dillon, 2000, Jessop, 1999, Rosenau, 2000, 
Walters, 2004:40-41, Whitman, 2005). It constitutes a regime of truth which passes 
through and constitutes sites of practice including those associated with management, 
digitalized information and communication technologies as well as global governance such 
as human security. Complexity theory itself emerged at the end of the Cold War from, most 
notably, cybernetics, the study of how systems organize, regulate, evolve, and adapt 
themselves as a result of the interactions between their constituent parts (see e.g. Dillon, 
2000:9, Whitman, 2005:48). In principal, complexity theory constitutes a ‘revolutionary’ 
move from reductionist and simplified accounts, according to Coveney and Highfield 
(Coveney and Highfield, 1996:7, see also Thrift, 1999:33), to  
the study of the behaviour of macroscopic collections of [interacting] units that 
are endowed with the potential to evolve in time. Their interactions lead to 
coherent collective phenomena, so-called emergent properties, that can be 
classified only at higher levels than those of individual units. 
In this way, processes are given primacy over events, the mode of relating in collectivities  
or systems over discreet and self-contained entities, and evolution or development over 
structure (Ingold, 1990:209).  
Essentially, complexity thinkers differentiate themselves from the traditional Newtonian 
logic which they argue proceeds on the assumption that bodies are out there, 
“independent of the experimental devices by which they were observed, and recorded as 
existing”. For complexity thinkers, bodies are contingent systems constituted in the mode 
in which their elementary parts interact (Dillon, 2000:8). The emphasis on modes of 
relating in systems leads complexity thinkers to conceive of order not in terms of a fixed 
structure or a predetermined, linear and divine design but of a dynamic, complex and 
transitional process. Specifically, while Newtonian thinking is machinic in that it assumes 
the world is predictable, reducible to cause and effect, and thus governable like a well-
oiled machine, complexity thinking maintains that order in complex systems emerges 
from the messy and unpredictable self-organizing dynamics of the interacting units that 
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they comprise. In this way, systems are characterized by, amongst others, openness, self-
organization, adaptability, a dissipative structure, bifurcation, feedback loops, 
autocatalysis (Dillon, 2000:4).  
Crucially, systems are open because they are not isolated from their environments 
(Whitman, 2005:50). Put differently, they are interdependent: “Open systems depend on 
and contribute to their surround and are thus involved in interdependence with it as well 
as being dependent on the interaction of internal relationships. This interdependence 
imposes constraints on all their constituents” (Vickers, 1983:17, as quoted in Whitman, 
2005:51). According to Vickers, while the constraining effects on systems can be 
mitigated, it is not possible to remove the constraints of interdependence since they “tend 
to become more demanding and sometimes even more contradictory as the scale of 
organization rises”. Vickers concludes that the possibility of managing interdependence is 
limited and unpredictable (Vickers, 1983:17, as quoted in Whitman, 2005:51). Although 
the adaptation of complexity in (global) governance/human security leads advocates to 
constitute a world in which state authorities interact in ‘self-regularizing’ networked 
configurations with public/private, private, and other units in processes of networking, 
piloting, steering, (global) governance/human security thinking diverges from complexity 
thinkers in that it still clings to the possibility of managing complex interdependence. As I 
demonstrate in the ensuing chapters, there remains a residual belief in human techno-
scientific ingenuity (scientific evidence, technological innovations, managerial 
effectiveness), the ability to determine/predict the trajectories and calculate the 
probabilities of interdependence and complexity. 
The direct influence of complexity theory on global governance, as Whitman has noted, is 
limited though by no means negligible (Whitman, 2005:54). At least six interrelated 
arguments have been put forward in relation to the adaption of ‘complexity’ themes to 
political science and International Relations (see e.g. Held and McGrew, 2002:1-24, 
Keohane, 2002, Rosenau, 1999). In fact, they do not describe an objectively observable 
reality but are the taken–for-granted assumptions which constitute the regime of global 
governance (the set of political subjects including the individual, the state, and global 
order) as they are passed through sites in which this reality is enacted. Firstly, as already 
mentioned, (global) governance involves a reorientation from institutions to processes in 
the practice and analyses of global politics. Secondly, political order is understood not as 
given by a static structure of states, i.e. the ‘international’, but as emerging from a 
heterarchical landscape of ‘self-regularizing networks (or frontiers) of governance. 
Thirdly, a narrative of the state is reiterated in which state authority is argued to be 
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declining and state sovereignty eroding vis-à-vis the alleged emerging heterarchical 
political order. Fourthly, and relating to this, it involves a shift in thinking about power 
from something owned by one centre to something that is produced in relation and shared 
among many players and networks. Fifthly, all this is embedded in an account of social 
transformation in which the world is seen as experiencing rapid development and 
increasing change, complexity, and interdependence, thereby making governance 
imperative. Finally, self-governance is understood as an attribute of resilient systems that 
must first be engineered, for example through training and learning.  
The move away from the focus on institutions of government (which is taken to be 
synonymous with the state) to a focus on the processes or mechanics of governing in the 
practice and analysis of contemporary political rule is said to provide a “healthy antidote” 
to much of political science in that proponents are interested in “what governments 
actually do” (Peters, 2000:37, Walters, 2004:31). Unlike calls to ‘bring back the state’ into 
political studies (cf. Skocpol et al., 1985), advocates of governance are “sceptical about the 
conceptual centrality and validity of the state” (Walters, 2004:27-8). Instead, they are 
interested in the strategies, processes, procedures and programmes for controlling, 
regulating or managing problems at the local, national, and global levels that are 
developed and exercised in, through, and beyond the traditional markers and institutions 
of authority (Lemke, 2007, Rose, 1999:15). As Gerry Stoker has argued, “The essence of 
governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on the recourse to the 
authority and sanctions of government” (Stoker, 1998:17). It is in this sense that, as James 
Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel have noted, global governance refers not to a world 
government but to ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992).  
In comparison and in differentiation with government, governance is cast as new. 
Accordingly, ‘old’ government refers to a time when society was governed in a top-down 
manner from fixed centres of power like the state while ‘new’ governance describes a time 
when political concerns such as security, economy, and welfare are increasingly 
negotiated in processes of networking, interacting, piloting and steering in “networked 
configurations” with a range of governmental and non-governmental organizations 
(Walters, 2004:29). In this narrative, a version of which is also recapitulated in the human 
security discourse I discuss in chapter two, the state is problematized as inadequate to 
govern. State authorities are seen as increasingly having to negotiate their competencies 
(steering, controlling, regulating, managing) with other emerging centres of power.  This 
debate has pushed to the limit though not abandoned traditional taken-for-granted 
categories and mechanisms of ordering which have functioned as markers of certainty, 
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grounding and disciplining the theory and practice of international relations. Here I am 
thinking particularly of the geographical spatialization of power in terms of bounded 
territorial and sovereign states conducting world politics (e.g. Featherstone and Lash, 
1995, Featherstone and Venn, 2006, Held and McGrew, 2002, Scholte, 2000:54).  
From the governance perspective, contemporary political order emerges not from states 
but from a heterarchical landscape of ‘self-regularizing’ networks of both government and 
non-governmental agencies involving “multiple ranking associated with differentially 
divided capabilities or authority” (Donnelly, 2009:64, see also Held and McGrew, 2002). 
For example, observing an increase in what they call complex transnational connections 
and mutual dependencies between states, corporations, and organizations peculiar to an 
increasingly interconnected  and complex world, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have 
argued that traditional geopolitical concerns such as military force and state-centric 
power balancing factors are now but one set of many ‘new’ dynamics including economic, 
social, and ecological, sets of problems of ‘international governance’. According to 
Keohane, “We have overemphasized states and we have over-aggregated power” 
(2002:276). In their analysis of power and ‘complex interdependence’, state sovereignty is 
partially compromised as power derives from the asymmetrical struggle between 
sovereign states, corporations, organizations, regimes over who has the authority to 
dictate and enforce rules to control common problems (Keohane, 1984, Keohane and Nye, 
2000). Stephen Krasner has referred to the ability to control transborder flows as 
interdependence sovereignty (1999:10).15  
Heralding the demise of the state as the supreme centre of power in international relations 
seemed particularly the intellectual fashion across the social sciences in the 1990s (Clark, 
1999, Weiss, 1998:2). The gist of this argument concerned the state’s reduced ability to 
monitor and control a wide range of global flows and activities that impinge on its 
territory. Observing for example, the changing nature of competition between states – 
from competition for control over territory to competition over market shares in the 
world economy – Susan Strange argued that the state is coming to share authority in 
matters of economy and society with a variety of institutions. These include transnational 
companies including banks, accounting and law firms, international institutions including 
the International Monetary fund (IMF) and Inmarsat, and nongovernmental organizations 
including Amnesty International and the Olympic sports organization and transnational 
                                                             
15 Interdependence sovereignty, according to Krasner, refers to “the ability of public authorities to 
regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of 
their state”. Krasner, Stephen (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. p. 10 
57 
 
professional associations of doctors, economists, and scientists. In Strange’s view, the state 
is becoming defective and retreating since “state authority has leaked away, upwards, 
sideways, and downwards. In some matters, it seems even to have gone nowhere, just 
evaporated”  (1995:56, see also, 1996). A proponent of the de-centralization of power, 
Ohmae similarly proclaimed the nation-state to be declining, overrun by flows of 
communication, corporations, customers, capital, and currencies (1996).  
On the other hand, rejecting the popular belief that globalizing (economic or social) forces 
have eclipsed the nation-state and are creating “a global economy and society in which 
political boundaries and national loyalties are no longer relevant,” realist Robert Gilpin 
argued that states continue “to use their power” (read authority) to channel economic 
forces in ways favourable to the national interest. In this account, although globalizing 
forces are profoundly transforming international relations, for the time being, the 
institution of sovereign states remains of vital importance to world affairs. Gilpin wants to 
remind that statist institutions are the only global entities with entrenched capacities to 
employ military force, of coinage, taxation, and “safeguarding national and individual 
security” (Gilpin, 2002:239-40). Similarly, in spite of their observation that power is 
partially migrating from the state to other centres of power such as transnational regimes, 
Keohane and Nye in fact retain key realist insights such as the continued supreme role of 
the state and the national interest in governing contemporary world affairs. As Keohane 
noted, the state remains an important force to uphold political order in a complexly 
interdependent world (2002:326). In this account, power is seen crystallizing in or 
transmitting between institutions which gain or lose power relative to the amount of 
power of other institutions. 
The emergence of ‘complex multilateralism’ in which states, international institutions, 
transnational networks and agencies come together to govern common global issues such 
as global warming, world trade, and human security led the then UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan to define the role for the UN, following the CGG, at the centre of ‘global 
governance’ (UN Secretary-General, 2000). Although states are deemed increasingly 
important as ‘strategic sites’ for holding together the ‘complex infrastructure’ of global 
governance, the notion of global governance rejects the state-centrism of the geographical 
spatialization of power (Held and McGrew, 2002:9). It is in this sense that a number of 
scholars have debated global governance, if controversially, in terms of a dramatic shift 
away from “the international” encapsulated in traditional geopolitics and sovereign states 
to a multilayered, pluralistic, and structurally complex system of global governance (see 
e.g. Cox, 1997, Held and McGrew, 2002, Keohane and Nye, 2000, Rosenau, 1999).  
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However, the trend to herald the demise of states rests on the assumption that there was 
indeed a time when states were the principal bearers of power and the main agents of 
(international) governance. Following Walters, such contention rests on an exaggerated 
understanding of the power of the state which leads to an overemphasis of the novelty and 
necessity of (global) governance. (Global) governance seems to assume that the state, in 
Walters words, was “one giant bureaucracy where authority simply flowed from the 
centre to the margins” when, according to recent governmentality studies of the state for 
example, “it too governed by assembling networks of actors, networks which cut across 
the nominal boundaries of state/society and public/private” (Barry et al., 1996, Burchell et 
al., 1991, Miller and Rose, 1995, Walters, 2004:38-9). 
With the assumed erosion of the state in global governance, power has come to be defined 
in terms of degrees of authority relating to the extent that authority has been established 
and the amount of authority flowing in and between states or other spheres of authority 
(SoA) (Rosenau, 2000:188, 2002:8). SoA are said to be located at all sites of human activity 
and amount to systems of rule in which aims and goals are pursued through processes of 
governing, in other words, controlling, regulating, administering, managing, in order to 
steer a group, community, society, towards certain goals. According to Rosenau (Rosenau, 
1995:13), 
in a turbulent and ever more interdependent world, where what happens in one 
corner or at one level may have consequences for what occurs at every other 
corner and level, it seems a mistake to adhere to a narrow definition in which only 
formal institutions at the national and international levels are considered relevant. 
However, in spite of emphasizing the importance of informal processes of governing, some 
of which are still largely inchoate such as at “a crowded town square,” clashing and 
overlapping, connecting and intersecting (1997:6-7), Rosenau ends up analysing these not 
in terms of how the processes operate but in terms of who carries how much authority 
(Sending and Neumann, 2006:653). Rosenau’s focus is limited to given and fixed state and 
non-state actors who have undergone some form of institutionalization of political 
authority. 
Indeed, although advancing important insights into the study of the supposedly emerging 
relational architecture of political organization in contemporary global politics, (global) 
governance remains tied to a specific meaning of power as sovereignty which has 
circumscribed the way they are to think about and study emerging global politics. 
Specifically, this conception of power leads them to focus their energies on the amount of 
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power held by institutionalized actors rather than on how power is exercised. It suggests 
that such attempts to understand governing are limited in making sense of the political in 
contemporary world affairs. In spite of debating a shift in the spatialization of power from 
the territorial to other (non-territorial and overlapping) centres and spheres of power, the 
meaning of power appears unchanged. In effect, power is an attribute which ends up being 
traded between institutions including states, corporations, international societies, and 
individuals. The state emerges as a continuing though weakened force insofar as power is 
read in terms of a zero-sum game in which any increase in the power of non-state actors is 
interpreted as diminishing the power of the state. In this account, the space of the political 
in international relations is extended from the territorial state to other, non-territorial and 
overlapping, institutions of power. Certainly, as Barnett and Duval have argued, studies of 
global governance would benefit from a closer analysis of the meaning of power (Barnett 
and Duvall, 2005).  
Finally, in Rosenau’s adaptation of complexity to political order, governance emerges as 
“the purposive activities of any collectivity that sustain mechanisms designed to insure its 
safety, prosperity, coherence, stability, and continuance” (emphasis added, Rosenau, 
2000:171-4). Essentially, ‘systems of rule’ self-govern, that is self-regulate/manage, in 
adaptation to dynamics of change and complexity in the world. They have the capacity to 
adapt and prepare for uncertainty. It is worth noting in passing, that an important aspect 
of arguments about self-governance and adaptation is the notion of ‘resilience’ (e.g. 
Duffield, 2007) understood as the capacity to rebound after shocks to the system and to 
maintain the system’s functionality when confronted with constantly emerging new 
threats. According to Duffield, resilience is the lingua franca of risk, preparedness and 
survivability. Indeed, self-governance is an attribute of resilient systems that must, 
however, be engineered through training and learning. In his paper on the changing 
capacities of citizens in the twentieth century which he presented to the CGG, for example, 
Rosenau argued for a shift in understanding community from territorial citizenship to 
membership which would enable individuals to engage with large-scale organizations, 
territorial or not (CGG, 1995:2, see also, Rosenau, 1990:211). Although he does not 
explicitly talk about resilience, self-governance in a system entails, in Rosenau’s 
understanding, “a progressive process of learning wherein the skills of people expand and 
thereby enable them to perform better the tasks of group membership and to engage more 
effectively in varying kinds of citizenship behaviour” (emphasis added, Rosenau, 
1992:277-8).  
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In contrast to its evident call for participation and collective problem-solving, the (global) 
governance discourse has been criticized for its exclusionary assumptions about the 
nature of politics. On the one hand, as Hewitt de Alcántara and others have noted, 
governance tends towards technocratic practice, resulting in the prioritization of 
effectiveness and efficiency over situated knowledges in the conceptualization and 
enactment of problem management (Hewitt de Alcantara, 1998:112-3, Walters, 2004:33). 
On the other hand, as Walters has argued, its emphasis on participation and the widening 
of actors including the ‘governed’– giving rise to political subjectivities  such as 
‘communities’, ‘partners’, ‘stakeholders’ – is representative of a particular kind of politics 
built around political consensus and problem-solving. In this respect, the CGG has called 
for a ‘global citizenship’ which includes “the poorer, marginalized, and alienated segments 
of national and international society” (CGG, 1995). Indeed, the promotion of ‘good 
governance’ in global governance has tended to involve only one kind of politics to the 
exclusion of alternatives. Specifically, ‘good governance,’ as Walters has noted, is equated 
with a narrow and instrumental form of democracy which “functions as little more than an 
institutional support for market-oriented reforms”. Effectively, global institutions are 
handed a depoliticized, technical basis on which to promote political reform in ‘target’ 
countries (Walters, 2004:34). In this respect, as I demonstrate particularly in chapters 
four and five, assemblages of global governance such as those comprising human security 
tend not to be spaces of politics but of technocratic management.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has drawn out some of the unspoken, tacit presuppositions about governing 
the contemporary state of the world encapsulated in ‘the international’ as well as global 
governance.  The chapter began by drawing on Foucault’s comments on the emerging 
‘international’ where he showed the way political subjectivities including the identity of 
individuals, states and inter-state relations emerged together from evolving governmental 
assemblages. I then discussed the Foucauldian interpretations of international relations 
which identify similar co-constitutions in contemporary international relations. 
Specifically, I looked to Ashley who demonstrated the way the knowledge practices of a 
dominant regime of truth (the paradigm of sovereignty) constitute specific ‘internal’ (such 
as the sovereign state and modern man) and ‘external’ configurations (such as anarchy) of 
international order. Put differently, he argued that in much of International Relations it is 
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taken for granted that reasoning man sets up the state which comes to embody the 
solution central to resolving the problem of political order in the face of an imagined 
external, anarchic realm. Consequently, theorizing and acting upon international relations 
are practices which help to craft the state and associated political subjectivities into being.  
Finally, I analysed global governance first as a regime of truth which sets up the political 
subjectivities that advocates take to be real and act upon. This is important in order to set 
the stage for examining the particularities of global governance specific to human security 
in the next chapter. Specially, I drew out the taken-for-granted truths about governing the 
contemporary state of the world which ultimately pass through sites of human security 
practice as I go on to show in the following chapters. I was particularly interested in the 
way the order of governance that global governance sets up is framed vis-a-vis the 
metanarrative of complexity which entailed a reorientation from institutions to processes, 
a heterarchical landscape of ‘self-regularizing networks (or frontiers) of governance, a 
narrative of the state in which state authority is argued to be declining and state 
sovereignty eroding, a relational conception of power, an account of transformation which 
makes governance inevitable, and finally the strategy to train the human to self-govern. 
Crucially, I suggested, governance thinking remains wedded to the possibility of taming 
complexity. In relation to this, I mentioned the inclination to render the political 
implications of complexity technical which ends up displacing political tensions and 
marginalizing subaltern voices. Problems of global governance are not objectively given 
but are (re)produced by discourses like human security which enact the ‘truths’ of global 
governance by imposing, as Ashley has suggested, a governmental ‘purpose’ on the 
international community (1989). 
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2 HUMAN SECURITY AS STATECRAFT 
 
 
 
In chapter one I examined the way the discourse of global governance generally, by 
describing and acting on a specific political order in terms of the metaphor of complexity, 
also constitutes this complex reality in which governance is seen to run through 
multileveled, polycentric, and self-organizing networks. In this chapter I take this 
argument further by examining the particularities enacted specifically by the global 
governance agenda that is associated with human security. As I noted at the outset, human 
security was put forward as a new way of thinking about and managing insecurity. In 
human security terms, security concerns the contemporary everyday insecurities affecting 
an increasingly complex and interdependent life which are to be managed by an 
architecture of global governance that is directed by a will to secure life as an end itself, 
rather than as a means to the end of the state (CHS, 2003, UNDP, 1994). As such, human 
security has also been examined as a ‘global’ biopolitical project which produces, 
disseminates, consumes, and refines meaning and understanding of how to interpret and, 
consequently, how to do things that then govern conduct with the aim of securing specific 
ways of life. In this chapter, I identify the assumptions and knowledge practices which 
help to set up the governance of life embodied by human security.  
Reflecting on the way thinking about human security has been framed and mapping the 
terrain upon which present political debates occur is an exercise which opens up 
possibilities of thought that these very debates might otherwise obscure (Connolly, 1989). 
Launching new avenues of thought is important not only for lucidity in the analysis but 
also, more importantly, for providing alternative accounts of global governance as well as 
human security. After all, the frameworks of thought used to make sense of the present 
world also inform, legitimize even, policies and practices which intervene, sometimes 
violently, in the different forms of life of individuals and communities around the world. 
As I go on to show in this chapter, human security comprises a biopolitical strategy to 
foster life. Specifically, its ‘biopolitical imaginary’ (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2009) sets 
out the order of human security in which the life worth protecting is circumscribed by a 
state operating on conditional sovereignty and an ambiguous exteriority. I then go on to 
discuss the way human security maps this ambiguous exteriority in terms of a dangerous 
geography. In the third section of the chapter, I examine the kind of order of governance 
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human security calls for – the global governance of life – in which also a particular state 
form is instigated. Put differently, as a statecraft, human security crafts a particular set of 
state and sovereignty into being. Finally, I reflect on one important way these tacit 
knowledges begin to be passed through sites of human security practice, namely, the 
logical framework.  
 
ASSEMBLING HUMAN SECURITY 
 
From a governmentality perspective, processes of human security describe and act upon 
an order of the real which is circumscribed by the intersections between a contemporary 
biopolitical problematization of life and the logic of ‘complexity’ associated with global 
governance as discussed in chapter one. Indeed, human security constitutes and manages 
an imaginative geography through a heterarchical rather than geopolitical order. This 
‘complex’ reality that it presumes to exist not only determines the kind of 
problematizations, correlative spaces, agents, and mechanisms through which human 
security initiatives govern but also defines the limits of the kind of human life to be 
protected and promoted, thus giving rise to specifically ordered human security 
assemblages. In particular, as the ensuing sections demonstrate, the governmental logic of 
human security involves the governmentalization of the state by deploying an extended 
Hobbesian discourse of danger and engineering, by foreclosing the political to all but 
biopolitical considerations, self-governing systems in which ‘human’ subjects and their 
attributes are constitutive parts. These processes take on a definite material form in a 
multiplicity of governmental assemblages that can be traced as consequently emerging in 
the world, as I go on to demonstrate particularly in the migrant health assemblage in 
Thailand and the human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam in chapters four and five.  
To reiterate, underlying human security is a will to secure life as an end itself, rather than 
as a means to the end of the state as has been hitherto customary in security thinking. 
Traditional security approaches proceed on the Hobbesian assumption that the territorial 
state is the ultimate purveyor of political order, and hence of security too, in international 
relations (for a compelling critique of this, see Ashley, 1989). In this understanding, states 
hold the monopoly on the rights and means to protect the lives of citizens. In turn, order 
(and peace) is principally established by the power balancing acts and the security of 
states. Threats to the state, considered synonymous to threats to its borders, people and 
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values, were assumed to originate from outside the state (see e.g. Buzan, 1991).16 
Accordingly, state security policy is about sustaining and promoting the core values of 
states in their relations with one another, these principally being sovereignty and 
territoriality. Put differently, the objective of state security policy is to protect the state by 
protecting its territory. In contrast to this, rather than taking the state (and its territory) as 
security referents, human security takes life itself as the referent of security (UNDP, 
1994:22). Put differently, human security elevates people and their needs to the centre of 
security thinking (Duffield and Waddell, 2004:7).  
The security challenges to (everyday) life that are of concern to advocates of human 
security include, as the HDR 1994 suggested, unemployment, famine, diseases, air 
pollution, earthquakes, flooding, industrial and traffic accidents, rape and gun crimes. To 
reiterate, the concept of human security was presented as an umbrella term for a 
comprehensive range of insecurities which are experienced at different levels of intensity 
including economic (job insecurity, unemployment), food (malnutrition, famine), health 
(viral contagions, lack of health services, environmental pollution), environmental (lack of 
clean water, air pollution, global warming), personal (torture, conflict, rape, domestic 
violence, community (interethnic strife, discrimination), and political insecurity (political 
repression, disappearance) (UNDP, 1994:22-5). Similarly, the CHS declared nearly a 
decade later in 2003 that human security is concerned with the “the lives of people”: their 
experience of violent conflict including displacement and trauma, of deprivation including 
impoverishment, pollution, ill health, illiteracy and “other maladies”, of “catastrophic  
accident and illness,” of “educational deprivations” that disadvantage people’s 
productivity and transformative potential as parents and as citizens (CHS, 2003:6). 
 
BIOPOLITICAL STRATEGIES 
 
Considering its security referent is human life in all its multi-dimensionality, a number of 
scholars have analysed human security as a site of biopolitics. In this interpretation, 
human security arises within a more general epistemic shift to ‘make life live’ beginning in 
                                                             
16 It should be mentioned here too that already during the Cold War, threat perceptions began 
changing, exposing limitations to the state security approach. What was considered the principal 
origin of threats to the security of the state, namely, the international realm, shifted to include also 
the domestic realm. According to the National Security Doctrine, the state needed to protect its 
sovereign territory from outside as well as inside, reflecting Cold War specific politics of fear fuelled 
by, for example, the threat of a communist Coup d’État. See e.g. O'Tuathail, Gearoid. (1996) Critical 
Geopolitics. Borderlines. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. 
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eighteenth century Western Europe. As indicated in the previous chapter, this was the 
time of the emergence of the ‘subject who knows’, specifically, the realization that ‘man’ 
was endowed with the ability to reason and rationalize. In Foucault’s narrative, the 
appearance of ‘man’ as a ‘subject who knows’ was the time when political discourse began 
to shift to the modern discourse of government, of how best to govern oneself, the family, 
political sovereignty and so on (Foucault, 2007:76). It was the time when concepts like 
‘population’ and ‘civil society’ began to emerge in response to wider problems of 
government. As such, the modern or ‘reasoning’ subject and problematics of government, 
for example of how best to govern a population within a delineated territory, emerge in 
the same historic-political field.  
Underlying biopolitics is a powerful governmental logic to foster life (Foucault, 1998:138). 
According to Foucault, the preoccupation with governance (of the self, the family, the 
school, the state) coupled with advancements in the sciences (e.g. statistics, demography, 
medicine, political theory) in eighteenth century Western Europe led to the belief in the 
possibility of mastering the inexorableness of human life so as to ensure the sustainability 
of certain dominant ways of life. Importantly, man was no longer regarded as a machine 
but as a living organism, a species with biological, somatic and corporeal attributes (Dillon 
and Reid, 2001:41). The bio-politics that has emerged from this is concerned with taming 
life by breaking it down17 and subjecting it to disciplined analysis, clarifying the 
problematizations of governance, thus rendering it governable (Foucault, 1998). 
Concretely, this has involved the development of mechanisms of identification, 
classification and management of living human beings as statistical ‘populations’ which 
make life amenable to particular ways of governing, of “systems of belief and cultural 
propensities or what one might want to call ‘ways of life’” (Foucault, 2007, Grayson, 
2008:384). The category of population is applicable to anything that “extends from 
biological rootedness through the species up to the surface that gives one a hold provided 
by the public” (Foucault, 2007:75). In fact, the emergence of biopolitics was accompanied 
by the violent imperial struggle to seize territory, control resources, and reconfigure state 
apparatuses in the colonies.  
The governance of living human beings principally concerns the management of the 
contingent or alleatory characteristics distinct to populations so as to mitigate risks and 
                                                             
17 Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue that Foucault’s account of biopolitics needs to be revised in the 
wake of the molecular and digital revolutions. In their view, contemporary understandings of life 
are informationalized, necessitating ‘an account of what it is to be a living thing in terms of complex, 
adaptive and continuously emergent, informationally constituted systems’ (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2009) 
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control threats emerging from them (Dillon, 2007:41). Essential to the effective 
management of populations is the continuing development of knowledge about the 
dynamics of life of target populations including definitions of normality and abnormality 
and the range of contingency as well as the mechanisms of intervention in order to 
normalize the dynamics of populations (Foucault, 2007). Specifically, it has led to the 
development of novel security assemblages concerned with improving the welfare, living 
conditions, health, wealth and sustainability of populations (Grayson, 2008:385). By 
constituting living human beings as statistical populations, biopolitics offers state officials 
and agencies a way to problematize and govern life. On the other hand, it helps to 
constitute and give rise to mechanisms of governing the excess (abnormal, deviation) of 
life. As Foucault argued, “The art of government therefore became a juggling act to 
promote the ‘right ways’ of living in ‘a system anxious to have the respect of legal subjects 
and to ensure the free enterprise of individuals” (Foucault, 2008, as quoted in Grayson, 
2001:385). Thus, biopolitical strategies target by disciplining, punishing, shaping and 
transforming abnormal or ‘substandard’ ways of life which could present as dangers to the 
norm (Dillon, 2007, Foucault, 2004). A variety of biopolitical strategies have been found in 
numerous practices of contemporary global politics, “marking a significant shift in the 
conceptualization and practices of security, development,” and other fields (see e.g. 
Berman, 2004, Dillon, 2006, Duffield, 2001, Duffield and Waddell, 2004, Elbe, 2009, 
Grayson, 2008:386, Pupavac, 2005).  
Human security is a form of biopolitics which aims to regulate target populations globally 
through the institutional framework of global governance. As such, the global governance 
of life that human security embodies proceeds on a metanarrative of ‘complexity’ which 
helps to constitute an order of the real in which several arguments about the state of the 
world are taken for granted (see e.g. Dillon and Reid, 2000, Dillon and Reid, 2001, Duffield, 
2001). Specifically, human security comprises a heterarchical order in which the sum of 
self-regularizing networks manage human insecurity. Secondly, in relation to this, human 
security presents a narrative of the state in which state authority is diminished and 
sovereignty made conditional on the responsibility to protect. In fact, as I go on to argue, 
human security proceeds on a dangerous ontology in which there is a commitment to the 
Hobbesian state. Notwithstanding, this involves also the refashioning of state authority 
and the reconfiguration of sovereignty. Thirdly, the imperative of human security is 
embedded in an account of social transformation in which the world is seen as 
experiencing rapid development and increasing change, complexity and interdependence. 
Finally, human security works towards engineering self-governance through learning and 
training. This ‘complex’ reality that it presumes to exist informs the kind of 
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problematizations, spaces, agents and mechanisms through which human security 
governs. Indeed, it is a biopolitical imaginary which gives rise to specifically ordered 
human security assemblages as this thesis demonstrates.  
Interestingly, as Grayson has argued, the biopolitical imperative underpinning human 
security was facilitated by knowledge practices which are circumscribed by a cosmological 
realism (Grayson, 2008). Specifically, Grayson has shown the way human security, as 
constructed by both analysts and policy-makers, has drawn on ontological and 
epistemological positions which share a belief in the self-evidence of the complex reality 
outlined above which is believed can be dissected, measured, and understood based on 
empiricism or rationalism. Grayson (Grayson, 2008:387) concludes that 
The entrenchment of cosmological realism has therefore disciplined what kinds of 
questions one can ask about the subjects, objects and dynamics of human security, 
the spectrum of research that is accepted as sound scholarship by the field and the 
limits of our ‘ethical and practical horizons’.  
This is evident, for example, in the programmatic practice of framing logically which I 
discuss in the last section of this chapter. The technocratic search for precision, 
measurement, and causality that defines human security knowledge has political effects in 
terms of agency, normalcy, and the scope of intervention. Indeed, as I will demonstrate, it 
forms the criteria by which the distribution is arranged in human security assemblages.    
For all its criticism of state-centrism and the state, I argue, human security is not only 
committed to the state, it also crafts a specific kind of state and sovereignty into being. As 
such, it can be understood as a practice of statecraft in the sense developed by Ashley as I 
discussed in the preceding chapter (Ashley, 1989). Put differently, human security 
governmentalizes the state in so far as it helps to redefine what falls within the remit of 
the state, and what are the roles and responsibilities of states in relation to human 
security. In the following, I want to suggest that human security is committed to what 
Ashley has referred to as the paradigm of sovereignty (see e.g. Tan, 2001). This said, I see a 
re-modulation of the paradigm of sovereignty to incorporate the imperatives of global 
governance. Specifically, while human security promotes a Hobbesian state which is 
responsible for the human security of its citizens, the state must operate alongside the 
‘international community’ – a range of governmental, intergovernmental, para-
governmental and nongovernmental agencies – within the perimeters of global 
governance. Moreover, the sovereignty of the state is not absolute but conditional on the 
fulfilment of that responsibility.  
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A HOBBESIAN ONTOLOGY 
 
In Hobbes’s imaginary, without the vigilance of Leviathan – the state apparatus to which 
‘reasoning men’ willingly surrender their sovereignty – people live in a stateless condition 
of profound insecurity. In this hypothetical state of nature, the security of ‘man’ is 
threatened by “a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of 
power after power, that ceaseth only in death,” resulting in a ‘war of all against all’ 
(Hobbes, 1996:66). In Hobbes’s ontology, then, individual security and the state are 
inextricably linked in opposition to a dangerous but supposed natural condition of war 
and anarchy. The danger of the state of nature is grounded in Hobbes’s conception of 
human nature. The Hobbesian subject is dangerous because of his desire for power and 
inability to trust others. Thus, in the absence of political community as embodied by the 
Leviathan, in the competition for power all persons in the state of nature are enemies to 
others. Ultimately, in Hobbes’s exposition, the fear of death and the ability to tap into 
reason and recognize the need for society enables ‘man’ to transcend the state of nature 
and embrace sovereign control (Connolly, 1989, Hobbes, 1996:86). Importantly, this 
conception of the social contract has “undoubtedly provided political thought with a 
powerful and lasting imaginary that inseparably links danger, government, and 
subjectivity” (Odysseos, 2002:406). 
In this context, as Connolly reminds, when discussing the state of nature, Hobbes was 
“talking to people already in civil society” (1989:28). The purpose of Hobbes’s exposition 
was to convince people to remain domesticated. As such, the state of nature functions as a 
‘shock therapy’: “The fear of death pulls the self together. It induces subjects to accept civil 
society and it becomes an instrumentality of sovereign control in a civil society already 
installed” (Connolly, 1989:29). The central strategy of Hobbes’s political theory, then, as 
Campbell notes, was to employ “a strategy of otherness designed to discipline the self” 
(1998:58). At various points in his text, Hobbes differentiates the rational, scientific, 
disciplined, and domesticated ‘man’ from unfavourable others, such as the “stubborn, 
insociable, forward [i.e. perverse], intractable,” and the ‘savage’ who lives in “brutish 
manner” (Hobbes, 1996:101 and 85). The other functions as the point of differentiation 
through which the desirable dispositions of a superior modern identity, namely rational, 
scientific, and social, are promoted. In this sense, as Campbell has suggested, Leviathan is 
“a polemic for science and the rationalism of the Enlightenment” (original emphasis, 
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1998:59). In effect, it is a script promoting the modern and state-centric form of life to the 
exclusion of other forms of life.  
Hobbes’s dangerous ontology can be said to be foundational of and endemic to what 
Foucault has called ‘the attitude of modernity,’ “a mode of relating to contemporary 
reality; [...] a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving” distinct to 
modern life (2000:309). In this sense, modernity is an economy of power which circulates 
knowledge practices across dispersed and varied sites which discipline interpretation and 
conduct, constitute modern subjects, but also struggles with attitudes of 
‘countermodernity’ such as delinquency. In Hobbes’s dangerous ontology, the inside is the 
space of the rational, ordered polity, the Leviathan, which is differentiated from the 
dangerous, chaotic, and anarchical space of outside (Campbell, 1998:60).  
Though Hobbes had little to say about the relation between states and the role of foreign 
policy, various major works of International Relations have taken his imagery of insecure 
individuals in a state of nature as a metaphor for interstate relations in a condition of 
anarchy. As Campbell and others including realists such as Bull have noted however, there 
are serious and fundamental objections to the way Hobbes’s work has been used to 
support a predominantly “crude realist” understanding of international relations as the 
permanent struggle for state power in anarchy. As Hobbes himself emphasized, first, the 
state of nature is hypothetical, “there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this” 
(Hobbes, 1996:85); second, the state of nature among states is qualitatively different to 
that of the state of nature among men (Bull, 1995, Campbell, 1998:53). Given that Hobbes 
took the state as the site where “civil and international war was mediated,” it seems 
arbitrary to assume that the state of nature among states is the same to the state of nature 
among men which, after all, the state is to transform. Notwithstanding, implicitly or 
explicitly, the Leviathan has stood as “a factual, historical narrative” (Campbell, 1998:55). 
In fact, the force of Hobbes’s reasoning, following Campbell, is “the fear of slipping back 
into the state of nature should men give up their allegiance to the sovereign power in the 
state” (original emphasis, Campbell, 1998:56). Theories of International Relations have 
succeeded in institutionalizing this fear (of death) in modern narratives of interstate 
relations. It is in this sense that Ashley has argued, the practice of ‘international politics’ is 
about inscribing the dangerous, it is about “the externalization and totalization of dangers” 
(Ashley, 1989:304). The raison d’être of International Relations, as Jahn has claimed, has 
been simply to take ‘the international’ as the dangerous Hobbesian state of nature (Jahn, 
1999:411). Based on this logic, Odysseos argues, survival has become the operating 
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concept for international relations (2002:410). This ethos of survival, according to her, 
provides the state as the space of reason with the legitimacy to act irresponsibly towards 
the ‘externalized’ dangerous Other to ‘reasoning man’ (Odysseos, 2002:415). In Ashley’s 
words (Ashley, 1989:295):  
All variants of modern discourse presuppose the necessity of a state as an agency 
of rational law and violence whose legitimacy obtains in its deployment of violent 
means to bring an external ‘anarchy’ under control and secure the conditions of 
sovereign man’s autonomous and reasoning being within domestic bounds.  
Indeed, key categories and terms of reference of Hobbes’s dangerous ontology and 
framing of the ‘other-as-enemy’ have provided scholars of International Relations and 
security the images by which global politics has been understood. 
To summarize, in Ashley accounts, the modern – reasoning – subject and the modern state 
are mutually constitutive (Ashley, 1989:268). In this view, domestic society is the space in 
which modern identity is embedded that stands in direct opposition to contingency and 
chance which “refuses to submit to reason” (Ashley, 1989:268). Thus, in its reference to 
Hobbes (see e.g. Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:168), human security can be read as a 
practice of statecraft which inscribes problems and dangers external to the state, thereby 
enframing the ‘domestic population’ in which the state comes to be seen as the legitimate 
source of authority and ultimate purveyor of security (Ashley, 1989:306). Accordingly, 
human security establishes the perimeters of political authority, delineates the 
geographical and conceptual spaces of governance, and constitutes the authorities that can 
speak on behalf of targeted populations. These variables are then placed in an ‘external’ 
configuration with the complexity of contemporary life. Importantly, reasoning man is 
centred in the state only through modern narratives of danger. Human security is a 
discourse of danger which reinforces dichotomies such as self/’other-as-enemy,’ 
rational/irrational, order/disorder, security/insecurity, inside/outside, and so on. This is 
demonstrated in the way a dangerous geography is mapped in and through human 
security.  
 
MAPPING DANGEROUS GEOGRAPHY 
 
Underlying human security is an imaginative geography comprising articulations of 
identity and difference circumscribed by a narrative of increasingly rapid and complex 
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interdependency of security in the world. Global space takes centre stage in the dramatic 
narrative of distance and difference articulated through human security. In what is 
effectively a dangerous geography of human security, Earth or the Globe emerge as the 
whole in which human and nonhuman parts now flow, that is, they globalize. These parts 
include goods, services, finance, people, labour, images, information as well as, what in the 
literature on human security is commonly referred to as the ‘downside risks’ of 
globalization or (global) human insecurities, CO2 emissions, refugees, viruses, trafficked 
persons, ozone, transnational terrorism (cf. CHS, 2003:2-6, Fukada-Parr, 2003, UNDP, 
1994:34). These human-nonhuman parts “travel the globe” (UNDP, 1994:34). They will be 
felt all over the globe (UNDP, 1994:36) as they connect in new or modified ways, for 
example through instant global communication, computer networks, and ever more 
sophisticated travel. According to the HDR 1994 (UNDP, 1994:22), 
When the security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are 
likely to get involved. Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic 
disputes and social disintegration are no longer isolated events, confined within 
national borders. Their consequences travel the globe.  
As the CHS has emphasized: “We share a planet, a biosphere, a technological arsenal, a 
social fabric,” i.e. the whole, in which “today’s global flows spotlight the many 
interlinkages in the security of all people” (CHS, 2003:2). In this dangerous geography, the 
relationality obtaining between the parts of this ‘complex, gigantic whole’ is characterized 
by an obtuse interdependency of (in)security in which the ‘downside risks’ of global flows 
– global human insecurities – are perceived as threatening the security of, no less than, 
‘humanity’ as a whole (Dalby, 2000, Gasper, 2005, United Nations Secretary-General, 
2005).  
Thinking or imagining space, time, and people as one geography is a process beset with 
the thinkers’ preconceptions, desires, and fantasies about what constitutes self and other. 
In fact, ‘imaginative geographies’ such as human security’s dangerous geography say more 
about the thinkers than the nature of that which is being thought or imagined. They are 
inextricably linked with the production of identity and alterity. As Said (Said, 1978:55) 
noted in relation to the imaginative geography of the Orient,   
The objective space of a house—its corners, corridors, cellar, rooms—is far less 
important than what poetically it is endowed with, which is usually a quality with 
an imaginative or figurative value we can name and feel; thus a house may be 
haunted or homelike, or prisonlike or magical. So space acquires emotional and 
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even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or anonymous 
reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here.  
Said would have us think through how space, time, and people converge together to form a 
particular understanding of the Orient; however, an understanding that is meaningful first 
to the geographer(s). In his words: “For there is no doubt that imaginative geography and 
history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and 
difference between what is close to it and what is far away” (Said, 1978:55).  
Essential to Said’s theorization is the ‘poetic process’ of enclosing identity and difference 
through a series of mapping or geo-graphing exercises. It is in this struggle of power that 
the limits of forms of life, between self and other, are constituted. Essentially, this is the 
logic of human security: “the making of the human through the advent of boundary or 
difference as such”. The limit is not only that which gives a thing identity as the very thing 
that it is; it is that which “continuously also betrays an excess, or surplus, to which the very 
existence of that thing remains irremissibly indebted” (Dillon, 1996:4). Such a perspective 
emphasizes the undecidability of borders. Just as the unnatural categories of the Occident 
and the Orient are subject to continued performative constitution so too is the dangerous 
geography of human security an unstable ‘enframing’. Thus, a perspective of limits asks 
not “how to secure security” but “what is lost and forgotten, and who or what pays the 
inevitable price, for the way that ‘we’ are thus habited in fear” (Dillon, 1996:35)? What 
forms of identity and difference are enclosed in human security’s dangerous geography? 
By saying what we are menaced by such as unemployment, illegal migration, disease as 
well as ‘bad’ (cf. CHS, 2003),18 human security is sifting between the good and the bad 
elements that it comprises. International trade and instant global communication are 
considered good, “widening people’s range of choices” and enabling “many more to 
participate in world events as they happen” (UNDP, 1994:34). Conversely, viruses, CO2 
emissions, drugs, and crime, ethnic and religious tensions and ‘bad’ states, i.e. states that 
do not take the human wellbeing of their population seriously, are bad, threatening the 
security of people everywhere. In this respect, for example, in his discussion of HIV/AIDS 
and contemporary international security, Stefan Elbe (Elbe, 2009:72) has argued that 
human security’s application to the AIDS pandemic is indicative of the particular 
rationalization of political rule characteristic of what he identifies as the contemporary 
“era of (neoliberal) governmentality”. This, according to him, “leads to the identification of 
a new category of threats to the welfare of populations  - which Foucault referred to [...] as 
                                                             
18 According to the CHS, “Human security shifts from focusing on external aggression to protecting 
people from a range of menaces” CHS. (2003) Human Security Now. New York: United Nations. 
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‘crises of circulation’” (Elbe, 2009:72, Foucault, 2007:64). Recalling Foucault’s discussion 
of the way the French city of Nantes (Foucault, 2007:17) was positioned within a much 
broader set of processes of circulation including the circulation of wealth, people, diseases, 
climate and so on, Elbe (Elbe, 2009:81) suggests that states today are similarly  
trying to position themselves optimally with respect to various processes of 
international circulation (be it labor, capital or tourism) [and] are thereby also 
potentially exposing themselves to seeing ‘dangerous’ increases in levels of 
HIV/AIDS among their populations – the AIDS pandemic as the ‘dark side of 
globalization.  
Organizing everyday life including people’s health in terms of good/secure and 
bad/insecure flows, the HDR 1994 endowed these occurrences with an ‘imaginative or 
figurative value’ of danger. Nothing is a danger in itself but an effect of interpretation 
(Campbell, 1998:2). That the range of issues concerning the everyday life of people 
including unemployment, famine, diseases, air pollution, earthquakes, flooding, industrial 
and traffic accidents, rape, gun crimes, and social disintegration as well as ‘failing’ states 
are made out to be threats to human security (CHS, 2003, UNDP, 1994), in fact, “bears no 
essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event” from which they are 
said to derive. Nothing is intrinsically more dangerous for human security than anything 
else, except when interpreted as such (Campbell, 1998:2). This is not to say that issues 
such as diseases, accidents, political violence and state failure are not ‘real’ dangers with 
deadly consequences. However, as Campbell has pointed out, not all issues are equally 
dangerous. Danger is a subjective value which results from a calculation about objective 
things which, according to Campbell, “results from the calculation of a threat that 
objectivises events, disciplines relations, and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the 
people said to be at risk” (Campbell, 1998).  
Although argued to be universal, the human security perspective is modelled on, and 
mainly applies to, the everyday insecurities lived in developing countries (Duffield and 
Waddell, 2006, MacFarlane and Khong, 2006). Linking everyday insecurities in developing 
countries with the notion of the security of ‘the globe’ or ‘humanity’ as indicated earlier 
was not, however, an original feat of the UNDP, nor is it an exclusive perspective amongst 
human security advocates. In fact, the emergence of this specific logic of danger 
concerning the problem of global security, in which an ethos of survival is cultivated, goes 
back much earlier to the Brandt (1983, 1980), Palme (1982), and Brundtland 
Commissions as well as Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’ (1992). Essentially, future 
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threats to international security were argued to originate largely from developing 
countries. Development was heralded as the new international security policy. It is within 
this context also that the CGG conceptualized global governance (1995). In this context, for 
example, Duffield has argued that development’s constant invocation of ideals such as 
rights, freedom and the people actually “conceals a stubborn will to manage and contain” 
the destabilizing effects associated with poverty and underdevelopment (Duffield, 
2007:viii). According to him, development manages undeveloped life; a life which, 
essentially, is life not insured by insurance-based welfare technologies. In the absence of 
these welfare technologies, the object of development, he contends, is the “stasis of basic 
needs and self-reliance”. Duffield concludes that development maintains rather than 
overcomes the divide between developed and undeveloped life (Duffield, 2007, Voelkner, 
2010).  
The populations and states that are targeted under human security are identified through 
statistical knowledge. In terms of target populations, the subjects created include those ‘at 
high risk of trafficking’, ‘the sick’, ‘the hungry’, ‘internally displaced people’, ‘poor farmers’, 
‘women’ and ‘girls’, ‘children in need of special protection’. These are the ‘categories of 
beneficiaries’ for example through which the UNTFHS operates. The knowledges and 
expertise on which human security depends are drawn from the likes of the Human 
Security Audit carried out by the Human Security Centre (Human Security Centre, 2005) 
and the Human Development Index computed by the UNDP. The Audit provides 
information such as the number of ‘cases of armed conflict and one-sided violence by 
country’, and ‘numbers of reported deaths from political violence by country’. The Human 
Development Index in turn is computed from the Human Development Indicators such as 
‘life expectancy at birth’, ‘adult literacy rate’, ‘combined gross enrolment ration of primary, 
secondary and tertiary schools’, and ‘GDP per capita’. These are translated into indexes – 
i.e. values, which enable comparability. Following comparison, an average can be 
established, and the normal range of fluctuation can be computed. Indeed, this process has 
as its frame of reference the stabilization of population, which is assumed imperfect in the 
sense that it fluctuates around an average that requires monitoring and intervention if 
necessary to reinstate a feasible balance. The identification of statistical normality is at the 
heart of Foucault’s account of biopolitics.  
Essentially, human security is predicated on a specific understanding of what constitutes 
defensible human life and what does not (Coward, 2005:863). As Duffield concludes, 
international development in the guise of human security, for example, is “a means of 
dividing humankind against itself in the generic form of developed and underdeveloped 
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species-life” (Duffield, 2007:ix). Representing issues as alien, subversive, dirty, or sick, as 
that from which we must be freed such as states ‘failing’ to provide human wellbeing, also 
has the important function of shaping and giving character to identity, to human being and 
its form of life. It is in this sense that the mapping of dangerous cartographies involves 
drawing boundaries between self and other, identity and difference, human security and 
human insecurity. By constituting and mobilizing what disallows life, such as war, violence 
as well as disease, and unemployment, and ‘bad’ states, human security is imparting a 
specific way of life including a specific state form. This dangerous geography is carried 
forward into the sites of human security practice. As I go on to demonstrate in chapters 
four and five, emerging problematizations of forced migration such as migrant health and 
human trafficking embody this dangerous geography which consequently necessitates 
governance.  
 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF LIFE 
 
The CHS argued that governance in contemporary world affairs is enacted through a 
complex of states, international institutions, transnational networks and agencies (both 
public and private) which governs common problems of ‘humanity’. It invited a complex of 
actors including states, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations as well as 
individuals and communities targeted to form a transnational alliance which can govern 
the ‘downside risks’ of globalization or global human insecurities including CO2 emissions, 
refugees, viruses, trafficked persons, ozone, transnational terrorism, and last but not least 
‘ineffective’ states (CHS, 2003:2-6, Fukada-Parr, 2003). The CHS claimed that a new 
paradigm of security was urgently needed because “both the challenges to security and its 
protectors have become more complex” (CHS, 2003:2). As I indicated in the introduction, 
the HDR 1994 describes and calls to act upon a reality that is marked by global flows, 
complex interdependency and transnationality, thus necessitating a profound shift in the 
way conflict and poverty are managed in the world. In contrast to the geopolitical 
spatialization of power concerned with demarcating the boundaries of government 
around a fixed territory, the geo-biopolitical spatialization of power is concerned with 
demarcating the boundaries of government around shifting and de-territorialized 
populations. Indeed, Duffield and Waddell have examined human security in terms of a 
shift from geopolitics, the security of states, to biopolitcs, the security of population in 
which the resilience of populations are sought to be engineered through a range of 
economic, health, educational and prudential interventions (Duffield and Waddell, 2004).  
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Indeed, implicit in human security is an aspiration to shift political authority away from 
the traditional centre of the nation-state to multilayered, networked configurations with, 
and through, a host of (inter)governmental, para-governmental, nongovernmental, and 
private organizations. Accounts of human security often rely on the idea of a shift in the 
locus of political power and authority which is passed through and acted upon in sites of 
practice. Consequently, a set of political subjectivities are constructed including the 
‘international community’, the ‘human’ and a globalised state running on contingent 
sovereignty as I go on to examine below.  
In terms of the ‘human’, there is an impetus in human security to encourage self-
governance. This is particularly evident in the way, for example, the CHS promotes a 
specific reality in which self-governance is proclaimed a basic right. The CHS argues that 
human security protects the “freedom to take action on one’s own behalf” (CHS, 2003:10). 
This is facilitated through the participatory and collective problem-solving approaches in 
which individuals are invited to participate in their own governance. This logic is 
performatively invoked in the implementation of human security programmes and 
practices, consequently constructing a political subject that is always free to self-govern. 
Promoting such a self-governing individual amounts to a form of prevention. Intervention 
is thus conceived as pre-emptive, taking place at the point where ‘freedom’ is produced, 
i.e. at the point that individuals come to know what their freedoms entail. Duffield has 
argued that the resilience of uninsured life hinges on “how adept and entrepreneurial” 
such life is in maintaining self-reliance and coping with life contingencies (Duffield, 
2007:18). This, on the other hand, as the CHS states, necessitates working institutions at 
every level of society, including police systems, the environment, health care, education, 
social safety nets, diplomatic engagements and conflict early warning systems, which 
provides the necessary conditions in which individuals can self-govern (CHS, 2003:132).  
Thus, the objectives of state, nongovernmental and intergovernmental, officials and the 
individuals targeted are brought into line with the set of global norms to improve the 
condition of the targeted population, whether this be its health as in the case of the 
Burmese in Thailand I discuss in chapter four, or its risk factor such as in the case of the 
Vietnamese women and children I discuss in chapter five. Indeed, to reiterate, in order to 
investigate the way human security practices constitute a specific kind of political order  
(political subjectivities including the state and the individual) concretely, I selected to 
trace the way they are applied particularly to problems of forced migration. Migration, I 
argued, highlights the question of political order. Specifically, forced migration raises the 
question of the membership of a political community as well as the technical question of 
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how large mobile or potentially mobile populations are constituted through regimes of 
governance such as human security. Indeed, migration flows problematize the distinction 
between the inside and outside as a way of enframing political issues as such. In the 
following, I examine the way the categories of the state are renegotiated in the literature of 
human security. Crucially, it is in this debate about the role of the state in human security 
that the dangerous imaginary outlined above is most evident.  
 
GOVERNMENTALIZING THE STATE 
 
For all its criticism of state-centrism and the state, human security is not only committed 
to the state, it also crafts a specific state and sovereignty into being. As such, it can be 
understood as a practice of statecraft. Put differently, human security governmentalizes 
the state in so far as it helps to redefine what falls within the remit of the state, and what 
are the roles and responsibilities of states in relation to human security. The human 
security agenda often is presented generally as challenging the state security approach 
and state centrism in security studies and international relations more widely. Human 
security’s claim to critique the state-centrist conceptualization of security has since often 
been repeated and hotly debated. Indeed, it has provided a fruitful basis for raising 
fundamental questions concerning the role and security of the sovereign state as well as 
the state of state sovereignty in the contemporary global order (see e.g. Alkire, 2003, Bain, 
2000, Evans, 2004, Hampson, 2004, Newman, 2004, Nishikawa, 2009). Most prominent in 
this context are the norm of non-intervention and the value of state sovereignty. Indeed, 
reflecting the discourse of global governance, much of the literature concerning human 
security and the state has focused on the question about state sovereignty, debating in 
how far a human security-principled world could erode absolute sovereignty and displace 
state power in international relations. 
By presenting statism as a perpetual problem, I contend, human security is putting in 
circulation what could be called an “inflationary critical value” (Foucault, 2008:187) by 
which the state unit, rather than disappearing from political agendas, remains the crucial 
nodal point of discussions. Secondly, human security’s ongoing problematization involves 
“continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state’s domain, what is 
public and what private, what is and is not within the state’s competence” (Foucault, 
2007:109). Indeed, the response to specifications set out by the human security agenda 
fuel ‘incessant transactions which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously 
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shift sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centres, forms and types of 
control, relationships between local powers, the central authority and so on” (Foucault, 
2008:77), bringing about a continual reconstitution of the state. Foucault termed this 
specifically modern process of reconstitution the ‘governmentalization of the state’, which 
he believed to be “a particularly contorted phenomenon” (Foucault, 2008:109). 
As human security advocates value the security of people higher than the security of 
states, human beings tend to be set against states in the competition for political 
privileges. This follows also in the spirit of the original conceptualization in the HDR 1994, 
wherein human security explicitly was argued to be the alternative approach set to 
supplant the state security approach (UNDP, 1994). In other words, human security and 
state security were set to compete. Thus, were the world governed by human security, so 
it is interpreted, not only would the state be de-ranked to second or less of a place when it 
comes to security. More profoundly, where states fail to fulfil the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
their citizens against any of the many human security issues, it also becomes acceptable to 
intervene in the domestic affairs of states in the name of human security – thereby 
supposedly undermining the state and state power. As Alkire summarises then, “A core 
edge of disagreement between human security and state security comes when these two 
agendas are said to compete. Clearly the debate about intervention and “responsible 
sovereignty” identifies an area where views differ deeply” (Alkire, 2003).   
However, notwithstanding the extensive problematization around state-centrism and the 
state to which it has given rise, human security thinking and application remains largely 
statist. As the co-chair of the CHS, Sadako Ogata, has emphasized, “the task of the challenge 
to focus on the security of the people is not to replace state security. Security of the state 
has to be reinforced. [...] In turning to the people themselves [...], the fundamental security 
of the state is reinforced” (Ogata, 2002:5-6). Indeed, in its final report, the Commission 
promotes a staunchly statist human security approach: the state is “the fundamental 
purveyor of security” whose security is to be guaranteed by human security (CHS, 2003:2). 
In fact, as the CHS argues (CHS, 2003:6),  
Human security and state security are mutually reinforcing and dependent on each 
other. Without human security, state security cannot be attained and vice versa. 
Human security requires strong and stable institutions.  
 The Commission operated in the immediate post-9/11 political environment that saw 
international policy largely converging in affirming the continued commitment to state 
security (Page, 2004). Indeed, Thomas and Tow have argued in favour of a statist form of 
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human security in which “states and their borders remain the primary referent of 
security” (2002).  
While the striking statism of the human security agenda has been interpreted as the 
gradual co-optation (Bellamy and McDonald, 2002:373), adaptation, cajolement and 
manipulation (Tadjbakhsh, 2007) of human security into a statist framework, considering 
Ashley’s paradigm of sovereignty, human security has never been outside a statist agenda. 
Rather, the increasingly explicit commitment to the state indicates the intensification of 
mechanisms of human security (Duffield, 2006). Human security is deeply rooted in 
statism. The ongoing critique of the state integral to the debate and application 
surrounding human security is enabling the reconstitution of practices of statecraft in the 
contemporary global order. As such, human security is more than ‘hot air’ as some of its 
critics have argued (Paris, 2001). It is powered by the critique of state-centrism and the 
state which allowed human security to emerge in the first place. Indeed, it is what Foucault 
would term its ‘inflationary critical value’ which has cast the state at the centre of human 
security thought and application. Scholarly work on human security has tended to begin 
by reference to the revered challenge to state-centrism and state security afforded by 
human security, repeating and instantiating this supposed given (Axworthy, 2004, Gasper 
and Truong, 2005, Jolly and Ray, 2006, MacFarlane and Khong, 2006, Mack, 2004, Shani et 
al., 2007, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007, Thakur, 2004).  
In fact, the perpetual problematization of the state that inevitably follows human security 
has involved ongoing redefinition of what falls within the domain of the state, and what 
are the roles and responsibilities of states in relation to human security (see e.g. 
Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:168). Indeed, in response to specifications set out by the 
human security agenda, practices of statecraft are shifting. For one, human security invites 
a range of actors to act on behalf of human security. As the CHS states: “unlike traditional 
approaches that vest the state with full responsibility for state security, the process of 
human security involves a much broader spectrum of actors and institutions – especially 
people themselves” (CHS, 2003:6). As suggested above, people are made responsible for 
themselves through human security initiatives “empowering people to fend for 
themselves” (CHS, 2003:4). Although human security reaches into and across states by 
linking the efforts, the practices and successes” of human security players in national, 
regional and global alliances, ultimately the aim of these alliances, according to the 
Commission, is “to create a kind of horizontal, cross-border source of legitimacy that 
complements [and is thus separate from] that of traditional vertical and 
compartmentalised structures of institutions and states” (2003:143).  
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In practical terms, according to Duffield and Waddell, “the Commission remains wedded to 
reinstating the state” (Duffield and Waddell, 2006:9). However, it is ‘effective states’ that it 
seeks to secure (CHS, 2003:8) as  
a cohesive and peaceful international system is far more likely to be achieved 
through the cooperation of effective states confident in their place in the world, 
than in an environment of fragile, collapsed, fragmenting or generally chaotic state 
entities.  
‘Effective’ states are those able to regulate ‘downside risks’ from local and global human 
insecurities, that is, “insecurities that threaten human survival or the safety of daily life” 
including disease, pestilence and abrupt penury related to economic downturns (CHS, 
2003:3). The ideal of a “’humanely secure state’ would be a fully sovereign democracy with 
a functioning administration and social political, economic, and legal institutions and a 
strong and focused developmental agenda” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:171). As 
human security advocates Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy argue, the state is “a security 
arrangement of prime importance”; “it should not and cannot withdraw from its 
obligations in the field of security” (2007:168). Crucially, in this perspective, “the weak 
state is defined as one that cannot uphold the Hobbesian contract for providing not only 
security, but also an especially development goods and human rights imperatives for its 
own citizens” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007:173). 
Unlike state security, where protection efforts were argued to be directed at the territory, 
in human security, “a state’s identity, in terms of its ability to perform certain key 
functions, may no longer be so intimately connected to territory” (Barkin, 1998:84). 
Rather, as Barry Buzan (Buzan, 1995:191) suggests, states 
have now to worry not just about their military strength and the security of their 
ruling families, […] but also about the competitiveness of their economies, the 
reproduction of their cultures, the welfare, health and education of their citizens, 
the stability of their ecologies, and their command of knowledge and technology.  
Indeed, human security is about “ensuring that states protect their people. When they do 
not, it is about ensuring that there are international mechanisms that can fill the gap ad 
interim and redesign states so that they will fulfill their purpose in the future” (MacFarlane 
and Khong, 2006:265). However, the burden of providing security does not lie with the 
state alone: “unlike traditional approaches that vest the state with full responsibility for 
state security, the process of human security involves a much broader spectrum of actors 
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and institutions – especially people themselves” (CHS, 2003:6). Human security makes 
sovereignty conditional on protecting individuals according to standards set by the human 
security agenda. It is not about marginalizing the state but rather about redefining the 
responsibility upon which the recognition of state sovereignty is dependent.  
Newman (Newman, 2004) suggests that the focus on individuals permits a reassessment 
of the relation between the state and the citizen, as state legitimacy becomes more directly 
dependent on meeting citizens’ demands inside than on the ability to protect against a 
hostile outside. In this context, the ‘state reconfiguration thesis’ put forward by some 
scholars of globalization is instructive. For adherents to this thesis, the state is not a fixed 
concept but is subject to constant change. On this premise, globalization is reconfiguring, 
and is itself a product of the reconfiguration of, states (Clark, 1999, Mann, 1997, Shaw, 
1997). In terms of the diminishing importance of territoriality in international relations 
and the implications for sovereignty as exemplified in the context of human security, a 
widely held view is that “a state’s identity, in terms of its ability to perform certain key 
functions, may no longer be so intimately connected to territory” (Clark, 1999:84). 
According to Barkin, “A state in the post-Cold War world is, thus, legitimated less by its 
relationship with a given piece of territory and more by its ability to ensure the political 
rights of its citizens.” (Barkin, 1998:249, Clark, 1999).   Thus, the salient statism of human 
security is not only serving to instantiate the state unit but is also reconstituting the kind 
of state unit deemed acceptable in the contemporary global order.  
Human security advocates argue that where states are deemed to be failing, it is the 
responsibility of other centres of power, i.e. the international community, to intervene 
(CHS, 2003). Intervening governing processes take the form of diplomatic pressures, 
preventive development initiatives and, in the extreme case, humanitarian intervention 
(MacFarlane and Khong, 2006). Moreover, it is assumed that given the interdependent and 
transnational character of much human insecurity, individual states are incapable to 
manage on their own. Here too, it is argued that, in the absence of state power to address 
transnational issues, the international community has a ‘responsibility to protect’ 
(International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, United Nations 
High-level Panel on Threats, 2004). In this sense, human security makes sovereignty, 
particularly of developing countries, contingent on protecting individuals according to 
standards set by the human security agenda. It is not about marginalizing the state but 
rather about redefining the responsibility upon which the recognition of state sovereignty 
is dependent. Contingent sovereignty is based on the assumption that the sovereignty of 
states is not absolute. Rather, states are obligated to fulfil the Hobbesian contract as 
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purveyor of security. When this is not honoured, states risk forfeiting claims to non-
intervention (e.g. Duffield, 2007, Elden, 2006, Stewart, 2004).  
Following Weber who argued that state sovereignty is enacted in processes of legitimating 
intervention (Weber, 1995), Duffield contends that the re-modulation of sovereignty into 
contingent sovereignty in human security is the effective means to intervene in order to 
contain, maintain and control non-insured life. Sovereignty is internationalized, negotiable 
and contingent. It is worth mentioning here that, much like Mbembe before him (Mbembe, 
2003), Duffield differentiates between territorial sovereignty over sovereignty over life. In 
this understanding, sovereignty over life is the ability to decide the point of exception; that 
is, the ability to decide which life is worth promoting and which is not. In fact, Duffield 
argues it is this sovereignty over life that is made contingent while territorial integrity 
continues to be respected. Similar to the argument put forward in this thesis about the 
reconstitution of the state and sovereignty within the confines of governmental 
assemblages, for him, when sovereignty over life is made contingent, it becomes a fluid 
and relational zone shaped by interactions between target states, United Nations (UN), 
donor and military agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Drawing on 
work carried out in Mozambique and Afghanistan, Duffield concludes that sovereignty 
over life has come to be contingent insofar as the international community “exerts a good 
deal of control and oversight over core economic, environmental and welfare functions of 
the state,” essentially exerting control over core biopolitical state functions (Duffield, 
2007:82). Interestingly, Duffield makes the case that contingent sovereignty applies to 
nongovernmental organizations too. As such, the independent petty or banal sovereignty 
of NGOs, the sovereignty that lies in “the endless decision making concerning whom to 
help and champion” (Duffield, 2007:52), gradually has been drawn back into the politics of 
donor states making NGO sovereignty over life now contingent on donor sovereignty over 
life.  
While the emergence of contingent sovereignty in Duffield’s account does not obliterate 
the state as a privileged organizing unit in global politics, it does indicate disruption of the 
conventional national/international dichotomy in political imagination. Zones of 
contingent sovereignty, state or non-state led, interact across the imagined inside/outside 
divide. This is most obviously discernible in ‘governance states’ (Harrison, 2004), Duffield 
argues, where the collapse of the national/international dichotomy takes concrete 
physical form in state institutions. A ‘governance state’ is defined by the international 
community forming an integral part of the state. Indeed, a ‘new’ kind of state is argued to 
have been born in which state institutions appear to be functioning as conduits for the 
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transmission of biopolitically informed governmental strategies and mechanisms 
deployed externally to secure insured life. What are the terms of operation for a world of 
states in which the inside/outside divide is collapsing in favour of overlapping zones of 
negotiable and contingent state and non-state sovereignty (Voelkner, 2010:212)? 
Interestingly, in this context, Elbe argues that the securitization of infectious disease has 
given rise to the identification of new types of ‘rogue’ states which resist this process by 
asserting their ‘viral sovereignty’ (Elbe, 2008). Specifically, viral sovereignty came to 
prominence in 2007 when the then Indonesian minister of health argued that deadly 
viruses are the sovereign property of individual nations. This defies international health 
regulations based on principles concerning sharing information in order to prevent 
pandemics (Holbrooke and Garrett, 2008).   
In conclusion, irrespective of claims to the contrary, human security takes for granted that 
the principle site of political order and security provision is the state. Yet, it is not the 
classical state but a reconstituted ‘global’ state operating on contingent sovereignty. 
Steeped in the dangerous ontology outlined above, the state is seen as a self-evident given 
and visible fact of global life whose boundaries are already decided. As Doty has argued, 
“there must be in place a society, a self, with a distinct and meaningful identity that is 
represented by the state” (1996:179). Yet, the state does not exist independent of the 
practices of statecraft which call it into being. The state, following Weber, is the effect of 
citational processes; it is performatively produced (Weber, 1998). She argues elsewhere, 
“it is impossible to talk about the state as an ontological being – as a political identity – 
without engaging in the political practice of constituting the state” (Weber, 1995:3).  
Human security discursively constitutes the state by working to produce, elaborate, and 
enframe the domesticated population of ‘humans’ who at once supply the governmental 
ground of state legitimation and actively serve as agents of statecraft themselves. Human 
security does this through the problematization of the ‘human’ and through the selective 
recognition and externalization of dangers (Ashley, 1989:303). 
Notwithstanding the compelling arguments about the biopolitical logic of human security 
already advanced by scholars of International Relations (de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008, 
Dillon and Reid, 2000, Dillon and Reid, 2001, Elbe, 2009, Roberts, 2010, Truong, 2006), 
little has been said about how human security takes concrete form. In reflecting only on 
programmatic rationalities and top-down flows of power, existent analyses tend to 
deemphasize the incoherence and contingency of power as well as the invention of 
governing practices from below. In so doing, an image of human security is inadvertently 
created in which it seems totalizing and ‘successful' rather than situated, instable, 
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adaptive, unpredictable, and sometimes ‘failing’. An important exception comes in the 
work of Duffield who looked to both the macropolitical narratives and the micropolitical 
mechanisms in Mozambique and Afghanistan in making sense and enhancing our 
understanding of the dynamics of human security (Duffield, 2007). It is in this way, for 
example, that he was able to show how sovereignty is becoming contingent. This thesis 
similarly explores the way the dangerous enframing of human security takes concrete 
form in sites of human security practice though it suggests to do so by tracing the way it 
materializes. Towards this purpose, in the following, I examine the logical framework as a 
governmental thing which begins to set up human security assemblages.  
 
LOGICAL ENFRAMINGS 
 
The governance of life, I would contend, tends towards technocratic practice, resulting in 
the prioritization of effectiveness and efficiency over situated knowledges in the 
conceptualization and enactment of problem management. As Grayson has shown, the 
biopolitical imperative underpinning human security is facilitated by a cosmological 
realism (Grayson, 2008). In this way, human security is constrained in terms of which 
questions about its subjects, objects and dynamics, which kind of research, and which kind 
of practices are allowable. This is evident, for example, in the programmatic practice of 
framing logically. The technocratic search for precision, measurement, and causality that 
defines human security knowledge has political effects. It forms the criteria by which the 
distribution in human security assemblages is arranged. This will be demonstrated in 
more detail in relation to the field analyses that I present in chapters four and five. In 
relation to the technocratic approach of development more generally, Ferguson has 
argued development is an ‘anti-politics machine’ which “pretends to be a disinterested, 
neutral bureaucratic function that exists outside the realm of politics” when in fact its 
programmatic approach has the effect of instituting new logics of political rule (Ferguson, 
1990). In the following, I consider the role of the governmental thing that is the logical 
framework (logframe). The logframe is an object  which organizes the assemblages that 
are set up in the name of human security by aligning the elements according to the 
biopolitical imaginary and strategies outlined above.  
In the mechanisms of human security, as already suggested, target sites are ranked 
according to the calculated Human Development Index and trends are computed for 
prediction purposes. It is based on these numbers that the criteria for targets of human 
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security are established. In this way, the logic of governing through human security takes 
the concept of population as its referent object and works towards improving the well-
being of the populations that are its target. Human security seeks to develop mechanisms 
capable of ensuring the regulation of these populations. It attempts to act directly and 
indirectly through strategies and techniques in order to swing an outlier population into a 
range or field that is considered normal and ultimately conducive to security. Ultimately, 
human security’s understanding of the political, to quote Dillon’s conceptualization of 
biopolitics (Dillon, 1996:31),   
construes the political realm as a domain of calculability in which political 
practices become exercises in the political arithmetic of representation of the 
things to be secured and of the calculuses which will secure them. This makes of 
human being not merely an index of (inter)national security, but an index whose 
very indexicality has to be secured first if there is to be an (inter)national political 
arithmetic at all. 
The logframe and the related logical framework approach (LFA) exemplify the 
calculability on which human security practices are predicated. Since the 1990s, logframes 
have played a central role in development practice. In fact, the logframe was developed as 
a planning approach for the US military in the 1960s, adapted after by the US space agency 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) before finding its way to United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the 1970s, where it was adapted 
to development project planning. In the 1980s, the logframe made its way to Europe. By 
the 1990s, it had become standard requirement to be utilised in the scripting of 
development projects for grant applications. The logframe is a matrix which “summarises 
the main elements of the program of work and connects them to each other”. The LFA is 
considered required thinking about “the wider planning procedures of problem analysis, 
the development of objectives and indicators, and identification risks and assumptions, 
which feed into the overall program plan” (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005:1-3).  
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Figure 1: An example of a logical framework 
 
Logframes and LFAs provide openings and closures, that is, they attempt to fix an 
otherwise messy social field on which standardised, and equally strategically fixed 
operations, can be carried out. Closure is a feature of expert discourses, which enables 
determining too the criteria for project success (Li, 2007). Success is to be measured 
(qualitatively and quantitatively) in terms of the extent to which project output, the 
results that should be within the control of project management, are in line with projected 
outcomes (Mosse, 2005). The logframe is an integral method to the logic of governing 
manifest in the human security approach. The HSF, for example, “recommends the use of 
the logframe,” because logframes are “useful in the design and planning, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of a project. It also makes it easier to report on a project”. In 
other words, it makes the project manageable; after all, “the logframe is a tool for project 
management” (2008:18-9).  
To be a useful management tool, however, the logframe, according to the UNTFHS 
(UNTFHS, 2008), depends on ‘good’ indicators: 
A good indicator is one that can be measured. Indicators provide data that assist 
with making more informed and better decisions throughout the process of a 
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project. An indicator is something that helps the project see if there is any change 
or progress towards achieving the objectives.  
An example for a set of indicators on which human security relies is the Human 
Development Indicators mentioned above which are used to compute the Human 
Development Index.   Standard indicators include ‘life expectancy at birth,’ ‘adult literacy 
rate,’ ‘combined gross enrolment ration of primary, secondary and tertiary schools,’ and 
‘GDP per capita’. These indicators are translated into indexes. Following comparison, an 
average is established, and the normal range of fluctuation within or between populations 
determined. In this way, outlier populations are identified as targets for human security 
intervention. Logframes generate indicators and identify populations for better, 
(understood in terms of effectiveness) project management: these logistical and statistical 
applications ultimately are considered an essential part in providing leverage for the 
management of global human insecurity. While logframes are not exclusive to planning for 
human security, the parameters determining whether a proposed intervention broadly 
meets the criteria set out by the logic of governing through human security are argued to 
be specific (UNTFHS, 2008). Governing a problem through statistical knowledges and 
techniques is not new of course. Human security is utilizing the methods adopted from 
long-standing development practices of which it is also a constituent. In turn, development 
is mainstreaming – through ongoing training programs – established planning methods 
borrowed from other fields such as the military and, more recently, management studies. 
Logframes set up human security assemblages. They are construed as a method for 
determining whether the governance of a messy field is framed ‘logically’ in terms of the 
biopolitical imaginary presented above. Put differently, they are a method for setting out 
what will be included and what not in an assemblage. Logframes identify the problem to 
be tackled (e.g. migrant health in Thailand), construe the narrative within which the 
problem is rationalized (e.g. no access to public services), determine the complex of 
international and local agencies set to govern a specific problem (e.g. the World Health 
Organization and the International Organization for Migration), draw out the populations 
targeted (e.g. 9,500 Burmese migrants in Ranong province), and design the 
implementation activities (e.g. aware-raising events). There is a foreclosure of politics at 
work here, as I go on to demonstrate in two sites of practice in chapters four and five, in 
which all but bio-political mechanisms are excluded. In fact, important but difficult and 
highly political questions such as legal status, informal businesses, exploitation, racism 
and citizenship are not addressed.  
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The exclusion of sensitive political matter from proposed interventions, however, is a 
necessary condition for agencies to negotiate their entry into the sites of human 
insecurity. In this way, organizations are enabled to work alongside and with state 
authorities. Importantly, it also made it possible for agencies to work with populations 
otherwise considered legally aberrant (i.e., not generally qualified to receive public 
services such as illegal migrants). By rendering a local problem technical, in which 
disparate datasets and expert knowledges, strategies and practices are assembled, human 
security actors begin to align the objectives of local state authorities with global 
imperatives, on whom it writes forms of subjectivation in pursuit of managing human 
insecurity, e.g. training in self-medication. Through the governmental thing of the 
logframe, human security presents in the space of a few paragraphs an assemblage with a 
discreet problem, target population, evidence, strategies, methods, tools, funds, and 
solution. 
Thus, I contend, in contrast to the call for participation and collective problem-solving 
evident in human security, it can be criticized for its exclusionary assumptions about the 
nature of politics. Firstly, the governance of life tends towards technocratic practice, 
resulting in the prioritization of effectiveness and efficiency over situated knowledges in 
the conceptualization and enactment of problem management. On the other hand, its 
emphasis on participation and the widening of actors including the ‘governed’– giving rise 
to political subjectivities  such as ‘communities’, ‘partners’, ‘stakeholders’ – is 
representative of a particular kind of politics built around political consensus and 
problem-solving. The promotion of ‘good governance’ involves only one kind of politics to 
the exclusion of alternatives. Specifically, ‘good governance,’ as Walters has already 
shown, is equated with a narrow and instrumental form of democracy which “functions as 
little more than an institutional support for market-oriented reforms”. Effectively, global 
institutions operate according to a depoliticized, technical rationale on the basis of which 
they promote political reform in ‘target’ countries (Walters, 2004:34). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter examined the tacit knowledges which direct and circumscribe narratives and 
practices of human security. Specifically, I argued that human security, in aiming to foster 
life, is a form of biopolitics which has the goal to regulate targeted populations globally 
through the notion of global governance. As such, I suggested that human security 
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operates on a metanarrative of ‘complexity’ which helps to constitute an imaginative 
geography that delineates the excess of the kind of human life to be protected which I 
argued is inscribed a dangerous value in the contemporary ‘complex’ world.  This 
‘complex’ reality that it presumes to exist informs the kind of problematizations, spaces, 
agents and mechanisms through which human security governs. Indeed, it is a biopolitical 
imaginary which gives rise to specifically ordered human security assemblages as this 
thesis demonstrates. In describing what must be secured, human security also operates on 
an imperative to govern which presumes the necessity of a heterarchical order in which 
self-governing networks and trained subjects manage human insecurity. Specifically, 
human security engineers systemic self-governance through learning and training in the 
logic of resilience. Moreover, I argued that its dangerous ontology commits human 
security to a re-configured Hobbesian state which operates on contingent or conditional 
sovereignty.  In so far as this narrative is carried forward into its practices, human security 
is a form of statecraft.   
Critiques which take human security as a site of biopolitics and governmentality have 
tended to reflect only on the programmatic rationalities and technologies of governance, 
consequently greatly downplaying the incoherence and contingency of power. In fact, 
generally, little has been said about how human security assemblages play out in sites of 
practice. As I noted in the introduction, if human security is not only partly generated by 
the intermingling of dispersed material and other (spatiotemperal) processes but is also 
dependent on the corporeal world which it comprises, then, it seems crucial to analyse the 
political implications of human security not in terms of the intentions of the programmatic 
agenda but in terms of the assemblage organizing around a human security problem. In 
other words, I depart from the text-centred hermeneutic models of the past and engage in 
the messy, material field itself. What kinds of politics of human security do these sites 
reveal? Before taking up an investigation of the way human security takes concrete effect 
in two situated moments, the following chapter examines the constitutive role of material 
objects in helping human security to emerge as a political strategy in these sites. 
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3 THE POLITICAL AGENCY OF ASSEMBLAGES 
 
 
 
At the beginning of the Millennium, an e(lectronic)-mail is sent from an ‘online’ computer 
connected to the internet19 at the office of the HSU in New York to an online computer at 
the ILO headquarters in Geneva where it is forwarded to another online computer at the 
ILO Southeast Asian Regional Office in Bangkok. The e-mail addresses a request for 
amendments to the logical framework – the template of which can be downloaded and 
printed off the HSU webpage hosted by an unknown local server from anywhere 
connected to the internet – which was part of an ILO application for UNTHS funding for a 
project to control human trafficking from and within Southeast Asia by preventing its 
recurrence in the Mekong basin in Vietnam and Cambodia. Upon satisfying the 
requirements put forward in previous email communications between the HSU Chief 
administering the UNTFHS and ILO officials, and the receipt of final confirmation from 
officials at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo,  USD 1.5m - represented as 
so many pixels on a screen – were transferred in a specific pattern of zeros and ones, 
inducing the flow of capital from New York to Geneva to Bangkok to the ILO country 
offices Hanoi and Phnom Phenh and to local project partners along the Mekong.20 
 
Human security is embodied and exists in a myriad of material objects dispersed around 
the world including, as the above event suggests, emails, computers, the internet, offices, 
institutions, management tools such as the logframe, capital, pixels, digits, and the river 
Mekong. These objects play a constitutive role in enacting the order of human security that 
I investigate in this thesis. Though some material objects like small arms, earthquakes, CO2 
emissions, viruses, and ozone are emphasized in the literature on human security, they 
tend to appear not as playing a part in the politics of human security but as raw, brute or 
                                                             
19 The global system of interconnected computer networks consisting of private, public, academic, 
business, and government networks is linked by an array of electronic and optical networking 
technologies. 
20 This scenario was written for the purposes of the arguments that follow. The electronic 
communication between the different points and the transfer of funds did indeed take place for the 
implementation of the human security project in Vietnam that is the subject of chapter five. 
However, since the precise details of this happening are unknown, I have created this fictional 
account so as to demonstrate the tangle of human and non-human elements in bringing human 
security to life.  
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inert objects whose existence either benefits or risks the state of (global) human security.  
Contrary to this tendency to depreciate material objects to the passive background setting 
of human security, this thesis sees them as giving the struggle of human security concrete 
form. By drawing attention to the materiality of human security, it is not possible to 
present it as a coherent and totalizing mode of governance as some of the biopolitical 
accounts of human security that I introduced in the preceding chapter have tended to do. 
Instead, it becomes clear that its materiality is actively involved in the (mis)management 
of human insecurity. In this context, though Foucault toyed with the idea of a materialism 
of the incorporeal in which he emphasized the constitutive role of material forces in giving 
rise to power effects such as political imaginaries and governmental logics, others have 
more decidedly, if controversially, expressed the dynamic and mobile forces of both 
human and nonhuman agencies in helping specific sciences, politics and subjectivities to 
emerge (e.g. Barad, 2007, Bennett, 2010, Coward, 2009, de Landa, 1991, Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004, Hinchliffe, 2007, Latour, 2004, Mitchell, 2002).  
Accordingly, in order to understand the political significance of material objects in human 
security, this chapter introduces and advances Foucault’s materialism by particularly 
elaborating on the Deleuzian conception of the machinic assemblage. Foucault and Deleuze 
shared a relational ontology in which the interaction between human and nonhuman 
elements in an assemblage is ontologically more fundamental than the elements 
themselves. As I show in this chapter, implicit in Foucault’s work but elaborated by 
Deleuze and Guattari is a distributive form of agency which arises in the relationality 
between the elements. It is this agency which engenders states of power such as 
governmental strategies. In the following, I begin by drawing out Foucault’s conception of 
materialism which arises in his earlier work from the evolving framework of his ontology 
of radical relationality. Foucault’s review of Deleuze’s immanent materialism in 
Theatricum Philosophicum leads me to consider Deleuze and Jane Bennett’s conception of 
‘thing-power’ and agency in assemblages (Bennett, 2010). Finally, I develop a narrative of 
human security’s dispersed emergence with and in the corporeal world which informs my 
interpretations of its emergence in Thailand and Vietnam which I discuss in chapters four 
and five. As the epigraph implies, tracing material objects not only shows the ways in 
which the global is localized and the local materializes. It also helps to demonstrate, on the 
one hand, the various ways in which governmental logics like human security are 
performed, on the other hand, the ways in which they are inherently adaptive and 
unstable.  
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FOUCAULT’S MATERIALISM 
 
In an interview in 1993, Latour suggested that Foucault, in what he called “the typically 
French attitude,” harboured a “complete belief” in the ‘solidity’ and passivity of 
nonhumans. The real test of Foucault’s redefinition of power, he argued, “would be to see 
whether or not the nonhumans [...] can be brought into his description”. Otherwise, if 
power is limited to human interactions, Latour claimed, Foucault’s redefinition of power is 
reductive (Crawford, 1993:252). Latour of course wants to “accommodate the nonhumans 
in the fabric of our society” (Crawford, 1993:262). He holds that the constructed realms of 
‘nature’ and ‘society’ are not separate but “completely related”. In fact, ‘natural’ 
(nonhuman) and ‘social’ (human) entities are ‘agents in association’ or actants – a term 
coined by Latour (Latour, 1993, Latour, 1987) to refer to human and non-human elements 
with agential capacity – within networks that involve different forces, spatial scales, and 
temporalities which, in combination, are capable of producing effects (Crawford, 
1993:260). In this view, things happen in the world because human and nonhuman actants 
have the capacity to strike alliances, forming partnerships and new networks or using, 
furthering or distorting networks already in place. Foucault similarly championed a form 
of ‘radical relationality,’ in which “the emergent property of bodies” is “contingent upon 
the modes of relationality productive of and mediated by them” (Dillon, 2000:5). However, 
as Latour contends, Foucault only raised the problem of materialism but “did not do the 
work” of bringing nonhuman agency into his description of power (Crawford, 1993:252). 
Contrary to Latour’s understanding, it is conceivable that Foucault considered nonhuman 
agency in his description of power, albeit only tangentially. Crucially, as he noted in his 
description of assemblages, people are never entirely in control of the world, since the 
mode of relationality of assemblages can give rise to new – and, for the human element, 
potentially unintended and undesirable – effects (Foucault, 1980:195-6). That (human 
security) politics, nonetheless, appears as the effect of singular human intention is, as 
Coward (Coward, 2006:421) has argued, the legacy of Enlightenment thinking, which 
regards the human, ‘by virtue of being the sole element endowed with reason’, as taking 
precedence over, and as master of, all other elements. This anthropocentricism remains 
salient in modern thinking, producing a world in which productive forms of activity 
remain the preserve of humans and not of human–non-human alliances (Bennett, 
2005:455). The thesis shows how such thinking is carried forward into human security 
mechanisms, overshadowing not only the constitutive role of human–non-human alliances 
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in giving concrete form to human security strategies and effects but also, importantly, the 
inherently contingent and precarious nature of these effects.  
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, a reflection on the relation between rhetoric and 
power/knowledge that he originally published in 1969, Foucault began sketching his kind 
of materialism by considering the materiality of language and modern history in the 
making. Here, Foucault was mainly interested not in what language (and history) had to 
say as such but in how it emerges, amongst others, through, and in relation to, materiality. 
His conception of materiality, however, had less to do with the material quality of artefacts 
such as computers and more to do with the material mode of relationality of assemblages 
which consist of linguistic, spatio-temporal as well as material elements. In this 
conception, the materiality of human security does not correspond to the individual 
materials or substances of artefacts or sounds through which it is articulated or expressed 
but refers to the relationality of the set of materials, material processes and relations 
which come to define what is (im)possible in human security practice. A year later, in 
1970, Foucault further advanced and specified these materialist ideas in his inaugural 
speech at the Collège de France, ‘The Order of Discourse,’ and in his review essay of 
Deleuze’s work, Theatricum Philosophicum (1981, 1998). Here, he called for a materialism 
of the incorporeal which, though not nominally present in his later work, nonetheless 
informed his analytics of power.  
In The Archaeology of Knowledge, focusing on the statement in his analysis of language, 
Foucault (emphasis added, Foucault, 2002:112) argued that it must have a material 
existence: 
The statement is always given through some material medium, even if that 
medium is concealed, even if it is doomed to vanish as soon as it appears. And the 
statement not only needs this materiality; its materiality is not given to it, [...] once 
all determinants have been fixed: it is partly made up of this materiality.  
Thus, the statement co-emerges with and through the materiality that it consists of. Put 
differently, a statement is itself an assemblage comprising heterogeneous, including 
material, relations that are constitutive of the characteristics of the statement. A 
statement, according to Foucault, has a material being which inhabits a specific space and 
time that combine in a specific way, defining its materiality. When these requisites change, 
he argued, the whole texture of the materiality changes, consequently changing the 
identity of the statement (2002:113).  
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This said, how is it possible to determine its identity, if a statement, for example ‘Human 
security now!,’21 is articulated in multiple, dispersed, and differentiated spatio-temporal 
and material enunciations, repetitions, and transcriptions, such as when a voice articulates 
it, a surface such as the logframe bears its signs, when it is embodied in a ‘sense-perceptive 
element’ such as the mouth, when it leaves a trace, no matter how minuscule, “in 
someone’s memory or in some space”? While the enunciation is an unrepeatable event, 
however, what stands out and is endlessly repeatable in enunciations, according to 
Foucault, is not their ‘small’ deviations in time, place, and material support which he 
argues are not significant enough to change the identity of a statement but the general 
form of a statement, e.g. a sentence, a meaning, a proposition. It is in this sense that a 
statement cannot be reduced to any specific artefact or material media such as a type-
writer or loud-speaker or a time and place. On the other hand, nor can a statement simply 
be reduced only to a grammatical or logical form since, according to Foucault, “to a greater 
degree than that form, and in a different way, [a statement] is susceptible to differences of 
material, substance, time, and place” (2002:112-5).  
Thus, the statement is unique: it is “neither entirely linguistic, nor exclusively material” 
(Foucault, 2002:97): it cannot with identified with certainty in the way it was first uttered 
as it is endlessly repeatable; on the other hand, it is not as free as a pure form because it is 
bound up with its environment. What, then, is that materiality proper to a statement 
which allows it to be repeated occasionally? For Foucault, the materiality of the statement 
is not “a perceptible, qualitative materiality, expressed in the form of colour, sound, or 
solidity, and divided up by the same spatiotemporal observation as the perceptual space” 
(2002:115). Rather, it is more akin to an assemblage whose elementary relationality 
defines “possibilities of reinscription and transcription (but also thresholds and limits), 
rather than limited and perishable individualities” of say enunciations (2002:116). Put 
differently, the statement partly emerges out of relations with materials. As it emerges in 
its materiality, the statement, according to Foucault, “appears with a status, enters various 
networks and various fields of use, is subjected to transferences or modifications, is 
integrated into operations and strategies in which its identity is maintained or effaced” 
(2002:118). Thus the identity of statements like ‘Human security now!,’ is an effect 
generated by modes of relationality which are constantly subject to change. In this sense, 
statements have distinctive histories of formation and finite life spans.  
Correspondingly, in history, Foucault contended, the document is not “the language of a 
voice since reduced to silence” or “an inert material through which [historical statements 
                                                             
21 This is the title of the report of the Commission on Human Security published in 2003.  
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try] to reconstitute what men have done or said”; rather, modern history co-emerges with 
the document, “trying to define with the documentary material itself unities, totalities, 
series, relations” (emphasis added, Foucault, 2002:7). According to Foucault, history is not 
an ancient collective consciousness that refreshes its memory through its material being. 
Rather, distributed in material documentation including books, texts, accounts, registers, 
acts, buildings, institutions, laws, techniques, objects, and customs, modern history is, in 
fact, “one way in which a society recognises and develops a mass of documentation with 
which it is inextricably linked” (emphasis added, Foucault, 2002:7). Thus, effects of social 
relations, e.g. historical, political, and artistic statements, partly emerge out of relations 
with materials. In turn, books, texts, and buildings are material objects whose properties, 
e.g. an ‘Edwardian’ house, emerge in material-discursive relation. Indeed, materiality and 
intelligibility are linked in ways irreducible to a function of signification or historical form.  
In ‘The Order of Discourse,’ Foucault proposed to treat discourses as events which, he 
argued, emerge in relation to the material world. Similar to his conception of the 
statement, he (emphasis added, 1981:69) defined the discourse/event as 
neither substance nor accident, neither quality nor process; the event is not of the 
order of bodies. And yet it is not something immaterial either; it is always at the 
level of materiality that it takes effect, that it is effect; it has its locus and it consists 
in the relation, the coexistence, the dispersion, the overlapping, the accumulation, 
and the selection of material elements. It is not the act or the property of a body; it 
is produced as an effect of, and within, a dispersion of matter. Let us say that the 
philosophy of the event should move in the at first sight paradoxical direction of 
materialism of the incorporeal. 
A materialism of the incorporeal seems paradoxical, Kelly (2008:13) suggests, because 
materialism is a material ontology. On the other hand, the incorporeal does not have a 
body and is thus immaterial. Yet, statements or events are incorporeal, i.e. they are not of 
‘the order of bodies,’ but neither are they immaterial since they emerge in the material 
world. Thus, the materiality of the incorporeal is not material in the sense of a materialist 
ontology but in the sense of the incorporeal co-emerging with and in a world of dispersed, 
overlapping, and accumulating matter.  
While matter or the material, as Latour suggested, appears undifferentiated in these 
works, in his review, Theatricum Philosophicum, of Deleuze’s ‘metaphysical treatise,’ Logic 
of Sense, however, Foucault may have tried marking a kind of material dynamism or 
agency when he wrote about an incorporeal dimension of bodies (Bennett, 2010:57). In 
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reference to Logic of Sense, he noted, “the body-organism is linked to the world through a 
network of primal significations which arise from the perception of things”. This 
incorporeal dimension consisting of phantasms that form “the impenetrable and 
incorporeal surface of bodies,” shaping and falsely presenting a centred organism, are 
produced out, Foucault contends (Foucault, 1998:346), of material surface effects:  
emissions proceeding from deep within bodies and rising like the wisps of a fog – 
interior phantoms that are quickly reabsorbed into other depths by the sense of 
smell, by the mouth, by the appetites, extremely thin membranes that detach 
themselves from surfaces of objects and proceed to impose colors and contours 
deep within our eyes (floating epiderm, visual idols).   
This “swarming of the impalpable,” argued Foucault, must be redeemed from the 
unthought. Foucault called for a philosophy of the phantasms which emerge among the 
surfaces of the corporeal world to which it is related (Foucault, 1998:346).  
Phantasms constitute what Foucault called incorporeal materiality. Firstly, because a 
phantasm is “not quite a discrete body or substantial corpus,” secondly, as Bennett 
suggests, because “this mobile activity remains immanent to the material world, remains 
in-corporeality” (original emphasis, Bennett, 2010:57). Phantasms function at the limit of 
bodies. According to Foucault, they “stick to bodies and protrude from them,” “touch them, 
cut them, break them into sections, regionalize them, and multiply their surfaces”. They 
function between bodies according to laws of proximity, entanglement, and differential 
distance (Foucault, 1998:346-7). They stimulate human perception, “for it is these mobile 
floaters that hit our sense apparatus” (Bennett, 2010:57). As such, they are not beings or 
nonbeings, they are extrabeings, incorporeal things which are embodied and exist within 
the material world (Foucault, 1998:347). For Foucault, in his discussion of phantasms, 
Deleuze registers that which has remained unthought in philosophical discourse. Foucault 
recounts Deleuze’s example of the mouth. It is through the mouth, he explains, “that 
cartloads of food pass as well as carts of meaning (if you say cart, a cart passes through 
your mouth)”. The mouth is the canal “where cries are broken into phonemes, 
morphemes, semantemes: the mouth where the profundity of an oral body separates itself 
from incorporeal meaning” (1998:354).  
Considering these tentative steps towards a materialism of the incorporeal, is it possible to 
conceive of the identity or emergent property of the incorporeal such as the statement 
‘Human security now!’ or a political rationality such as state of reason, as emerging and 
taking effect in relation to, but being also contingent on, the arrangement of an ensemble 
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of differential material including materially different tracings of phonemes, ‘sense-
perceptive elements’ and ‘someone’s memory’? How do relations of power figure in these 
considerations?  
 
IMMANENT MATERIALISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE AGENCY 
 
Though Foucault may not have mentioned ‘incorporeal materiality’ again and in 
subsequent work dedicated his focus to the analysis of economies of power and the 
emergence of strategic imperatives such as governmental logics and their effects in and 
through assemblages, nonetheless, it can be argued, contrary to Latour’s opening remark 
about Foucault’s neglect of nonhuman agencies, that he brought material dynamism into 
his description of power, however tangentially. This is because Foucault understood 
power not as possessed by humans but to be “the multiplicity of force relations immanent 
in the sphere in which they operate” of which the human is but one element to have an 
effect (Foucault, 1998:92). Put differently, states of power emerge in the interaction 
between the differential elements of an assemblage. Taking into account also his prior 
considerations concerning the materialism of the incorporeal, the multiplicity of force 
relations conceivably refers to the encounter between different ‘inhuman and 
subindividual forces’ – prior to nature/culture, form/matter distinctions constructions – 
immanent in a heterogeneous field comprising, amongst others, disparate bodies, their 
dispositions, forms of matter, substances, and materially different tracings (Cheah, 
1996:124). It is this dynamism in their differential encounter which constitute[s] their 
own organization and which, according to Foucault, ultimately gives rise to states of 
power (Foucault, 1998:92). In this sense, all elements immanent in a sphere are 
constitutive of the sphere. Put differently, they are ‘agents in association’ or actants within 
a network, capable of producing in combination whole power effects whose power, 
however, is dependent on the actants it can mobilize on its behalf.22 
                                                             
22 It should be noted here that Foucault’s body of work is principally concerned with the 
discursive/social construction in/of the world which largely departs from the vitalist ontology of 
the new materialists which proceeds on the assertion that there is a mind-independent world or a 
world prior to construction. While scholars such as Cheah have attempted to show that the 
ontological gap between Foucault’s and new materialist thinking is not as significant as usually 
assumed, others like Aradau argue that although Foucault was concerned with the materiality of 
power and bodies he rejected ‘things’ anterior to discourse (Aradau, 2010:493). Indeed, the 
majority of contemporary scholarship drawing on Foucault maintains that the world is not a priori 
but only emerges in discourse. Bearing this in mind, in this thesis, I consciously proceed on a partial 
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What, then, is the ability to produce power effects, to make a difference; in other words, 
what is the agency of assemblages? Anthropocentric notions of agency, Jane Bennett 
argues, are conceptually and empirically inadequate to describe the ability of all, human as 
well as nonhuman, elements to produce an effect (Bennett, 2005:446). She proposes to 
theorize agency without presupposing human intentions and behaviours by focusing on 
the distributive as well as composite nature of agency of heterogeneous assemblages. In 
this understanding, the productive power behind effects such as a statement, a document, 
an event, discourses discussed here like human security, migrant health, and human 
trafficking, is always a collectivity. Put differently, the power to create emerges from the 
interplay of the differential elements that assemblages comprise including human bodies, 
intentions, intellect, feelings, political imaginaries, institutions, scriptures, computers, 
capital flows, virus, and logframes. Indeed, in Bennett’s compelling account, human agency 
itself is “always already distributed in tools, microbes, minerals, and sounds, it only 
emerges as agentic by way of a distribution into the ‘foreign’ materialities its bearer are 
eager to exclude” (Bennett, 2005:463). Thus, the agency of assemblages originates not in 
human initiative or any single element within it but results from its spatiotemporal 
configuration.  
Nonetheless, according to Bennett, each element maintains an agentic capacity emerging 
from its membership in the collectivity. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari and Bergson, for 
Bennett, the ‘nonhuman’ itself exudes a ‘thing power’, a vitality and potentiality, 
irreducible to social constructions. While assemblages include humans and their 
constructions, in her narrative of enchanted materialism, they include also some very 
active and powerful nonhumans such as electrons, trees, wind, and electromagnetic fields. 
Some have “sufficient coherence to appear as entities”; others, “because of their great 
volatility, fast pace of evolution, or minuteness of scale, are best conceived as forces” 
(Bennett, 2005:446-7). Consider metal, a “conduct of all matter,” Deleuze and Guattari 
argue. It brings “to light a life proper to matter, a vital state of matter as such, a material 
vitalism” which they concede exists everywhere but does not normally figure on the 
human radar (emphasis added, Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:454). After all, metal is 
everywhere: even the waters, the grasses and varieties of wood, the animals are populated 
by salts or mineral elements. In this account, individual entities and singular forces, 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
and strategic reading of Foucault for purposes of emphasizing the heterogeneity (and especially the 
role of nonhuman elements) of assemblages/dispositives. Undoubtedly, there is much work still to 
be done in thinking the implications of a new materialist ontology vis-a-vis a Foucauldian 
(materialist) analysis which I plan to investigate in future work after the thesis.  
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human and nonhuman, each exercise energetic pulses which, in fact, constitute the self-
organization and distribution of assemblages.  
In fact, all actants maintain “an energetic pulse slightly ‘off’” from the agency of the 
assemblage (Bennett, 2005:447). Accordingly, assemblages are characterized by relations 
of exteriority. Actants composing the assemblage have a certain autonomy and may be 
detached from an assemblage and plugged into a different assemblage in which its 
interactions are different. Importantly, the properties of the components can never explain 
the relations which constitute a whole: “relations do not have as their cause the properties 
of the [components] between which they are established”. Yet, the agentic capacity of 
material elements alters the paths of the multiple lines of forces which determine the 
mode of relationality of assemblages, thereby also altering the effects that they help to 
constitute. Thus, the mode of agency of assemblages is nonlinear, non-hierarchical, non-
subject-oriented. It is in this sense also that Bennett has referred to assemblages as ‘living-
throbbing groupings’ whose “coherence always exists with energies and countercultures 
that exceed and confound it”. Indeed, assemblages are characterized by an open-
endedness because of the agentic capacity of its differential elements (Bennett, 
2005:445n2).  
Bennett demonstrates the agency of the dynamic interactions between the ‘human’ and 
‘nonhuman’ in the example of the North American blackout affecting over 50 million 
people in the United States and Canada in 2003. The electrical grid, in her description, is a 
“volatile mix of coal, sweat, electromagnetic fields, computer programs, electron streams, 
profit motives, heat, lifestyles, nuclear fuel, plastic, fantasies of mastery, static, legislation, 
water, economic theory, wire” and many more actants (Bennett, 2005:448). It becomes 
clear in her demonstration not only that the ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman' cannot be separated 
– they are inextricably interlinked – but that the power blackout cannot be explained by 
human failure alone. It was the result of a cascade of events including voltage collapse, 
self-protective withdrawals from the grid as well as human decisions and omissions. Not 
only does Bennett identify an assortment of agencies complicit in the implosion of the 
electrical grid, she observes “a world where agency is distributed” (Bennett, 2005:451). 
Human intentions, she argues, although they very occasionally control, are always clashing 
with, the trajectories of other beings, forces, or institutions.  Indeed, she concludes, 
although human thought is essential to political transformations, the nature of political 
change cannot be reduced to a function of humans. Politics is the combined effect of a 
range of bodies (Bennett, 2005:454). A similar tale is told by actor-network theorists. For 
example, in Aramis (Latour, 1996), Latour demonstrates how the material forces such as 
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electricity and magnets of machines as well as human bodies, words, regulations played an 
active role in the emergence and implosion of the assemblage  of Aramis, an experimental 
mass transit system in Paris in the 1980s.  
Distributive and composite accounts of agency unsettle traditional accounts of power 
since to distribute agency more widely entails the impossibility of a single, preformed 
agent (in the form of a person or institution) giving effect to power. Rather, power (and 
human agency) emerges in the relation between a heterogeneous set of actants. Put 
differently, a range of human and nonhuman elements must be mobilized in order to make 
a (political) difference. Following this conception of agency, notions like human security 
do not travel disembodied or are mobilized only in epistemic communities but are carried 
and enabled as well as disabled through specific materialities (including the human body) 
that are circumstantial, unevenly distributed, unpredictable and contingent. Secondly, 
reconceptualizing agency as distributive and composite begs the political question, who or 
what is to be held responsible or accountable for practices in the world? Bennett asks, 
“Does the acknowledgement of nonhuman actants relieve individual humans of the burden 
of being responsible for their actions?” Indeed, in drawing out the assembled nature of 
agency in, for example, security practice, can the human ever be held entirely responsible 
for the consequences of securitization? As I detail below, by arguing that the human 
element is never entirely in control, Foucault himself inadvertently claims that can never 
be held absolutely accountable for the political effects they attempt to engineer in the 
world (Foucault, 1980:195).   
 
THE MICROPHYSICS OF POWER AND THE EXCESS OF STRATEGY 
 
In fact, Foucault’s conception of a microphysics of power as the heterogeneous field of 
intervention mediating between the state and the materiality of bodies and forces can be 
read as exemplifying the subindividual dynamism in governmental assemblages 
constitutive of power effects as discussed above (Foucault, 1979:26). Specifically, in 
Discipline and Punish, he wrote a history of punishment against the background of “a 
history of bodies”. The body, he argued, is “directly involved in a political field; power 
relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it 
to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs”. He exposed the minuscule and 
mundane techniques and everyday practices through which the human body is invested 
with power. He asked how the deployments of power are connected to the body; how is 
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the body disciplined and normalized. He analysed the ‘panoptic machine’ that is the 
French prison of the nineteenth century in terms of “the whole technique of forces and 
bodies” (Foucault, 1979:217) assembled in response to a new demand for productive 
labour. Crucially, it can be argued, his was an interrogation into the processes by which the 
mode of relationality pertaining to the human and nonhuman elements and forces 
comprising the machinic assemblage of the prison was rearranged towards the careful 
fabrication of ‘docile,’ analysable and manipulable, bodies.  
For example, incorporeal norms of organization were distributed and solidified in material 
documentation through ‘a power of writing’ that concerned “the accumulation of 
documents, their seriation, the organization of comparative fields making it possible to 
classify, to form categories, to determine averages, to fix norms,” and, in the final instance, 
to render individuals legible and thus amenable to governance (Foucault, 1979:189-90). 
Secondly, by binding, through “instrumental coding,” “the whole surface of contact 
between the body and the object it handles,” e.g. a rifle, fastening them to one another, the 
forces of the materiality of the body and the rifle were intertwined in such a way as to 
constitute governable complexes of body-weapon, body-tool, body-machine (emphasis 
added, Foucault, 1979:153). For example (Foucault, 1979:153):  
Raise the rifle with the right hand, bringing it close to the body so as to hold it 
perpendicular with the right knee, the end of the barrel at eye level, grasping it by 
striking it with the right hand, the arm held close to the body at waist level. 
Thirdly, by organizing the prison into complex, at once architectural, functional and 
hierarchical, spaces such as ‘cell,’ ‘places,’ and ‘ranks,’ positions were fixed to permit 
strategic circulation. Foucault considered these spaces ‘real’ insofar as they “govern the 
disposition of buildings, rooms, furniture” and ‘ideal’ since they embodied an arrangement 
of “characterizations, assessments, hierarchies” (emphasis added, Foucault, 1979:148). 
Finally, by ‘striking’ the bodiless reality of the non-corporeal soul, that is, “the heart, the 
thought, the will, the inclinations” of individuals (Foucault, 1979:16), subjects could be 
brought into being “which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the 
body” and its materiality and forces (Foucault, 1979:30).  
Indeed, through “the concerted articulation of the elementary parts” comprising the prison 
assemblage such as in and through documents, repetitive training, strategic architectural 
designing, differential forces were composed to obtain “an efficient machine,” in other 
words a successful mode of governance, to maximize specific effects such as altered minds 
or the body-machine complex “which had to be superior to the sum of elementary forces 
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that composed it” (Foucault, 1979:163-4). Thus, material objects and forces, whether as 
tools such as documents, weapons, the human body, as architectural or spatial 
arrangements, or as ‘inclinations’ imprinted in human brains, play an intrinsic part in 
producing in combination power effects such as ‘docile’ subjects. Yet, the fabrication of 
‘docile’ bodies was also physically resisted: relations of power traverse the body, exerting 
pressure on it; in turn, the body resists the grip that they have on it. Relations of power 
“are not univocal; they define innumerable points of confrontation, focuses of instability, 
each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at least temporary 
inversion of the power relations” (Foucault, 1979:26).  
In The History of Sexuality: Vol.1 published a year later, Foucault theorized power in terms 
of “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the field of intervention in which they 
operate and which constitute their own organization” (Foucault, 1998:92). Secondly, 
power is the process which, through countless struggles, transforms, bolsters, or upsets 
the multiplicity of immanent force relations. Power, then, is “the support these force 
relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the 
disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another”.                                          
Ultimately, it is the strategies in which relations of force take effect in the world whose 
general design becomes embodied and institutionalized, for example, in the state 
assemblage (Foucault, 1998:92). Thus,  power results not from a central point of 
sovereignty but from the dynamic base of local, differential, and unstable force relations 
(Foucault, 1998:93). A machinic assemblage such as human security is always both 
inscribed in the play of power and linked to specific coordinates of knowledge emerging 
from and conditioning it. It is in this sense that human security assemblages are of a 
strategic nature: they inhabit “a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either 
developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilizing them, utilizing them, 
etc” (Foucault, 1980:196).  
In fact, from this perspective, human beings are never entirely in control of the worlds 
they carve out to govern since the interrelation between actants produces differential 
effects that enter “into resonance or contradiction” with each other, perpetually calling for 
a “re-adjustment [...] of the heterogeneous elements,” producing new, and for the human 
element potentially unintended and undesirable, effects (Foucault, 1980:195-6). Foucault 
referred to this as a process of functional overdetermination. In other words, it is the 
process when the strategy becomes increasingly incongruent with the dynamic 
distribution of the assemblage.  On the other hand, as Foucault has shown too, a 
readjustment of elements has resulted also in a readjustment of strategic imperatives. He 
103 
 
referred to this process as strategic elaboration (Foucault, 1980:195). In effect, the excess 
of strategic imperatives resulted in the (creative) elaboration of strategies. Thus, in the 
Birth of Biopolitics, Foucault explained that “the logic of strategy is the logic of connections 
between the heterogeneous and not the logic of homogenization of the contradictory” 
(Foucault, 2008:42). For example, Foucault was able to demonstrate, the prison made 
mechanisms of detention appear to be the most efficient and rational approach to deal 
with criminality while what was in fact constituted was a delinquent milieu wholly 
different from what was intended or expected. This happened because the prison, 
according to Foucault, “operated as a process of filtering, concentrating, professionalizing 
and circumscribing a criminal milieu”. However, Foucault also observed the way the 
existence of the delinquent milieu subsequently gave rise to the formulation of new 
strategies such as the organization of prostitution for profit (Foucault, 1980:195-6, 
Foucault, 1979:264-68).  
Similarly, Timothy Mitchell has demonstrated the way governmental logics, mechanisms, 
and their readjustment are not the result of only human intentions and ideas but arise 
from a process of energetic manufacture whose ingredients are both human and 
nonhuman (Mitchell, 2002:42-3). In this process, as Foucault himself suggested, there are 
always forces which exceed the grasp of governance. In Pandora’s Hope, Latour similarly 
noted “the slight surprise of action” that is inherent to assemblages (Latour, 1999:281). It 
is in fact this excess which engenders new scientific expertise and governmental logics in 
so far as the tension inherent to the interaction between the elements calls for a (creative) 
readjustment of strategies (Mitchell, 2002:38). Specifically, Mitchell investigated the way a 
chain of events in Egypt involving war, disease, and agriculture led to the malaria epidemic 
in 1942-44. He argued that the disaster was the result of interactions between human 
agents and a variety of nonhuman agencies including the anopheles mosquito, the 
faciparum parasite, the chemical properties of ammonium nitrate, the 75mm guns, and the 
hydraulic force of the river (Mitchell, 2002:27-30).  
In spite of the active involvement of nonhuman agencies in world events, however, it is 
usually only the human (the intellect, intentions and ideas) who appears as the agent. 
Mitchell explained this conundrum as a result of the power of the narrative of 
rationalization, of technological and social progress in Western development. The story of 
modern life, according to him, is resolved into the binary arrangement nature (materiality) 
versus human expertise (human ingenuity, science) (Mitchell, 2002:36): “Human beings 
are the agents around whose actions and intentions the story is written” (Mitchell, 
2002:29). It is this “narcissistic reflex of human language and thought” that Bennett and 
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others wants to counter (Bennett, 2010). Drawing on Agamben, Martin Coward has noted 
that the roots of anthropocentrism can be traced to Descartes and Kant’s formalization of 
Aristotle’s De Anima. The core of the anthropocentric bias in modern discourses, he 
argues, is the belief in the primacy of the human over all other elements as a result of the 
human being the only element endowed with reason (Coward, 2006:421).  
As the preceding chapter suggests, this anthropocentrism also defines the way human 
security is assembled: its biopolitical imaginary assumes human evolution (development), 
human calculations (statistics), human ordering (logframe), and human constructions (the 
state, sovereignty, networks) can tame the inexorableness of life. Material objects, on the 
other hand, appear as raw, brute, or inert instruments which are either indispensable for 
or disruptive of the functioning of human security. Informing the imaginary is a tendency 
to see the world as a binary of subject (vibrant life) and object (dull matter). Such 
differentiation motivates an anthropocentric focus on the rationality and self-reflexivity of 
agents or on the intersubjective relations of individuals in the production of identity and 
meaning in discourse, ignoring the vital role that matter and material formations play. 
What difference would it make to our understanding of the political significance of human 
security were matter to be figured not simply as an object of discourse but also and more 
radically as an actant?  
As this chapter has shown, the power of incorporeals like human security inhere to 
heterogeneous assemblages. The vital role that digits, monies, and computer screens, 
human bodies and so on play in governing processes affects the way human security 
proceeds in the world. Against anthropocentrism and at the conscious risk of ‘appearing 
naive or foolish’ (Bennett, 2010:xiii), the account that I develop in this thesis is attentive to 
the constitutive role of human and nonhuman elements in the enactment of human 
security. As I suggested earlier, human security is embodied and exists in a myriad of 
material objects dispersed around the world including emails, computers, the internet, 
offices, institutions, management tools such as the logframe, capital, pixels, digits, and the 
river Mekong. Thus, it does not travel disembodied but is carried and enabled as well as 
disabled through specific materialities (including the human body) that render human 
security circumstantial, unevenly distributed, unpredictable and contingent. They give the 
struggle of human security concrete, albeit instable, form. Put differently, they are actively 
involved in the (mis)management of human insecurity which however is always also open 
to (creative, adaptive) readjustment (see also Aradau, 2010, Lundborg and Vaughan-
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Williams, 2011).23 Adopting a relational ontology to the interpretation of human security 
as discussed in this chapter, in the following, I elaborate on a Deleuzian articulation of 
human security which informs my analysis of the fields that I discuss in chapters four and 
five. 
 
(UN)BECOMING HUMAN SECURITY 
 
Human security materializes in dispersed sites. The move to analyse more fragmented 
geographies of human security that I suggest to do here challenges the dominant 
representational practices of the omniscient Cartesian perspective of world order in 
International Relations (Haraway, 1988, Hyndman, 2001). How to account for the 
emergence of human security as a situated political strategy? To begin with, as Foucault 
noted, governmental assemblages such as human security comprise ‘men and things’ 
(Foucault, 2007:96). The things which figure in these assemblages are the material givens 
that make up what he referred to at one time as the “the fine materiality of human 
existence and coexistence”. The things he identified that are of governmental concern 
include “natural givens”  pertaining to geography, climate and physicality such as rivers, 
marshes, hills, air, dryness, fertility and “artificial givens” such as borders, qualities, 
groups of individuals, and houses (Foucault, 2007:21). The principal concern and strategic 
imperative of governmental assemblages is, as he suggested, what is “the right way of 
arranging (disposer) things in order to lead (conduire) them?” (Foucault, 2007:96). The 
way mechanisms and material things are distributed across an assemblage indicates the 
way governmental power traverses an assemblage. These invisible and unsayable lines 
                                                             
23 Adopting a new materialist analysis to human security, as I have done in this thesis, helps to 
explore how global human security localizes and materializes thereby also demonstrating the way 
the macropolitical logic underlying human security practices is always situated and instable, 
resisted and creatively readjusted, giving rise to ‘new’ and unintended (human security) effects. On 
the other hand, a focus on the (security) life of things may in fact detract from broader ‘global’ 
effects, e.g. in relation to how the localization and materialization of human security affects the 
macropolitical logic and practices? Moreover, a new materialist analysis to human security shifts 
attention away from some of the other approaches to analyzing security practices including 
institutional analyses as well as the analysis of the textual, linguistic (including speech act), 
performative and intersubjective character of human security regimes which helps to normalize 
concepts like human security. More generally, a new materialist perspective raises important 
philosophical questions such as in relation to the question of agency, accountability and 
responsibility in global politics which need still to be answered. Finally, a focus on the material life 
of security may lead to the radicalization of positivism insofar as it detracts from the many rewards 
of a social constructivist analysis of security including the constitution of subjectivities.  
106 
 
hold the assemblage together; they are the lines which act as go-betweens between seeing 
and saying, between one line and another. In the following, I set up an interpretative 
framework mindful of the way material givens (natural and artificial) play a vital role in 
the reconstitution of the relations, institutions and subjectivities of the Thai and 
Vietnamese states in global politics. 
Human security is a strategic bricolage which acts like a machine that “make[s] one see 
and speak” such as the Foucauldian ‘panoptic machine’ of the prison (Deleuze, 1992). This 
collective body is a multiplicity that is made up of heterogeneous practices and things 
which establish contingent liaisons, relations between them (in Dialogues II, p. 69 as 
quoted in de Landa, 2006:121n9). The organization of the heterogeneous elements of the 
human security assemblages is characterized by a multilinear mode of relationality, the 
interaction between human and nonhuman actants, an uneven topography of relations of 
power, the lack of a central authority, and finally, rhizomatic impulses. The assemblage’s 
only unity, according to Deleuze, is that of “a co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a ‘sympathy’” 
(in Dialogues II, p. 69 as quoted in de Landa, 2006:121n9).  
Firstly, human security assemblages are complex ‘multilinear ensembles’ composed of 
differential lines. Indeed, human security composes lines of force as well as lines of 
visibility, enunciation, subjectification, splitting, breakage, and fracture. The lines “criss-
cross and mingle together, some lines reproducing or giving rise to others, by means of 
variations or even changes in the way they are grouped” (Deleuze, 1992:162). The lines of 
force flowing through human security correspond to the substrate of force relations which 
engenders states of power that Foucault was principally interested in tracing. It refers to 
the microphysics of power specific to human security. The individual entities and singular 
forces comprising human security each exercise agentic capacities. The interaction 
between different ‘spirited actants’ alters the paths of the multiple lines of forces which 
determine the system of agency of the assemblage, thereby also altering the subjectivities 
that they aim to constitute. In this sense, while the human agents carve out and attempt to 
organize fields of intervention – comprising heterogeneous elements including natural 
givens (e.g. rivers, marshes, hills) as well as artificial or social givens (e.g. houses and 
individuals) – in which it is a perpetual struggle of aligning and realigning the 
heterogeneous elements (with their forces) in order to render the field governable. The 
effectiveness of their intervention is always contingent on the dynamic forces emerging 
from the immanent interrelation with the heterogeneous elements which perpetually calls 
for readjustments.  
107 
 
Despite lines of force passing “through every area” in the assemblage (Deleuze, 1992:160), 
power is not distributed equally across the surfaces of human security assemblages: they 
exhibit “uneven topographies” because “some of the points at which trajectories of actants 
cross each other are more heavily trafficked than others” (Bennett, 2005:445n2). Indeed, 
human security assemblages are not governed by a central agency or power: no one 
material component “has sufficient competence to determine consistently the trajectory or 
impact of the group” (Bennett, 2010:24). Essentially, they are not organized in a linear but 
in a rhizomatic way. The differential lines flowing through at different speeds and viscosity 
“ceaselessly establish[...] connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, 
and circumstances” relative to the struggle of human security (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2004:7). As such, assemblages are multiplicities of attractions and influences with no 
certain origin or genesis because a rhizome has “neither beginning nor end, but always a 
middle (milieu) from which it grows” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:23). Consider the recent 
conjuncture of the ‘swine flu’ pandemic: “We form a rhizome with our viruses, or rather 
our viruses cause us to form a rhizome with other animals. [...] transfers of genetic 
material by viruses or through other procedures, fusions of cells originating in different 
species” (2004:25). 
Human security assemblages are always in the process of (un)becoming. Deleuze and 
Guattari divide the different lines of an assemblage into two groups: firstly, there are lines 
of becoming or territorialization, that is, “lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and 
territories”; secondly, lines of unbecoming or deterritorialization, that is, “lines of flight, 
movements of deterritorialization and destratification”. It is in this sense that human 
security can present in two ways: on the one hand, it appears as a signifying totality; on 
the other hand, it appears as a body without organs which is “continually dismantling the 
[totality], causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate, and 
attributing to itself subjects that it leaves with nothing more than a name as the trace of an 
intensity” (2004:4). In his work, Foucault drew our attention mainly to the becoming of 
assemblages. That is, he looked at processes of sedimentation or consolidation of power 
effects such as rendering individuals legible and governable as docile bodies or as 
delinquents to the exclusion of alternatives as described above in the emergence of the 
‘panoptic machine’. Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, were more interested in lines 
of unbecoming, that is, lines of breakage and fracture which dismantle seemingly 
established assemblages. These lines of flight arrives “from outside to break constraints 
and open new vistas,” that is, to open creative alternatives into the future (Massumi, 
2004:xiii).  
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In this thesis, though I follow Foucault in emphasizing the processes, for example the 
documentation and training, by which human security effects including the state form and 
global order are stabilized, I also want to stress the material forces which render these 
effects precarious. In the preceding chapters, I suggested seeing global governance and 
human security not as pre-discursive givens and visible facts of global life but as 
ontological effects of governmental logics As such, they are historically, both spatially and 
temporally, specific formations that emerged in response to urgent needs to govern. 
Travelling through multiple lines of force, subjectivation, and lines of splitting, breakage 
and fracture, governmental logics traverse these assemblages, assembling and 
reassembling elements in such a way that they can be directed in this or that direction 
(Foucault, 2007:96). The ‘multilinear’ relationality of these assemblages makes possible 
the (re)constitution and decomposition of objects, subjects and regimes of enunciations 
capable of governing whatever has been marked out as urgent problem. It is in this way, I 
suggested, that it is possible to conceive of human security as assembling orders of 
governance in which people are directed in what they can think and do.  
Foucault, according to Deleuze, spoke about “lines of sedimentation but also of lines of 
‘breakage’ and of ‘fracture’” in assemblages. His endeavour was particularly to untangle 
the lines within assemblages: “drawing up a map, doing cartography, surveying unknown 
landscapes [...]. One has to position oneself on these lines themselves, these lines which do 
not just make up the [assemblage] but run through it, from North to South, from East to 
West, or diagonally” (Deleuze, 1992:159). How do nonhuman components with “their 
materiality and their forces” shape lines in vernacular human security assemblages 
(Foucault, 1979:26)? Following this, I examine human security by excavating, tracing, and 
mapping the little knowledges and mundane practices, techniques and material elements 
through which orders of human security are rearticulated. It is a heterogeneous field of 
intervention which mediates between the state and the materiality of bodies and their 
forces.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As this chapter has shown, interpreting human security as a governmental assemblage 
entails considering its open-endednesss which always somehow escapes the biopolitical 
imperative within it. Firstly, following Foucault’s materialism, human security is not only 
partly generated by the intermingling of dispersed material and other (e.g. 
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spatiotemporal) processes but also dependent on the corporeal world which it comprises. 
Secondly, following a Deleuzian materialist conception of assemblage (partly via Bennett), 
human security’s relation with material and other forces renders it, and the intended 
effects produced out of it including orders of governance and associated political 
subjectivities, always transient and subject to unintended and unforeseen change. In terms 
of understanding its politics, such an interpretative framework shows that the world 
cannot be explained only by analysing human intentions, omissions and programmes. In 
fact, only rarely does the human element have the power to tame contingencies arising 
from the interrelation between the parts of an assemblage. I use this interpretative 
framework in the following chapters to advance biopolitical accounts of human security. 
Indeed, it is thus also possible to pin point where creative readjustments of the political 
strategy have taken place. Human security is never a coherent, stable and totalizing logic 
but emerges in multiple and transient guises in the world. 
As I suggested in the thesis’ introduction, governmental notions which invoke the ‘global’ 
such as human security operate along dramatic distances. Tracing its materiality beyond 
governmental categories such as the state helps to locate the dynamic mechanisms and 
effects of human security. When the object of analysis is the global, a focus on the 
materiality of events helps to explore how the global is localized. At the same time, a focus 
on materiality opens up the opportunity to explore how the local materializes. This 
interplay between localizations and materializations disrupts the logics that underlie 
governmental processes. By looking at the emergence of the complex assemblages that 
human security comprises, tracing the multiple transactions and relations that assemble 
the heterogeneous elements including the material objects into nearly stable 
organizational and institutional practices, it becomes possible to capture where and how 
power operates and where human security is performatively produced. It helps to 
understand the distinctive interplay between the micro- and macropolitics of global 
human security. In the following, I develop two narratives of human security’s dispersed 
emergence with and in the corporeal world.  They engage with materiality in the form of 
viruses and technological artefacts such as logframes, software, and spidergrams as 
vibrant things that constitute orders of governance in global politics.  
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4 THE MIGRANT HEALTH ASSEMBLAGE 
 
 
 
This chapter traces the emergence of human security in the struggle to manage the 
circulation of pathogens relating to Burmese migrant communities in Thailand. The 
situated struggle to improve the health conditions of Burmese migrants in Thailand 
presents an interesting example for how human security localizes and materializes in the 
migrant health assemblage in Thailand. The Burmese migrant embodies a double 
circulation problematic: on the one hand, her body is desired for the labour to be yielded, 
on the other, she is repulsed and criminalized for the diseases and illegalities her body is 
said to carry. I examine the migrant health assemblage in terms of its microphysical field 
situated between the institutions operative at the ‘global’ or ‘national’ level and the bodies 
with their materiality and their forces relating to those targeted at the ‘local’ level. 
Specifically, I trace the interactions of a multiplicity of forces including social, political, 
international, governing, viral and chemical forces which helped to bring forth and shape 
this assemblage in Thailand in the 1990s. The chapter documents the biopolitical 
mechanisms of the human security intervention in two of Thailand’s provinces. By 
enframing, ordering and depoliticizing the complex health world of Burmese migrants in 
terms of simple dichotomies in which ‘unruly’ nature (pathogens, diseases, bodies) is 
contrasted with human techno-scientific ingenuity (scientific evidence, technological 
innovations, managerial effectiveness), these mechanisms arrange the elements of the 
assemblage in a way which renders the circulation of pathogens amenable to biopolitical 
governance.  
On the one hand, the struggle to manage pathogenic circulation through human security 
transforms the issue of migrant health into a technical matter concerned with the (self-
)management of bodies and the governmentalization of the Thai state to the exclusion of 
important but difficult questions concerning a violent politics of exclusion. On the other 
hand, the tensions, contradictions and practical difficulties in biopolitical encounters 
arising from the interplay inherent in the assemblage attest to the productive power of 
human-nonhuman alliances in the manufacture of political decisions and subjectivities. 
They remind of the contingent and therefore precarious nature of human intentions and 
strategies encapsulated in initiatives like human security. Finally, I conclude with 
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reflections on the order of governance inhabited by the migrant health assemblage in 
Thailand. The chapter is based on research carried out in 2008 in Ranong town and 
Samutsakorn city, as well as Bangkok, Thailand, during September and November, 2008. 
The chapter draws mainly on interviews with persons from communities targeted under 
human security and relevant officials of Thai and (inter)national governmental and non-
governmental and other private organizations. It also draws on publicly available 
documents and documents made available to me during my research. How does the 
biopolitical strategy of human security fare in the situated moment in Thailand? How are 
sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centres, forms and types of 
control, relationships between local powers, central authorities, and other powers as they 
present in this specific assemblage moved or modified in order to control global circuits of 
migrant health?    
 
MIGRANT HEALTH AS EMERGING ASSEMBLAGE 
 
Thailand shares a land and sea border stretching 2,401 kilometres with Burma24 and has 
become a reluctant host to increasing numbers of displaced people fleeing from civil strife, 
political oppression and economic stagnation. They travel accompanied by mosquitoes 
and other carriers of parasites (Beyrer and Lee, 2008), drawing on the support of their 
undernourished and abused bodies, ‘flimsy’ boats, and the ‘free’ flows of the Salween 
River. The number of Burmese people migrating to Thailand rose sharply following “a 
crackdown on urban, pro-democracy supporters” and Burmese government offensives 
against “sundry ethnic minorities along the Thai border” between 1980s-90s (Hynd, 2002, 
Lang, 2002). As of September 2009, Thailand’s Burmese migrant community is estimated 
at two to three million (Fry, 2009). Around 140,000 (Srithamrongsawar et al., 2009) are 
living legally in the few available “temporary shelter areas,” essentially refugee camps in 
the Thai borderlands.25 Most migrants, however, live and work illegally in Thai villages 
                                                             
24 The change from Burma to Myanmar is not accepted by the opposition, and use of the latter term 
is politically charged. 
25 The UNHCR considers these shelters refugee camps. According to the UNHCR, refugees along the 
Thai-Burma border are recognised on a ‘prima facie’ basis in the absence of a Refugee Status 
Determination procedure in Thailand. Thailand is not a signatory of the 1951 Convention relating 
to the status of refugees or to its 1967 Protocol. Thus, the Thai government sees the Burmese as 
displaced persons and does not process them as refugees. Due to Thailand’s position on the status 
of refugees, these people are largely seen as economic refugees despite their frequently mixed 
reasons for entering Thailand, and are classed as illegal migrant workers. While the Thai 
government is prepared to grant refugees temporary shelter while they wait for third-country 
resettlement or repatriation, it is not prepared to grant permanent residency or citizenship to any 
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and cities in and beyond Thai borderlands. Their living and working situations render 
them hugely vulnerable, mostly voiceless and anonymous, often highly exploited in 
sweatshops and on construction sites, as seasonal migrant labour, bar girls, and sex 
workers (Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004:55). Indeed, their aberrant existence in 
Thailand is perceived as an increasing threat to the Thai social fabric (Fry, 2009). Thus, 
unregistered Burmese find themselves “in a status of non-belonging, non-citizenship” 
(Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, 2004:54). 
Migrants are often forced to live in unsanitary and overcrowded conditions in which 
pathogens flourish  (WHO, 2004):  
Many lack access to latrines, safe water for washing and drinking, and means of 
disposing of solid waste. Some [...] are located above cesspools into which are 
deposited garbage and human faeces [sic.], where pathogens proliferate, and 
where disease-carrying mosquitoes breed.   
Since they have limited or no access to appropriate healthcare including preventive care 
and vaccinations, they are considered more likely to contract communicable diseases 
(Jitthai, 2009:14). Indeed, experiences of Thai government crackdowns on ‘illegals,’ 
poverty-ridden conditions of life in Thailand, and violent exploitation in Thai work 
situations are just some of the stresses rendering Burmese migrant bodies particularly 
vulnerable to various health conditions. Migrants typically treat themselves; their bodies 
have to bear the illness on their own as long as possible (Archavanitkul et al., 2000:xii). 
Compared to Thais, migrants suffer from higher case fatality and morbidity as health 
statisticians have deduced from the limited accepted data and research available. Often, 
migrant bodies surrender to treatable health problems. In Ranong, for example, the “top 
five reportable infectious diseases” captured in 2003 were malaria, diarrhoea, pneumonia, 
tuberculosis, and food poisoning. The prevalence of the human immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV), passing through, amongst others, the body fluids of migrant sex workers and 
seafarers, was also recorded (WHO, 2004).  
In the mid 1990s, HIV infection among migrants within and from Burma was found to be 
the highest recorded in the region (Porter, 1995). Since migrants are mostly integrated 
into the local communities where they co-exist, reside and work alongside Thais, pressure 
mounted to address migrant health needs, particularly those relating to communicable 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
of the residual refugee population. Indeed, Thai authorities prefer not to use the term ‘refugee’ but 
use the term ‘displaced persons’ or migrant workers. Hynd, Michael. (2002) Thailand. In FMO 
Research Guide, p. 17. Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre. 
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illnesses. There was fear that lethal pathogens not only take advantage of weakened 
migrant bodies but will pass through to, and circulate, amongst Thai communities. Since 
the mid 1990s, the public health community in Thailand has increasingly expressed 
concerns about “cross-border movement” since it raises problems concerning health but 
also citizenship, legal rights, and access to services and support (Archavanitkul, et al., 
2000:3). From the intricate interplay between Burmese migrant bodies, pathogens and 
impromptu government initiatives, there has gradually emerged a distinct assemblage 
oriented towards the control of migrant health in Thailand. The emergence of Thailand’s 
migrant health assemblage has not been a process in which governance successfully 
extends itself across a field but involves fragile relays, contested locales and fissiparous 
affiliations (Rose, 1999:51). Indeed, much labour is spent on bringing the heterogeneous 
elements together, forging alliances between them and maintaining the connections when 
confronted with tension (Li, 2007:264). Tension arises, for example, from factors such as 
the mutability of pathogens and shifts in migration trends. 
That the Thai government has not adequately adopted public health measures to cope 
with the burgeoning migrant population is considered an ongoing problem. Especially in 
light of the government’s efforts to promote migrant labour circulation through extending 
illegal migrant employment from 9 to 43 provinces in 1996 in order to meet the growing 
labour demand of the flourishing private sector (Archavanitkul, et al.:49, Hyndman, 2001). 
While encouraging labour circulation, the government was also seen as increasing the risk 
of ‘migrant disease’ circulation, further straining ill-equipped public health facilities. As 
the director of the Bureau of Policy and Strategy of the Thai Ministry of Public Health 
(MOPH) recently noted in the Bangkok Post, migration has increased the burden on 
Thailand's health services and manpower, adding challenges to the disease surveillance 
and outbreak control system (Fry, 2009). 
In this respect, to this day, the Thai government is criticized for not having adequately 
addressed public health issues concerning the burgeoning migrant population in Thailand. 
Authorities have primarily been concerned with promoting migrant labour circulation. 
While encouraging labour circulation, this was also seen, in the absence of sustained 
public health initiatives, as increasing the risk of ‘migrant disease’ circulation, further 
straining ill-equipped public health facilities. In fact, the Thai government has attempted 
to manage migrant labour circulation through a series of registrations. Yet, few migrants 
have been in a position to take up the Thai government’s call for migrant worker 
registration required to legalise their status and grant them limited access to public 
services including healthcare. In 2007, only 532,305 migrants from Burma, Lao PDR and 
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Cambodia out of an estimated total of 1.8 million migrants registered (Srithamrongsawar, 
et al., 2009). This is because the registration process is selective, expensive, complex and 
dangerous. In fact, few have passports or other forms of identification, the funds, or 
knowledge of the Thai language to register. Moreover, the fear of deportation is very real.  
Nonetheless, provincial health offices (PHOs), especially in border provinces, are treating a 
growing number of Burmese migrants in Thailand, of whom the majority are not 
registered and thus not accounted for officially. This has led to shortages of medication 
and equipment in health offices burdened by insufficient welfare budgets. This was 
compounded further by the protracted consequences of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
whereby public health budgets, including funds for medication, equipment, and welfare 
services, were drastically cut (Archavanitkul, et al., 2000:48). In response to these 
financial challenges, in 1998, the Thai government made the purchase of an annual health 
insurance card by migrant workers mandatory. This governmental thing, through which an 
attempt has been made to manage the health of migrants, has proven largely ineffective. 
Many employers have been found retaining health insurance cards in order to prevent 
migrants from ‘running away or changing jobs’. Meanwhile, several PHOs have initiated 
programmes targeting migrants involving the promotion of disease prevention and 
environmental sanitation as well as a reporting system tracking spread of diseases within 
communities. Some provinces have collaborated with NGOs, setting up clinics exclusively 
for migrants. Yet, these haphazard attempts to control migrant health have had little effect 
in dealing with the problem of migrant health in Thailand. Meanwhile, pathogens continue 
to develop in crowded and unhygienic spaces, feeding on weakened Burmese migrant 
bodies. 
Interestingly, the MOPH began forging new alignments between Burmese migrants and 
government offices in the sense that it sought to link the health objectives of migrants 
themselves with those of government offices. It did so by promoting self-care guidelines 
for migrant workers “so that they can take care of themselves,” releasing dependency on 
public health services (Archavanitkul, et al., 2000). A similar strategy formed the core of 
the human security intervention discussed in more detail below. In 2004, indicating a shift, 
the MOPH launched the Healthy Thailand policy wherein there was recognition that it was 
“impossible for the country to achieve the Healthy Thailand goal when the health needs of 
some 2.5 million migrants remain unmet” . Recently, the MOPH has developed several key 
governmental strategies aiming to address the problem of migrant health including 
forging new alignments with neighbouring governments such as Burma. The strategies 
involved also developing governmental things such as information systems and migrant 
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health service systems. Essentially, these strategies and governmental things render the 
problem of migrant health a technical problem, that is, a problem of effective public health 
management. 
Since at least the end of the 1990s, the Thai government has drawn heavily on the 
technical support and expertise of national and international migration and health experts 
in its efforts to deal with the issue of migrant health. The intimacy of this relationship is 
demonstrated by the Ministry of Public Health’s extending an invitation to the World 
Health Organization (WHO) to set up an office within the ministry compound, which 
resulted in the WHO being physically integrated into the political architecture of a Thai 
government ministry. Similarly, the process of establishing dedicated Migrant Health Units 
within Provincial Health Offices, a process beset with political difficulties, is partly due to 
the advocacy of International Organization for Migration (IOM) field offices. These Units, 
in which the politics of the Migrant Health assemblage takes concrete physical form, 
embody the shift in governing the health of migrants assembled over the last two decades. 
As I go on to show, international (non-) governmental organizations are in many ways 
formative of the field in which they intervene. The alignments that are being forged 
between these organizations and Thai NGOs are dealt at several levels, including at the 
level of authorising knowledges. Indeed, the ‘reality’ of migrant health is consolidated with 
the perpetual production of scientific knowledge by experts including statistics, analyses, 
and guidelines on which interventions are subsequently based.  
Several major programmes have emerged since. Most notable in this respect are the IOM-
led Migrant Health and the WHO-led Border Health Programmes. Indeed, strategies are 
converging: much like the MOPH strategies outlined above, the WHO programme is 
oriented to improving coordination among key players, data collection, technical training 
(e.g. emergency preparedness and response) and information sharing (e.g. the border 
health report containing health statistics, information on provinces and organisations). 
The activities these organisations carry out in migrant communities as well as with Thai 
state authorities are bound up with knowledges, practices, and things, associated with 
what Mitchell has termed a ‘techno-politics logic’(Mitchell, 2002). Herein included are 
practices of categorization, measurement, monitoring and evaluation, lessons-learned, 
framing logically as well as the governmental things which began enframing and ordering 
the complex health world of Burmese migrants, turning the issue of migrant health into a 
simple, dualistic world of ‘unruly’ nature (pathogens, diseases) versus science, the human 
versus (biopolitical) machine, bodies versus hygiene (Mitchell, 2002:210). The relations 
that are forged in these activities connect in important ways, forming a web in which the 
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individual migrant is linked to local and central public authorities, public authorities of 
neighbouring countries and (transnational) non-/inter-governmental organizations.  
When the IOM and WHO applied in 2004 for funding to the global Human Security Fund 
(HSF) to run a co-managed migrant health project in two Thai provinces, migrant health 
was reframed in terms of the problem of human security and the baggage of actants it is 
inevitably loaded with – including logframes, cosmological realist perimeters, the 
biopolitical imaginary and so on –was plugged into the migrant health assemblage (e.g. 
Grayson, 2008). Articulating migrant health in Thailand through human security has had 
at least two effects. Firstly, it is arguably providing human actants a distinct grammar to 
think and articulate the complexities of contemporary migrant politics in Thailand. Indeed, 
human security’s governing logic to promote the life of unruly transnational populations 
in Thailand such as Burmese migrants now speaks directly to the security of the ‘Thai geo-
body’. In this perspective, improving the health conditions of migrant populations is 
understood to “benefit and assist with maintaining the health security” of the Thai people 
(emphasis added, Srithamrongsawar, et al., 2009:11), prompting an IOM expert to claim 
recently that the problem of migrant health is a matter of “national health security” 
(Jitthai, 2009:14). Secondly, and more important, Thai public health officials have begun 
rearticulating Thailand as a transnational state. It is a ‘transit state’ through which run 
flows of people and goods from neighbouring and distant countries.26 Since the flow of 
Burmese migrants into Thailand is considered difficult to stem, partly owing to the desired 
labour they constitute, their health insecurity, and by extension that of the Thai 
population, according to public health officials in Ranong, is best managed by including 
migrant health into public health considerations.27  
The intricate and complex interplay between Burmese traffic to Thailand, the ‘free’ flows 
of the Salween River, travelling pathogens, mosquitoes, crowded and unhygienic spaces, 
weakened and neglected refugee bodies, human intentions and desires, Thai refugee and 
migrant policy, ‘states of non-belonging’, fear and anxiety, failed governmental initiatives, 
sex work and body fluids, the problem of circulation, foreign aid capital, transnational 
agencies, inadequate health funds and the rise of global human security helped to bring 
forth and shape the migrant health assemblage in Thailand. The different properties of 
these various elements, involving “very different forces, agents, elements, spatial scales, 
and temporalities”, interlinked with and shaped each other, forming biological, ethical, 
                                                             
26 Interview with an officer of the Thai Ministry of Social Development and Human Security, 
Bangkok, Thailand (September 2008). 
27 Interview with the Chief Medical Officer and Head of Migrant Health Unit, Ranong Provincial 
Public Health Office (September 2008). 
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discursive, techno-scientific, knowledge, transnational and political alliances that 
comprise the migrant health assemblage (Mitchell, 2002:27). In spite of the constitutive 
role of human–non-human associations in setting up and shaping the assemblage, the IOM 
and WHO represented the assemblage only in terms of the actions and intentions of 
human actors whose techno-scientific ingenuity could tame pathogenic circulation. That 
the assemblage’s representation is itself a ‘technical body’, one that “must emerge from a 
process of manufacture whose ingredients are both human and nonhuman, both 
intentional and not, and in which the intentional or the human is always somewhat 
overrun by the unintended” – such as tensions and contradictions between policies, 
pathogen mutations and initiatives such as the health insurance cards – is not taken into 
account (Mitchell, 2002:42-3). 
 
FRAMING LOGICALLY AND THE FORECLOSURE OF THE POLITICAL 
 
Human security was plugged into the migrant health assemblage cleansed of politics; all 
but techno-(bio)political strategies were put forward to deal with the problem of migrant 
health in Thailand. In their proposal to the HSF, IOM and WHO experts argued migrants 
are “at high Human Security risk,” their health is “a particular Human Security concern”. 
Migrant health insecurity was due “in large part” to the inability of migrants “to access 
basic preventative and curative health services”. Three primary factors disabling migrants 
from accessing healthcare services were identified: security concerns (fear of arrest and 
deportation), socio-linguistic factors (the language barrier, citizen-denizen tensions and 
differences in health cultures) and economic factors (opportunity, travel and health costs) 
(WHO, 2004). While the problem of access is symptomatic of a violent politics of exclusion, 
the solution to the problem was seen as lying mainly with migrants themselves: they were 
to learn to care for themselves. This involved the making of self-governing migrant health 
subjects. It involved also the making of a migrant health information system (MHIS) 
developed by WHO officials and maintained by public health authorities to regulate the 
internal dynamics of this largely illegal population in Thailand. 
By foreclosing politics to the exclusion of important but difficult and highly political 
questions such as legality, refugee status, labour exploitation, racism and citizenship, 
migrant health in Thailand was rendered but a technical problem for which a technical 
solution applies. The exclusion of sensitive political matter from their proposed 
intervention was a necessary condition for the intergovernmental WHO and IOM to 
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negotiate their entry into the field of migrant health in Thailand. Such a move not only 
enabled these organizations to work alongside and with the Ministry of Public Health in 
this situated matter of global circulation. Importantly, it also allowed the Ministry of Public 
Health, a government department, to work with the group of Burmese otherwise handled 
as legally aberrant (i.e., not generally qualified to receive public services) in Thailand. The 
Rendering migrant health technical, in which disparate datasets and expert knowledges, 
strategies and practices are assembled, saw the objectives of the Ministry of Public Health 
and the intergovernmental organizations converge.  
This transnationalization of this particular Thai ministry was seen as necessary for taming 
the (global) circulation of pathogens said to originate in Thai migrant communities. The 
process of rendering migrant health a technical problem involved enframing the field of 
human security intervention ‘logically’. The conception of the project was organised 
around a logical framework, otherwise referred to as a logframe, now a standard 
requirement in applications to the HSF and widely used in the aid community (Bakewell 
and Garbutt, 2005:1). This governmental thing, as mentioned in chapter two, is a project 
management tool that is considered in setting up a project (UNTFHS, 2008:9). Most 
importantly are the indicators which enable, it is argued, making more informed decisions 
throughout the process of a project (UNTFHS, 2008:9). In fact, as I have argued, the 
logframe is charged with political meaning. It sets the parameters of a project in no 
uncertain terms: objectives, namely in terms of method of intervention, targets, and 
outputs. As such, this thing called logframe obliges users, whether the project managers 
who design the project or field workers acting on it, to render a problem field in distinctly 
techno-scientific terms, i.e. in terms of mastering the pathogens.  
The targets sites of the project were classed as high priority areas in two provinces in 
Thailand, namely Ranong and Samutsakorn. These Thai coastal provinces were argued to 
host large numbers of mostly Burmese migrant workers. Ranong is bordered to the west 
by Burma and the Indian Ocean. The town of Ranong is located opposite Kawthaung, 
Burma’s most southern town, from where most Burmese migrants in Ranong have entered 
Thailand. Many of those fleeing Burma since the pro-democracy protests in 1988 have 
remained in Ranong. They live in communities throughout the province (Archavanitkul, et 
al., 2000:14). Samutsakorn province is located just 50 kilometres south of Bangkok facing 
the Gulf of Thailand. It is recognised as the largest seafood producer in Thailand, 
employing a large number of registered and un-registered migrants in local fishing and 
fishing related businesses. Most migrants live within the urban area. Overall, 
approximately 9,500 migrants in each province were to be targeted directly through 
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“outreach, referral mobile medical clinics, and other healthcare services” (WHO, 2004). 
Approximately 20,000 additional migrants were to be targeted indirectly through health 
awareness campaigns. The target beneficiaries or target populations, understood as 
statistical cohorts, were considered “primarily employed in the sectors of seafood 
processing and fisheries, with others working as general labourers, sex workers, and 
agricultural labourers” (WHO, 2004). These migrant women and men and their 
dependents were to be targeted whatever their legal status in Thailand. 
The main objective was loosely laid out in the proposal of the human security project: “To 
contribute to the improved Human Security of migrants in Ranong, Samutsakorn, and 
other provinces of Thailand, through enhancing their overall health standing” (WHO, 
2004). For effective project management purposes, given the standard project life of three 
years, the ambitious human security objective to improve migrant health was rendered in 
solely technical terms. It was broken down into smaller and more manageable bits: 
activity clusters of sub-activities with sub-objectives, methodologies, outputs and 
timeframes involving extensive planning, data and information gathering, coordinating, 
supervising, training, campaigning, programming, and documenting (WHO, 2004). Buried 
under a string of technicalities, the politics of migrant health (be this donor politics, inter- 
and intra-organizational politics, immigration politics or gender politics) was mostly 
written out of the human security project. 
Logframes, as I suggested in chapter two, are the epitome of a project management logic 
by which the demand to manage effectively establishes an exclusive claim to politics. As an 
inscription device, a logframe is the site where the complex health world of migrants and 
biopolitical subjectivities are written and contextualized in terms of the dichotomous logic 
of nature versus science and technology and body versus hygiene. It establishes an 
exclusive claim on a specific class of subjects, e.g. migrants (mostly Burmese and illegal in 
Ranong and Samutsakorn), on whom it writes forms of subjectivation in pursuit of 
managing pathogenic circulation. To experts of the WHO and IOM then, the migrant body 
presented a technical problem requiring effective public health management.  This meant 
not only developing mechanisms such as training migrants to care for themselves, e.g. 
through hygiene, so that migrant health could be governed from afar. It meant also being 
able to account for all migrants (whatever their legal status), in terms of costing for 
(provincial, central) health budgets and monitoring disease trends in order to intervene in 
the regularities of migrant populations. Through the governmental thing of the logframe, 
human security presented in the space of a few paragraphs the migrant health assemblage 
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with a discreet problem, target population, evidence, strategies, methods, tools, funds, and 
solution. 
 
MIGRANT COMMUNITY HEALTH WORKERS AND CARTOGRAPHIES OF THE SELF 
 
Under the human security project, a network of dedicated Migrant Community Health 
Workers (MCHWs) and Migrant Community Health Volunteers (MCHVs) was established 
in the target provinces of Ranong and Samutsakorn under the steering of public health 
offices and IOM field personnel. The role of MCHWs in bringing migrant health under the 
primary control of the Thai government is substantial. They perform basic health services 
on targeted migrants. Secondly, they campaign for health awareness and behaviour 
change in targeted migrant communities. Thirdly, they observe disease trends in these 
migrant communities, standing in as pseudo disease surveillance officers. Finally, they 
conduct migrant community mapping, providing “informative evidence such as the 
location and distance between migrant communities and public health facilities” (Jitthai, 
2009:35). The data recorded through social mapping exercises carried out by MCHWs is 
essential for feeding the computerised migrant health management system designed and 
programmed by the WHO in this project.  
At least two thirds of MCHWs are Burmese. Importantly, these women and men are 
respected members of the migrant communities targeted for intervention under the 
human security project. They are informal practitioners such as traditional birth 
attendants, hospital translators, and health volunteers, recruited through existing 
networks by Public Health Offices (PHO) and IOM field offices. They speak Burmese 
and/or relevant languages/dialects28 and understand the cultural nuances of Burmese 
ways of life. Given the exclusionary political climate in which Burmese migrants navigate 
their lives in Thailand, MCHWs prove to be a valued resource for all parties involved. For 
targeted migrants, MCHWs are trusted healthcare providers. For public (health) 
authorities, MCHWs know and are able to penetrate targeted migrant communities in ways 
that public (health) authorities cannot. Indeed, MCHWs are employed by public health 
authorities with the funds of the donor, the Human Security Fund. Their (re-)training 
takes mainly two forms and is considered “an investment in the technical capacity” of 
targeted people. Firstly, MCHWs are trained in basic health knowledge. Secondly, MCHWs 
                                                             
28 There are more than 10 languages/dialects among Burmese migrant communities in Thailand. 
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are trained in scientific methods such as survey data gathering for baseline surveys used 
later for the assessment of project impact. This is considered “a learning process in itself 
worthy of notice” (WHO, 2004).  
While usually operating from public health centres or hospitals, “trained MCHWs,” clad in 
blue uniforms typical of Thai healthcare professionals, also administer community health 
posts in migrant communities, serving as “frontline service in target populations” (Jitthai, 
2009:18). For example, some business owners and employers of migrants in Ranong and 
Samutsakorn have provided space in their workplaces to set up migrant health posts. 
Indeed, some MCHWs and MCHVs have offered a corner of their residence to be used as 
health corners (Jitthai, 2009:39). MCHWs also conduct home visits, following up patients 
to ensure treatment adherence. They perform medical translation during diagnosis and 
treatment as well as explain medication details in the appropriate native languages. 
Together with Migrant Community Health Volunteers (MCHVs), MCHWs are establishing 
an elaborate web of control points deep within migrant communities`, linking these to 
public (health) authorities aiming to manage migrant health. They are the “key catalysts 
for improving the reach” to migrant communities which they are able to do “more 
efficiently than public health personnel” (emphasis added, Jitthai, 2009:61).  
MCHW posts within migrant communities are considered crucial to monitor 
communicable disease trends in migrant communities. Indeed, MCHWs are being 
integrated to District/Provincial Surveillance and Rapid Response Teams (SRRT). They 
have been drawn in by local health authorities to assist in outbreak assistance and control, 
supporting “government SRRT with translation services during the case tracing 
interviews” and “investigation measures such as rectal swab samples in suspected Cholera 
cases”. The state surveillance assemblage they helped set up is dispersed throughout 
targeted migrant communities. This assemblage functions as a disease trend monitoring 
system. Indeed, they are credited for the timely halt of the 2007 Cholera outbreak in 
Samutsakorn (Jitthai, 2009:58). It is in this sense that the head of the Migrant Health Unit 
at the Provincial Health Office in Ranong referred to MCHWs as small epidemiologists or 
out-break investigators. 29  This strategy is being adopted by other organisations 
specializing in other aspects of migrant life. For example, in the case of avian flu, in the 
spirit of the governmental technology of the MCHW introduced by the IOM and WHO, the 
ILO recently pushed for Burmese migrant workers to “take on a greater role in detecting 
and stopping the spread of the deadly H5N1 virus” (Macan-Markar, 2009). 
                                                             
29 Interview with the head of Migrant Health Unit, Public Health Office Ranong (September 2008) 
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Following the Cholera event in Samutsakorn, when the vibrio cholera bacteria travelled 
through contaminated drinking water and food into migrant bodies, MCHWs “intensified 
health education efforts on Cholera, Diarrhea and sanitizing strategies” in the province  
(Jitthai, 2009:58). Indeed, they train in and campaign on a large scale on a number of 
health-related issues in targeted migrant communities. For example, the IEC material 
produced in Ranong included a bilingual version (Thai and local Burmese dialect) of the 
MOPH’s Maternal and Child Health Handbook which was distributed to migrant mothers 
to record growth and vaccination schedules of their children. At health centres in Ranong 
and Samutsakorn, bilingual posters remind Burmese migrants to wash their hands. 
MCHWs in Ranong also developed and delivered a bilingual puppet show to raise 
awareness about specific health issues. Using dramatization “to convey health messages 
and learning via entertainment” which is considered “an effective and popular strategy to 
internalize and disseminate” knowledge of health among migrant communities, according 
to the IOM (Jitthai, 2009:51).  
Addressing the problem of migrant health in Thailand ‘effectively,’ however, is considered 
a two-pronged matter. Apart from the elaborate range of (self-)governing techniques 
involving MCHWs outlined above, including directing migrant health behaviour towards 
modes of self-governing, and erecting migrant-operated governmental assemblage of 
disease surveillance loosely bound and strategically dispersed in targeted communities, 
the human security intervention involved also developing public administrative 
information and service systems. In order for public health authorities to be able to act on 
migrant health in more than haphazard ways, it needed to be brought into the domain of 
government responsibility more determinedly. As will become clearer, this is a matter of 
finance, legality and politics, and technology. Foremost, provincial health offices lack the 
funds to provide health care to ‘non-registered irregular’ migrants that they are in the 
process of moving into their sphere of responsibility. They require a headcount to present 
to central authorities in order to get the allocation of government funds befitting the 
number of people for which they have assumed responsibility. The human security project 
introduced a system by which authorities were able to account for, that is, cost for 
unregistered, essentially illegal, migrants in (provincial and central) health budgets. In this 
way, sources of finance and decision-making centres were moved, and forms of control 
modified.  
The public health management system introduced by the WHO, however, presupposes the 
availability of intimate details around migrants’ health. The kind of knowledge sought 
includes migrant movement, health and residence, the numbers of migrants and their 
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relations to one another, living conditions, and the types of disease circulating, medical 
history, immunisation and treatments received and so on. Given the aberrant status and 
therefore usually covert existence of migrants in Thailand, these details are notoriously 
difficult to come by. Indeed, “The scarcity of valid data to measure the health status of the 
migrant population in Thailand [poses] serious challenges in the effective planning of 
health programs (and policy-making) for migrants” (WHO, 2004). Here again, MCHWs 
prove valuable semi-public health officials. During their visits and consultations in migrant 
communities, MCHWs record information relating to migrants and their health situations 
in family health folders (Folder). Armed with these governmental things, MCHWs give an 
authoritative appearance as they enter the alleyways of Burmese migrant housings. Much 
like the MOPH’s Maternal and Child Health Handbook, with the Folder under their arm, 
MCHWs discipline migrants to confess their and their co-migrant health predicaments and 
histories as well as those of their co-migrants.  
The visually impressive inscription device that is The Folder also disciplines the MCHW to 
take stock of health subjects. It bids trained MCHWs to map and characterise the health of 
co-migrants according to variables predetermined by public health systems standards of 
the Thai Ministry of Public Health and the WHO. MCHWs are trained by IOM field 
personnel in community or social mapping, a technique whereby they draw out the 
location of a migrant lacking an official address as depicted in the illustrated map below 
(figure 2). Social mapping is a visualisation tool, used to present information on 
neighbourhood layout, infrastructure, demography, ethno-linguistic groups, health 
pattern, wealth and other social issues. Indeed, these Folders were modelled on existing 
health folders for Thais.30 MCHWs map networks of co-residents, co-environments (access 
to safe water, cleanliness and so on), and health provider contact points within which the 
health of migrants is embedded. 
The Folder also disciplines the MCHW to take stock of health subjects. It bids trained 
MCHWs to map and characterize the health of co-migrants according to variables 
predetermined by the public health systems standards of the Thai Ministry of Public 
Health and the WHO. Indeed, these Folders were modelled on existing health folders for 
Thais.10 MCHWs are trained by IOM field personnel in community or social mapping, a 
technique whereby they draw out the location of a migrant who lacks an official address, 
as illustrated in Figure 2. Social mapping is a visualization tool, used to present 
information on neighbourhood layout, infrastructure, demography, ethno-linguistic 
                                                             
30 Although only part of this information is collected for the Thai population, prompting the 
argument that the migrant folder is more ‘advanced’ than the existing system for local Thais. 
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groups, health patterns, wealth and other social issues. MCHWs map networks of co-
residents, co-environments (access to safe water, cleanliness, and so on) and health 
provider contact points. It is within these networks that the health of migrants in Thailand 
is to be found. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Map of location of one Burmese migrant in Ranong (September 2008) © Voelkner 2008 
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Figure 3: Filing cabinet for Thai (blue) and migrant family health folders (green) at a public health 
centre in Ranong (September 2008) © Voelkner 2008 
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Like Thai folders, migrants’ folders are filed in relevant public health centres, separated by 
colour from Thai family health folders (as shown in Figure 3), and are retrieved whenever 
the migrant visits the health centre or is visited by a MCHW. The separation between Thai 
(normal) and migrant (abnormal) folders filed away in large, open cabinets is to see when 
one enters the health centres. Although the agency of migrants – both MCHWs and the 
populations under their care – Thai health officers, and IOM and WHO officers in Thailand, 
Geneva and elsewhere is distributed in the tools (e.g. the Folder), colours (e.g. blue or 
green folders) and spaces (e.g. the location of the filing cabinet), in fact, as Bennett 
(Bennett, 2005:463) has suggested, human agency can only emerge by way of a 
distribution into these materialities. 
The willingness to employ registered Burmese migrants as semi-legal subjects in the form 
of MCHWs, albeit with external funding, constitutes a significant alternate development in 
Thailand. Currently, there is no government policy which allows migrants from 
neighbouring countries to work as health workers. Migrants are only permitted to be 
“employed in unskilled or low-skilled work whereas health work is considered skilled 
work” (Jitthai, 2009:72). Moreover, there is no official MOPH national training curriculum 
and accreditation for MCHWs. The IOM noted after project completion that MCHWs 
(re)training has not been standardised at MOPH level (Jitthai, 2009:72). Nor has there 
been government budget allocation to these purposes. Nonetheless, local health 
authorities are willing to secure some budget in future by leveraging existing budget items 
in order to sustain MCHWs beyond WHO/IOM contributions.31  
MCHWs indeed play a ‘catalytic role’ in “bridging the gaps between migrant populations 
and available public health services” (Jitthai, 2009:29). They make governing migrant 
health possible from afar while ensuring nonetheless the extension of the state in which 
‘the state’ is by proxy ever-present in evasive migrant communities. They map the 
unmapped social that is the migrant populations targeted towards bringing to the fore and 
enabling intervention on the internal regularities of this population. MCHWs and the 
governmental things they employ such as the Folder are the supposed missing link 
between Burmese migrant communities, local and provincial offshoots of the MOPH, and 
global governmental organisations. As attracter and container of knowledge, however, the 
Folder is but one step in the chain linking together the various human and nonhuman 
elements including individual migrants, Thai state authorities, intergovernmental 
agencies, and a rationality of governing that is global in perspective. 
                                                             
31 Interview with heads of Ranong and Samutsakorn Migrant Health Units (September 2008) 
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THE MIGRANT HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEM AND THE DIGITIZATION OF MIGRANT 
HEALTH 
 
In Ranong, the elaborate information recorded by MHCWs in Folders is logged by health 
personnel at local public health centres in an experimental computing system. This system 
collects and collates the information for “effective planning of health problems (and 
policy-making) for migrants” (WHO, 2004). While the MOPH had previously begun to 
develop such a Migrant Health Information System (MHIS), now with human security 
funds, it was possible to complete the development of a standardised system replicable in 
all provinces. The MHIS is to run parallel to the Thai Health Information System (HIS), 
intended eventually to be fused with the Thai HIS.  Developing the MHIS is a “really 
difficult issue,” according to one WHO officer, “Not only [a] technical issue but in terms of 
capacity, coordination, and politically.” 32 Indeed, in Samutsakorn, the promotion of the 
MHIS is abound with tension and practical difficulties that are blamed on the absence of a 
political will to tackle the issue of migrant health and, interestingly, the built environment. 
Samutsakorn’s dense urban space had given rise to a central hospital that was managed 
through a central administrative system allegedly incapable of also running the MHIS.33 
In Ranong, the information collected from migrant communities is brought back to local 
health centres, where it is uploaded to the new administrative software developed by the 
WHO. Health providers working at the health centres are trained by WHO personnel to 
input all the details of the Folders into the new database, as illustrated in Figure 3. The 
indicators by which the software computes migrant health include population (proportion 
of population by age and sex and district, crude birth rate), mortality, morbidity (acute and 
chronic diseases), nutrition and child health, insurance, service utilization, family planning 
(vaccination, contraception) and special disease surveillance (HIV). The computer that 
maintains the MHIS database and the Folder filing cabinet give the migrant health 
assemblage an almost physical presence in the room. The Burmese readily provide all of 
the required information because, first, the person asking is from their own community; 
second, they have indeed apparently benefited from better healthcare and services; and, 
third, they have experienced a change in attitude in terms of self-care and responsibility 
                                                             
32 Interview with a WHO officer (September 2008) 
33 Interview with a IOM field officer in Samutsakorn (September 2008) 
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towards oneself and one’s community – for example, in relation to monitoring disease 
trends within the community.34  
 
Figure 4: Training in MHIS data input at a public health centre in Ranong (September 2008) 
©Voelkner 2008 
So far, it is their illegal or unrecognized political status which largely prevents migrants 
from entering the imaginary of public health administration in Thailand. Migrants do not 
officially figure in public (health) records and systems, even when out of necessity they 
must access health services.  The system developed by the WHO, however, is designed to 
bring migrants, regardless of their legal status, into the domain of public health 
responsibility, rendering them governable through state authorities. As one Thai WHO 
official conceded, “If we want to achieve [...] health security, we need a good health 
                                                             
34 According to interviews with Burmese health workers as well as members of NGOs, September 
2008. 
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system”.35 Without this system, as the WHO/IOM penned proposal to the HSF read, 
“inefficiencies result and it is not possible to track health trends or compare data between 
different sites making it difficult to identify priority area” (WHO, 2004). Essentially, it is a 
techno-(bio)political machine served by state health authorities to facilitate the 
computation, statistical inference and decision-making regarding the regulation of the 
internal health dynamics of migrant populations in Thailand. Foucault termed this form of 
governing biopolitics which, in Ong’s words, refers to “the strategic uses of knowledges 
which invest bodies and populations with properties making them amenable to various 
technologies of control” (emphasis added, Ong, 1995:1243). Indeed, the unruly bodies of 
migrants are “recuperated through the language of numbers that allows these very bodies 
to be brought back, now counted and accounted, for the humdrum projects of [...] 
sanitation, education, welfare, and loyalty” (Appadurai, 1996:133) . 
Indeed, “when we talk about migrants in the health system, we have to divide them into 
categories. Then, [...] when it link[s] to the health determinants, we also can see what are 
their main health problems”.36 The properties invested in or (sub-) categories into which 
migrant and other aberrant populations are divided concern their (il)legal status  in 
Thailand: 1) hill tribes (ethnic minorities) with identification cards (ID) beginning with ‘6,’ 
‘7,’ and ‘8,’ the “ambivalent categories” (Toyota, 2007); 2) Registered migrants with IDs 
beginning with ‘0’; 2a) with work permit; 2b) without work permit; 3) Migrants without 
IDs; 3a) refugees; 3b) other; 4) nationally verified registered migrants from Laos and 
Cambodia; 5) Other (not mentioned above). Based on these migrant categories, the MHIS 
is said to be “capable of identifying, quantifying, and monitoring the health situation of 
migrants”. It is by quantifying the health of migrants and comparing these statistics to the 
‘normal’ Thai population, its values and degree of ‘natural fluctuation’  that it becomes 
possible to infer whether or not the health of migrant populations is outlying or abnormal, 
therefore necessitating intervention to minimise statistical divergence. For example, in the 
HSF proposal, ‘irregular’ migrants are represented, by comparison to the local (and 
‘normal’) population, suffering from higher morbidity, higher case fatality, and lower 
compliance with treatment for a range of health conditions, legitimating intervention in 
their health (WHO, 2004). 
The governmental logic unfolding in the MHIS and MCHWs is at least twofold. On the one 
hand, migrants themselves in the form of MCHWs are recruited as semi-legal 
governmental subjects to make the health of their communities governable to public 
                                                             
35 Interview with a WHO officer (September 2008) 
36 Interview with a WHO officer (September 2008) 
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health authorities as well as intergovernmental agencies. MCHWs do this not only by 
providing basic everyday health services and consolation. As campaigners, they promote 
voluntary behaviour change in terms of self-health care at the level of the individual as 
well as at the level of the population, e.g. the 20,000 additional migrants targeted through 
large-scale campaigns. As disease controllers, they are points of intervention into the 
regularities of migrant populations. As cartographers, MCHWs are making these 
communities legible to health interventions by drawing out maps of migrants and their 
health specificities that are convertible into indicators legible to biopolitical machines 
such as the MHIS. The MHIS is a machine served by public health authorities that is able to 
compute migrant health regularities now comparable to Thai health regularities. 
Intervention in the health of migrants takes the form of normalizing techniques unfolding 
in the activities of MCHWs.  Regardless of their official political status in Thailand, as a 
result of the governmental strategies deployed through human security that are the 
MCHW and MHIS, Burmese migrants previously excluded from matters of public health 
administration now gradually come to be included in significant ways in Thai public health 
policy and administration in Thailand.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Human security emerges as a situated political strategy to manage pathogenic circulation 
in Thailand through the intricate and productive interplay of a range of human and 
nonhuman elements that form a multiplicity of alliances with each other. However, in spite 
of the constitutive power of both humans and nonhumans in producing the assemblage, it 
is represented by IOM-WHO only in terms of human intentions, activities, and techno-
science ingenuity that are to bring pathogenic circulation under control. Indeed, the 
techno-(bio)political mechanisms enframe, depoliticize, order, authorise knowledge in, and 
align the complex health world of Burmese migrants in terms of simple dichotomies of 
‘unruly’ nature (pathogens, diseases, bodies) versus human technologies (scientific 
evidence, technological innovations, managerial effectiveness), rendering migrant health 
manageable. Tensions, contradictions, and practical difficulties in techno-(bio)political 
encounters arising from the productive interplay inherent to the Assemblage are 
explained away in terms of the mystique of the unruly ‘nature’. Nonetheless, they attest to 
the productive power of human-nonhuman alliances in the manufacture of political 
decisions and subjectivities. Moreover, they remind, by following trajectories of their 
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dynamism, for example when a virus mutates, the contingent and therefore precarious 
nature of human intentions and strategies encapsulated in initiatives like human security.  
Human security is given concrete form through, amongst others, the Burmese migrant 
bodies and migrant behaviour, the pathogens, and the governmental things that are the 
logframe, and the Folder, filing cabinet, the information systems software and the personal 
computer stationed at the public health centres, which make possible the unfolding of the 
governmental logic of human security. Some of these objects are developed elsewhere and 
dropped by the circuits of global human security governance. Some are readjusted from 
existing repertoires and habits; they are accretions, bricolages (Li, 2007:265). They allow 
the health of Burmese migrants in Thailand to be rendered governable by mapping this 
unmapped population and by digitizing and informationalizing their life (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero, 2009) through which they are given properties and intervention into the 
regularities of their health/life dynamics becomes possible. As actants, these things are 
not so much social constructions as elements with constitutive power bearing in equally 
important ways upon the lives of Burmese migrants and MCHWs, Thai public health 
officials, WHO and IOM officials as well as the ‘gigantic, complex whole’ that is the migrant 
health assemblage. They make demands on the human agents (discipline, visualize, 
translate, delimit, obstruct) but these demands only come alive by way of a distribution 
into the material objects that help to shape the assemblage (e.g. Bennett, 2005). 
In the struggle to manage pathogenic circulation, human security has transformed the 
issue of migrant health into a technical matter concerned with the (self-) management of 
bodies and the governmentalization and transnationalization of the Thai state to the 
exclusion of important but difficult questions concerning a violent politics of exclusion. 
The biopolitical subjectivity produced out of human security to manage pathogenic 
circulation embodied in the MCHWs and MCHVs is concentrated mainly in Ranong and 
Samutsakorn provinces where the human security intervention took place. Thus, since 
migrants live throughout Thailand, the governmental power unfolding through human 
security is momentarily unevenly distributed in the migrant health assemblage. The 
immersion of the Thai state into the transnational assemblage opened the possibility to 
imagine managing the health of displaced persons from Burma in spite of their illegal 
status and evasiveness in Thailand. Not only could the state materialise deep in migrant 
communities through the work of the MCHWs and their tools, it could also, through the 
work of the MHIS, calculate the (ir)regularities of migrant health in order to decide points 
of intervention. These developments fundamentally challenge, disrupt even, some 
Agamben scholars’ interpretation of migration life in Thailand as bare life (Rajaram and 
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Grundy-Warr, 2004, Tangseefa, 2006), under which the majority of migrants must 
navigate their life.  If, as these scholars hold, the discourse of migrants in Thailand 
functions as the boundary-producing discourse instrumental to the task of statecraft, then 
the inclusion of the health of migrants into public health policy making can be understood 
as a mutation in Thai statecraft. Ong’s argument that we are moving beyond the 
citizenship-versus-statelessness model in “an ever-shifting landscape shaped by the flows 
of markets, technologies, and populations” is instructive here (Ong, 2006:499). 
To be sure, however, the Thai state is not a ‘governance state,’ where “the international 
community exerts a good deal of control and oversight over the core economic, 
environmental and welfare functions of the state, that is, its core biopolitical functions” 
(Duffield, 2007:82). On the contrary, its absorption into the transnational Migrant Health 
assemblage need not be understood as an act of relinquishing to the international 
community control and oversight over its core biopolitical functions but a move by Thai 
authorities to extend control over ungoverned populations within Thai territory. Indeed, 
these mutations in statecraft can be read as indicative of the inherent flexibility of 
statecraft in global politics (Ong, 1999:214). 
These small mutations in statecraft are fundamental to human security’s struggle for 
governmental management of global circulation. Migrant health in Thailand presents a 
situated example of circulation to be managed. On the one hand, the migrant body is 
desired for her labour, the circulation of which is to be encouraged. On the other hand, her 
body is a ‘menace’ insofar as it is constituted as a carrier of disease and illegalities, the 
circulation of which is to be contained or eliminated. The way human security resolves this 
dilemma is by bringing Burmese migrants not under sovereign but under governmental 
control. What is at stake in these governmental strategies is not the extension of sovereign 
power over territory, expressed in draconian border regulation practices, but a 
governmental concern for circulation. This concern, bound up as it is with and formative of 
the migrant health assemblage, is contributing to the extension and transnationalization of 
the already governmental Thai state. In a small measure, though only concentrated in the 
Ranong site, human security’s political ambition of assembling a ‘global alliance’ and 
reassembling the link between ‘individuals [legal or illegal] and the state – and the state 
with a global world’ had been achieved (CHS, 2003:4). 
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5 THE HUMAN TRAFFICKING ASSEMBLAGE 
 
 
 
“Marriage brokers charged with human trafficking” and “Four jailed for sale of 
young ‘brides’” read two headlines published in December, 2009, in Vietnam’s major 
and government-controlled daily English newspaper, the Viet Nam News (Viet Nam 
News, 2009, 2009).37 Three women and one man were arrested the year before “as 
they tried to get three women aboard a plane at [Ho Chi Minh City’s] Airport” (Viet 
Nam News, 2009). They were reported to have “trafficked more than 400 young 
women” from Tay Ninh – the Vietnamese province bordering Cambodia – and other 
Mekong provinces  to Malaysia, South Korea, and Taiwan to be “sold as brides” (Viet 
Nam News, 2009). According to the police in Tay Ninh, they were using “a 
matchmaking service as a front for a human trafficking scheme” (Viet Nam News, 
2009). The alleged main players Yen and Phong were accused of keeping a house in 
Ho Chi Minh City “to select good-looking young women as ‘mail-order’ brides”. Yen 
was said to have trained ‘would-be brides’ in foreign languages before they were sent 
abroad. Yen and Phong paid VND2 million (approx. USD 108 as per 07.01.2010) for 
each “victim” and sold the ‘brides’ for USD1,000 (Viet Nam News, 2009).38 This 
alleged case of ‘human trafficking’ is but one of a range of cases and related issues 
published in the same newspaper between 2008 and 2009 alone. Indeed, a quick 
search of the term ‘human trafficking’ in articles published online by the 
government-controlled newspaper yields a range of horrific cases. Apart from the 
trafficking of ‘brides,’, the paper reported on the trafficking of “unborn” children 
(2008), infant/child trafficking for the international adoption market, sexual 
exploitation, and trafficking in human organs (Viet Nam News, 2008, 2008, 2008, 
2008).  
 
                                                             
37 Viet Nam News began circulation in 1991, five years after the initiation of Đổi mới or ‘renewal,’ 
the government policy geared towards free-market reform and the integration of Vietnam into the 
global economy. See http://www.vietnamnews.com.vn/AboutUs.htm 
38 For more information on the commodification of international marriages in Vietnam see Wang, 
Hong-zen, and Shu-ming Chang. (2002) The Commodification of International Marriages: Cross-
Border Marriage Business in Taiwan and Viet Nam. International Migration 40. 
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In global trafficking parlance, Vietnam  is considered a source country for men, women, 
and children trafficked for forced labour and prostitution (Secretary of State, 2009). They 
are believed to be trafficked to various destinations within and outside Vietnam. Circuits of 
human trafficking operate across the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) comprising 
Vietnam, Cambodia, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Lao People's Democratic 
Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, and beyond.  These circuits cut across flows of people 
migrating through formal and informal networks across Southeast Asia, East Asia, the 
Middle East, and Europe. For example, some Burmese migrants in Thailand, the subject of 
the last chapter, are thought to have been smuggled and/or trafficked39 to Thailand.40 
‘Human trafficking’ is considered a global problem insofar as it is regarded as a 
transnational criminal activity operating across borders around the world. Over the last 
two decades, it has given rise to a global anti-trafficking machinery formed of, and by, 
different alliances with distinct problematizations and problem-solving activities. Here, I 
focus on the problematization of human trafficking through labour exploitation and 
human security in relation to Vietnam. Specifically, I investigate the ILO-IPEC project to 
prevent human trafficking in Vietnam that was framed in terms of human security. 
This chapter offers a snapshot of the way human security is emerging as a situated 
political strategy in the human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam. The chapter is based on 
research carried out in late 2008 in Phung Hiep Commune and Vi Thanh Town in Hau 
Giang Province in the Mekong Delta, in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, as well as 
Bangkok, Thailand. The chapter draws mainly on interviews with persons from 
communities targeted under human security and relevant officials of Vietnamese and 
international governmental and non-governmental and other private organizations. It also 
draws on publicly available documents and documents made available to me during the 
course of my research. Whether understood as sexual or labour exploitation, the notion of 
human trafficking is a highly sensitive political matter in socialist Vietnam. Research into 
this area remains highly controlled. Access to communities is restricted, especially for 
foreign researchers. Moreover, those interviewed are careful about information they are 
willing to share. How does the biopolitical strategy of human security fare in this political 
environment? How is the prevention of human trafficking in Vietnam assembled? 
                                                             
39 Acts of smuggling and trafficking are difficult to distinguish. Differences are subtle. Indeed, 
smuggling and trafficking may overlap. Unlike smuggling, however, which is considered “a criminal 
commercial transaction between two willing parties who go their separate ways once their 
business is complete,” trafficking specifically “targets the trafficked person as an object of criminal 
exploitation. The purpose from the beginning of the trafficking enterprise is to profit from the 
exploitation of the victim. It follows that fraud, force or coercion all plays a major role in 
trafficking.” http://www.state.gov/m/ds/hstcenter/90434.htm (accessed 14.10.2010) 
40 Interview with ILO field officer in Ranong, Thailand (September 2008) 
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Accordingly, I trace the emergence of human security as a situated political strategy for 
managing illicit circulation relating to the trafficking of women and children in and beyond 
Vietnam. Specifically, as I have done in relation to the migrant health assemblage in 
Thailand, the chapter focuses on the dynamism between the human and nonhuman 
elements that helped to bring forth and shape the vernacular micropolitics of human 
security in this site of practice. Much like in Thailand, this involved a multiplicity of forces 
including market, social, international, governing, viral and chemical forces which 
mutually interacted, helping to shape the emergence of the assemblage. Here too, 
biopolitical mechanisms were developed to prevent the occurrence of human trafficking. 
The complex world of Vietnamese women and child migrants was enframed, ordered and 
depoliticized in terms of simple dichotomies in which the ‘unruly’ life of those earmarked 
as at risk of human trafficking is contrasted with human techno-scientific ingenuity. In so 
doing, these mechanisms attempted to arrange the elements of the assemblage in such a 
way that the illicit circulation of women and children could be made amenable to 
biopolitical governance. Yet, in contrast to the Thai migrant health assemblage, the 
intervention was at first resisted by the Vietnamese state authorities. Moreover, the 
conditions of possibility for the successful enactment of biopolitics were found wanting: 
Vietnam did not operate according to the form of cosmological realism underpinning the 
knowledge practices of human security(Grayson, 2008). Finally, and partly in relation to 
this, central elements critical to the rearrangement of the assemblage either escaped or 
were discarded from the assemblage. Consequently, the assemblage clashed and, following 
a creative readjustment, hybridized with the situated precepts of ‘social evil’. 
 
SOCIAL EVIL AS EMERGING ASSEMBLAGE 
 
Vietnam is on the move. Leaving behind high unemployment and poverty-ridden 
conditions of life, Vietnamese men, women, and children are on the move from rural areas 
to urban centres and from Vietnam across borders to neighbouring and distant countries 
in search of better opportunities. Their journeys and destinations are often beset by 
difficulties. They may opt to travel via formal channels (for example, labour export 
channels run by predominantly state-affiliated and private labour export companies), but 
subsequently end up in unsafe and exploitative working conditions (UNFPA, 2006).41 They 
                                                             
41 In the 1980s, the Vietnamese government opened up the country to the member countries of the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries such as the former East Germany, the Czech 
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may opt to travel via unofficial, informal networks and recruitment channels to evade 
restrictive immigration policies and tight border controls (O'Connell Davidson, 2008:9). 
They may incur debt in order to finance these journeys or to pay agents and brokers but 
subsequently find themselves in relations of debt bondage (Marshall, 2001). They may 
wed foreign men in the hope of security but end in the prostitution of their bodies or 
become domestic helpers in foreign countries such as in the epigraph above. They may 
have been made to believe they will obtain lucrative jobs only to find themselves with little 
or no pay, excessive working hours (Marshall, 2001), and performing sex work. As a young 
middle class Vietnamese lady42 in Ho Chi Minh City quietly recounts: 
My aunt borrowed money to pay for her daughter to go to Cambodia to find 
work. The girl was brought to a ‘cave’ [a brothel in colloquial understanding], 
where she could not get away for several years. We had no contact with her. 
Eventually, she escaped and returned to Ho Chi Minh City. She is now in 
Thailand working.  
Experiences of exploitation “may not even be seen as such by the ‘victim,’ who may see 
themselves as being nonetheless better off than if they had stayed at home” (Marshall, 
2001, see also Nguyen-vo, 2008).    
Many of the mobilities within and out of Vietnam today are the effect of Đổi Mới, the path 
breaking governmental policy of market reform and the integration of the country into the 
global economy and polity.43 Đổi Mới has had an enormous impact on Hồ Khẩu, the 
household registration system introduced in 1954. Registration to the system involved 
gaining “access to rights, employment and services such as the distributions of rations and 
essential commodities” (Scott et al., 2006). The Vietnamese government used the system 
as a tool of regional planning which not only served to spatially enclose residents within 
Vietnamese provinces but also to police provincial borders in order to curtail massive 
southward migration following the partition of the country.44  Travelling within Vietnam 
henceforth required governmental permission. The development of private enterprises in 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Republic, Poland, and Bulgaria. Since 1992, Vietnam has found new markets in many developed 
countries and territories such as South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Libya, the Middle East and Laos.   
42 Interview with Chinese-Vietnamese professional in her twenties, Ho Chi Minh City, October 2008 
43 In 1986, ten years after the Vietnam War and the country’s reunification under communist rule, 
the Vietnamese socialist government launched Đổi mới, literally ‘renovation’. Over the next two 
decades, the government’s renovation commitment to free market reforms involved a twofold 
process: state-owned enterprises opened up to market competition, on the other hand, though 
imbued with deep-seated suspicions of foreign elements owing to its turbulent recent history, 
Vietnam opened up to the global economy and polity (cf. Dixon and Kilgour, 2002).  
44 The Geneva Conference in 1954 produced the Geneva Accords which saw the division of Vietnam 
into communist North and South Vietnam. 
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the reform period, however, “created a labour market which broke the tie between 
permanent residence and employment” (Scott, et al., 2006:22).  The relaxation of Hồ Khẩu 
has significantly increased mobility within and out of Vietnam. 
Indeed, as Anh et al argue, “The increasing commercialisation of labour with capital inputs 
has been of major significance in releasing the rural workforce and prompting them to 
leave rural areas” (Anh et al., 2003). “The growth in labour intensive garment, shoe and 
other factories” (Scott, et al., 2006:21) as well as a flourishing pleasure industry 
developing in tandem with emerging market forces provided women with greater 
incentives and opportunities to live and work in urban centres. In Ironies of Freedom: Sex, 
Culture, and Neoliberal Governance in Vietnam, Nguyen-vo makes the compelling argument 
that the informal ‘hooking economy’ that emerged in the wake of the scramble for profit-
making business opportunities gave rise to a booming pleasure industry. Entrepreneurs 
from the three sectors – state, private, and/or foreign – ‘hook up’ at Bia Ôm 
establishments, literally “hugging beer” venues, where business deals are agreed over food 
and sexual entertainment.45 Since the late 1990s, the problem of (growing) prostitution in 
Vietnam has been linked to a growing problem of HIV transmission. This viral force has led 
the government to utilise, among others, public health measures to address prostitution 
(Nguyen-vo, 2008).       
Primarily, however, the Vietnamese government has responded to increases in drug 
abuse, prostitution and trafficking for sexual exploitation, and HIV/AIDS in contemporary 
Vietnam by framing these social issues in the language of social evils and linking them to 
the ‘downside’ of Đổi Mới. The language of social evils renders these issues a problem of 
morality affecting traditional Vietnamese culture and social order. Trafficking, according 
to the Vietnamese government, is the result of “the open-door policy, the change of 
economic management, the process of urbanization and the increasing exchanges with 
other countries, particularly with countries in the region” (Derks, 2000:46). In 1995, the 
government called for the “insertion of ‘order and moral principles into cultural activities 
according to our cultural content” to “eliminate social evils” (as quoted in Nguyen-vo, 
                                                             
45 Comparing life in Vietnam to the USA, Linh Dinh writes in the Literary Review: “A typical bia om 
has private rooms where a group of buddies can sit on a couch in front of a big screen TV to warble 
their favorite hits and oldies. Each man has a hostess to help him ease a tune along. A case of beer 
sits on the floor. [...] There are also ‘bida om’ (billiards and a hug) and ‘hot toc om’ (a haircut and a 
hug). An 18-year-old girl in my neighborhood decided she wanted to work at a hot toc om. She 
assumed, innocently enough, that all she had to do was rub her breasts against a man's whiskers as 
she gave him a haircut. She was required to do more than that and was fired after four days. ‘he 
place had six chairs. Three of these guys had their things out. One guy had two girls all over him. I 
was supposed to eat ice cream,’ she giggled. ‘And everyone was in the same room?’ ‘Yes.’” Dinh, 
Linh. (2002) Eight Postcards from Vietnam. Literary Review 45:812-22.  
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2008:45). Vietnam was “to build a ‘progressive culture deeply colored with national 
characteristics’ by cracking down on the dissemination of ‘decadent, poisonous cultural 
products’ and the three social evils” (as quoted in Nguyen-vo, 2008:45). In the scheme of 
social evils, the source for “increasing drug dealing, prostitution, smuggling, and other 
criminal activities” is interpreted as a consequence of foreign influences and the 
concomitant corruption of traditional Vietnamese values (Dixon and Kilgour, 2002:604). 
Consequently, social evils have been dealt with by intensifying propaganda about 
Vietnamese traditions, virtues, and moral mores, resulting in the stigmatization of those 
having experienced trafficking. The Vietnamese family unit plays a central role in this 
campaign, standing in as moral arbiter: “families may ‘turn a blind eye’ to the realities of 
the experiences of trafficked daughters or express shame towards daughters who have 
engaged in the ‘social evil’ of sex work, albeit against their will, in destination countries” 
(Vijeyarasa, 2010:S90). Yet, Vietnamese cultural values including filial piety, a central 
Confucian tenet, impose family obligations on girls, creating a desire to migrate, even if by 
unsafe and irregular ways, in order to be able to support the family through home 
remittances. In the end, the welfare of the family is an important factor in the decision to 
migrate within and/or out of Vietnam (Busza, 2004). It is in this sense that the effect of the 
language of social evils has been argued to have led to the criminalisation of those 
otherwise considered, under the global standards of human trafficking, victims of human 
trafficking (Vijeyarasa, 2010). 
Considering the increasing exchanges with other countries, particularly with countries in 
the region, Vietnam now lies at the crossroads of regional and global circuits of human 
trafficking. According to the influential US-published Trafficking in Persons Report46 of 
2010, Vietnamese men, women and children are trafficked to neighbouring countries 
(Cambodia, Thailand, and People’s Republic of China-PRC), to other parts of Southeast Asia 
(Malaysia and Indonesia), East Asia (Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan), 
Europe (Czech Republic, Russia, United Kingdom), and the Middle East (United States 
Department of State, 2010). In dealing with the social evil, from mid 1990s onwards, the 
Vietnamese government has drawn heavily on the technical support and expertise of both 
national and ‘foreign elements’ such as international organizations. In 1997, the Socialist 
Republic issued a directive calling for “a closer cooperation between government agencies, 
mass organizations as well as international and non-governmental organizations” as this 
relates to dealing with this social evil (Derks, 2000:46). In the end, the government’s 
                                                             
46 The annual "Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons 
Report" is submitted by the US Secretary of State to Congress.  
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decision to invite ‘foreign elements’ to resolve the problem of trafficking in and from 
Vietnam is linked with its open-door policy to promote Vietnam as a serious player on the 
world state. As such, it bowed to political pressures from the regional association ASEAN 
and other international organizations as well as to pressures arising from its bid for 
membership to the WTO.47  
In the mid 1990s, both the Department of Social Evils Prevention (DoSEP) under the 
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), and the mass organization the 
Vietnamese Women’s Union (VWU), in cooperation with international organizations, 
began developing tentative initiatives to eliminate the social evil of trafficking. In 1997, the 
VWU developed a Plan of Action on the prevention of trafficking in women and children. 
The Plan involved amongst other things the dissemination of information and education, 
research, and community-based prevention schemes in coordination with agencies and 
organizations in different localities, regional and international cooperation. Indeed, the 
human security project discussed below was implemented with the VWU as the primary 
local partner. Moreover, in 1999, in collaboration with the IOM, the VWU developed a 
national counter-trafficking campaign which included door-to-door campaigns, public 
meetings and performances, and training of journalists (Derks, 2000:47). Since this time, 
human trafficking has been seen officially as “a problem related to illegal migration and 
prostitution” (Derks, 2000:46). 
The emergence of social evil as a political strategy arose out of the interactions between 
human and nonhuman elements comprising, amongst others, women and children, 
desires, agents, economic imperatives, HIV/AIDS, filial duties, forced marriages,  Đổi Mới, 
make-up, Mekong river flows, foreign elements, Vietnamese virtue, politicians, border 
controls, the materiality of bodies, bars, drugs, and sex. The introduction of international 
organizations to govern the problem of the purchase and sale of women and children led 
the social evil assemblage to vacillate and undermine itself. Indeed, confidence in the 
governance of social evils was beginning to wane as foreign institutions were invited to 
rearrange the assemblage.   
 
 
 
                                                             
47 Vietnam became the WTO's 150th member on 11 January 2007. 
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FROM SOCIAL EVIL TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
 
In fact, it is only after the Vietnamese government invited international organizations to 
support its battle with human trafficking in the mid 1990s that human trafficking ‘came’ to 
Vietnam, insofar as the country was only then, through its promotion by international 
agencies, introduced to the concept and problem of human trafficking specific to Vietnam. 
It is in this sense that an IOM officer based in Vietnam exclaimed: “The name trafficking 
was given; the problem was created. Did the problem exist before the term came into use, 
who knows?!”48 This is not to say that the acquisition, forceful movement, and exploitation 
of people did not exist prior to ‘human trafficking,’ or indeed to social evils. Indeed, 
celebrated Vietnamese poet Nguyễn Du (1765-1820) wrote two centuries earlier, at the 
turn of the eighteenth century, in the now epic poem The Kim Van Kieu: “And now the girl 
must meet that capital account... ‘Desist!-‘she cries, ‘and in their place take me for bounty 
to be sold!” (Nguyễn, 2004:34).49 Rather, as one ILO officer50 based in Bangkok at the ILO 
Subregional Office for East Asia insightfully contends:  
people say trafficking is on the rise, and now it’s a big issue [...]. I mean, isn’t it just 
because we are able to see it now, we have trained ourselves to see it. I mean, I 
think there [was] a lot of things that we could define as trafficking like 100, 200, 
300 years ago [...].But it was not called ‘worst forms of child labour according to 
convention one and two’, it was not called trafficking and Palermo Protocol. So, it’s 
because we have identified things differently, so we changed. 
The term human trafficking is said to have first emerged from the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC). According to the UNODC, human trafficking is “the acquisition 
of people by improper means such as force, fraud or deception, with the aim of exploiting 
them”.51 Much like the emerging global migrant health assemblage, the global anti-human 
                                                             
48 Interview with an IOM officer, Ho Chi Minh City, October 2008 
49 The poem tells the story of the life of Thúy Kiều, a beautiful and talented young woman, who was 
compelled to sacrifice herself to save her family. She unwittingly sold herself as a prostitute to save 
her father and younger brother from prison. Nguyễn, Du. (2004) The Kim Van Kieu, translated by 
Vladislav Zhukov. Canberra: Pandanus Books. 
50 Interview with an ILO officer, Bangkok, September 2008 
51 Human trafficking is, according to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime, “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by 
means of threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, or deception, of 
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of giving or receiving or payments or benefits 
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others 
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
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trafficking machinery, constitutive of actors, institutions and alliances, of 
problematizations, reflections and analyses, of strategies, standards and practices, of tools 
and devices as well as expert jargon, has given rise to an array of biopolitical activities 
seeking to normalize what it considers ‘irregular’ transnational mobility. Indeed, the 
reality constituted in and through the processes of human trafficking governance is 
distinct from the Vietnamese reality constituted by the governance of social evils. Since the 
working practices of the social evils approach of Vietnamese state officials and institutions 
are markedly different from the biopolitical practices to ‘combat human trafficking’ 
propagated by IGOs and other transnational organizations, much of the latter’s efforts in 
Vietnam have concentrated on authorizing and disseminating expert knowledges about 
governing human trafficking as well as taking minuscule steps in training Vietnamese 
officials in the situated management of the global battle against human trafficking. 
Specifically, as I demonstrate below, this has involved attempts to authorize knowledges 
and align the desires and needs of those considered at risk of trafficking as well as 
Vietnamese state officials and institutions with the strategic imperatives of the ‘global’ 
anti-trafficking machinery. The encounter between governing through ‘social evil’ and the 
governance of human security is in fact causing the social evil assemblage to vacillate, 
leading to the gradual hybridization of governing the issue of migrant deceit and 
exploitation in and from Vietnam.  
At the turn of the millennium, Vietnam drew mainly on three expert intergovernmental 
organizations operating across the Greater Mekong Subregion on the ‘technical’ issue of 
human trafficking. Most influential in this respect has been the IOM which has been active 
in Vietnam since the late 1980s. The IOM’s promotion of the management of migration 
flows within the Mekong subregion has been the precursor for more extensive 
collaboration between the five countries in the subregion. The IOM continues to promote a 
system of migration management which it argues not only is an organizational tool to 
“help governments and civil society focus on the complexities of the growing migration 
portfolio” (IOM, 2010). It is also handled as a framework for public discussion which 
“offers principles for managing migration in an orderly way and for controlling irregular 
migration” (see also IOM, 2010, Oelgemoeller, 2011, 2010). The IOM has been 
instrumental in developing the growing, scientifically verifiable, human trafficking 
portfolio and, importantly, in identifying emergent properties such as ‘at-risk of 
trafficking’ and victims of trafficking in/from Vietnam as well as elsewhere. It recently 
supported MOLISA in developing guidelines in ‘victim identification’ and has proposed 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” United Nations, The. (2000) Un Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. 
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conducting formative research to “investigate the reality of trafficking of persons in Viet 
Nam, including its potential link with labor exploitation” as well as to develop a 
comprehensive database of migrant profiles in order to support “policy makers, 
government implementers, destination countries and migrants” in managing (irregular) 
migration (IOM - Mission in Vietnam, 2008).     
Secondly, the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP) was 
established in 2000 to facilitate a stronger and more coordinated response to trafficking in 
the GMS and beyond. It aims to pool the expertise and efforts of several UN agencies 
including the IOM, ILO, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United 
Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 
UNIAP is managed by a regional office in Bangkok, with country project offices in the 
capitals of Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Burma, Thailand and Vietnam. Its core function is to 
coordinate the policy and operational response to human trafficking within the Sub-region 
in collaboration with GMS governments at different levels, local NGOs, UN agencies and 
I(N)GOS including Save the Children, Oxfam, and World Vision. Through the Coordinated 
Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT), it aims to support 
governments in the institutionalisation of approaches to combat human trafficking. 
Through the Strategic Information Response Network (SIREN), it aims to deliver 
comprehensive data and analysis on cutting edge issues within the global anti-trafficking 
machinery, especially as this relates to the GMS. By the time of my visit to the region in 
2008, the UNIAP had managed to span a web of collaboration on combating human 
trafficking anchored at key country nodal points, bringing together senior government 
officials including police, border guards, women’s organizations, NGO and IGO officials, of 
five GMS countries across the GMS.   
Finally, together with the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour 
(IPEC), the International Labour Organization (ILO) was engaged in the region from 2000-
08 implementing a USD 20m UK Department for International Development (DfID)-funded 
project entitled The Mekong Sub-regional Project to Combat Trafficking in Children and 
Women (TICW) involving five countries (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and China). 
Over the eight-year period, the DfID-funded TICW sought to ‘combat human trafficking’ as 
a regional labour phenomenon. The HSF-funded human security project that is the subject 
of this chapter constituted a small component of the larger DfID project and was 
implemented in two countries only, namely Vietnam and Cambodia. The overarching aims 
of TICW were to develop national frameworks, structures, policies and processes to 
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address human trafficking in each of the targeted countries (phase II); to establish a 
transnational governmental network across the region to share information (phase II); 
and to facilitate the mainstreaming of ‘good practices’ in ‘community-based prevention’ 
initiatives by governments (phase I).52 Similar ‘combat’ strategies were adopted in all 
targeted countries in the region.  
What is striking about the constitutive work of all three IGOs is the intricate governmental 
web that they are spinning across the GMS to combat human trafficking, relying on a 
reality of human trafficking manufactured out of knowledges and frames of thinking which 
take for granted the value of scientific truth. In the process, the human trafficking 
assemblage in Vietnam is extended across nominal scales from the ‘local’ to the ‘global’ 
level, linking the women and children deemed ‘at risk of trafficking’ with government 
officials and institutions at the ‘local,’ ‘provincial,’ and ‘national’ level with I(N)GOs 
operating at the ‘regional’ and ‘global’ level.  
Trafficking remains a “sensitive issue to be addressed with care” – until recently, for 
example, men were not recognized as ‘victims’ of trafficking.53 Following the development 
of haphazard policies and resolutions which formed part of a national policy to “address 
and prevent trafficking and prostitution of women and children” in the 1990s (Derks, 
2000:46), by 2003, a change could be registered in the governing ethos of the Vietnamese 
government towards a more realist representation of society reflecting emerging market, 
social and governing forces. The ‘propatainment’ movie Bar Girls was released as part of “a 
new wave of Vietnamese state-sanctioned cinema that mixes sensational story lines with 
the Communist Party’s campaign against ‘social evils’” (Johnson, 2003). As Nguyen-vo has 
argued, “An emerging commercial popular culture in Vietnam now takes over some of the 
production of ideology in its response to [market forces emerging in Vietnam since the 
open-doors policy] through its representation of society in a self-proclaimed social 
realism” (Nguyen-vo, 2008:215). The movie is set in the nightclubs and slums of Ho Chi 
Minh City and follows Hoa, a heroin-addicted rich girl working as a prostitute in nightclubs 
                                                             
52 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/migmain.showPractice?p_lang=en&p_practice_id=59(accesse
d 14.01.2010) 
53 The Trafficking in Persons Report 2008 reported of 200 Vietnamese men and women recruited by 
Vietnamese state-run labour agencies for work in apparel factories in Jordan who were allegedly 
“subjected to conditions of fraudulent recruitment, debt bondage, unlawful confiscation of travel 
documents, confinement, and manipulation of employment terms for the purpose of forced labor at 
their worksite”. When workers began to strike and clashed with Jordanian police, they are said to 
have faced threats of retaliation by Vietnamese government officials and employment agency 
representatives. According to the Trafficking in Persons Report, “There were no reported efforts by 
the Vietnamese government to consider any of the repatriated workers as possible victims of 
trafficking”. United States Department of State, The. (2008) Trafficking in Persons Report 2008. 
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to satisfy her addiction, and Hanh, a gentle character who hopes for a better life, to their 
dramatic end. In the first few months of its screening, Bar Girls took in USD 1m, becoming 
“Vietnam’s highest-grossing film ever”. As the deputy director of the government’s 
Cinematography Department, Nguyen Thi Hong Ngat, noted: “We need more skilful, subtle 
propaganda. [...]. More like Holly-wood films” (Johnson, 2003). What is interesting in this 
development is the gradual shift towards a social realist stance in relation to the sex and 
trafficking industry in Vietnam.     
In 2004, the Vietnamese government issued an Approval of the National Plan of Action 
against Crime of Trafficking in Children and Women during the period of 2004-2010 (Deputy 
Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem, 2004). Though the plan continued to use the language of 
social evils and social cohesion: trafficking, it argued, is an “urgent and pressing problem, 
badly affecting the society, customs, tradition, social morals and Government laws, 
destroying family happiness, increasing the risks of HIV/AIDS transmission and resulting 
in potential impacts on national and social security” (Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia 
Khiem, 2004). The Plan set out a four point programme to combat trafficking of women 
and children: firstly, “education and communication in the community on prevention”; 
secondly, criminal investigation; thirdly, reintegration of ‘victims of trafficking’; and 
finally, developing and strengthening the legal framework (Deputy Prime Minister Pham 
Gia Khiem, 2004). A governmental agency was appointed to lead each program point. 
Given its mandate and experience, the VWU was put in charge of prevention. Under the 
Prime Minister’s Decree 69 relating to marriage and family relations with ‘foreign 
elements,’ steps were taken to protect Vietnamese women from deceit or trafficked 
circumstances in brokered marriages including increased due diligence in issuing 
marriage certificates and ensuring that the marriage is voluntary. For example, the VWU 
began a programme in collaboration with the South Korean Women’s Union to set up pre-
marriage counselling centres and hotlines in key source areas of Vietnam. 
In sum, Vietnam is indeed on the move. Considered a major ‘supplier’ in men, women, and 
children to global circuits of human trafficking, Vietnam has joined the quest to contain 
and normalise this form of ‘irregular’ transnational mobility. As the governance of social 
evil gradually is brought into and formative of the governance of human trafficking in 
Vietnam, it is also gradually transforming into the technical problem of human trafficking. 
The reality created by the campaign against social evil gradually is being replaced by the 
reality of ‘human trafficking’ in which the techno-scientific and managerial objects and 
‘rituals of truth’ need first to be learned. Through their technical training in managing the 
problem of trafficking (beginning with their participation in the designing, planning, and 
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project managing process) Vietnamese state officials are re-conceptualizing the object of 
governance as knowable only through expert knowledge.54 As to the men, women, and 
children who may or may not be trafficked, they are subject to a range of governmental 
‘good practices’ to combat human trafficking. What this involves specifically is discussed 
below in relation to the ILO-IPEC human security project to prevent women and children 
from trafficking.  
As with the human security project to improve health conditions of Burmese migrants in 
Thailand discussed in the last chapter, the human security project in Vietnam emerged 
from and was formative of the Vietnamese human trafficking assemblage. The human 
security project, entitled Prevention of Trafficking in Children and Women at a Community-
Level in Cambodia and Vietnam, was an integrated part of the already running ILO-IPEC 
Mekong Sub-regional Project to Combat Trafficking in Children and Women (TICW). With 
additional funding of approximately USD 1.2m from the Government of Japan through the 
UN’s HSF, ILO was able to extend over a three-year period (2003-06) ‘community-based 
prevention’ activities in two countries, namely Vietnam and Cambodia. In this sense, 
human security slipped into an already established field of governmental practices and 
problem spaces to which it related in terms of ‘logical’ reinforcement. As with the Burmese 
migrants in Thailand, the practices employed in this human security project are bound up 
with a range of intergovernmental and transnational nongovernmental activities that are 
subject to mandates, expertise, standard procedures, funding conditions, and last but not 
least the material things including artefacts, devices, and the bodies of ‘at risk of 
trafficking’ women and children. As such, this chapter is concerned with the micropolitics 
of the Vietnamese component of the human security project, taking into account also the 
circumstantial and historical origins of the human trafficking assemblage as presented 
above. Specifically, I am interested in the order of governance and associated political 
subjectivities that are emerging in relation to controlling ‘irregular’ mobility in and from 
Vietnam as conceived through the lens of human security.   
The concept of human security, noted in late 2008 Tan, the then deputy director of the 
Institute for International Relations, Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is “not 
popular in Vietnam”. Though the American Asia Foundation helped organize the first 
workshop on human security in Vietnam in mid 2008 at the University of Ho Chi Minh 
                                                             
54 Nugyen-vo oberserves a similar phenomenon in the governance of commercial sex in Vietnam. 
Nguyen-vo, Thu-huong. (2008) The Ironies of Freedom: Sex, Culture, and Neoliberal Governance in 
Vietnam. Critical Dialogues in Southeast Asian Studies. Seattle and London: University of 
Washington Press. 
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City,55 human security remains an imported concept with little substantial traction in the 
country, he argued. In Vietnamese policy, there is virtually no mention of human security. 
However, in Tan’s view, the Vietnamese notion of social security is equivalent to the broad 
understanding of human security promoted by the UN. Indeed, he pointed out, “social evils 
disrupt social security”. In this sense, human security in Vietnam falls within the realm of 
community rather than individualistic society. In his terms, human security refers to 
community security. In this perspective, “The state has the largest role to protect 
individuals”. Moreover, “The state is still the centre”. MOLISA stands for the “Protection of 
human securities”.      
 
FRAMING LOGICALLY AND LOGICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
Human security entered the emerging human trafficking assemblage, as with the migrant 
health assemblage, loaded with an entourage of actants and forces. Recalling the epigraph 
to chapter 3 above, the Vietnamese project comprised from the outset emails, devices such 
as computers, the internet, offices, institutions, and management tools such as the 
logframe, capital, pixels, digits, and the river Mekong which extended across scales, 
helping to make possible and shape this intervention in Vietnam. To reiterate, I argued 
that human security is embodied in for example an email exchange between the HSU in 
New York and the ILO headquarters in Geneva and the ILO Regional Office in Bangkok, in 
which documents including the logframe were exchanged, led to the transmission of USD 
1.5m from New York to local project partners along the Mekong. Here, I want to focus on 
the possibilities afforded by the logframe since the logframe sets out how an intervention 
is to be assembled. The logframe is the site where the complex life world of Vietnamese 
women and children was written and contextualized. It is where their (migratory) desires 
are given biopolitical properties such as ‘blind migrants’ and ‘at risk of trafficking’. The 
logframe establishes an exclusive claim on a specific class of subjects such as girls aged 
between 8 to 12 years in the Mekong Delta province of Hau Giang, on whom it writes 
forms of subjectivation in pursuit of managing illegalized circulation such as human 
trafficking. To technical experts of the ILO then, the ‘at risk of trafficking’ body presented a 
technical problem requiring effective public measures. This meant not only authorizing 
knowledges and aligning the desires and needs of those considered at risk of trafficking 
                                                             
55 Interview with Kim N. B. Ninh, Ph.D., Country Representative Vietnam, The Asia Foundation, 
Hanoi, October 2008  
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but also of those in positions of authority such as Vietnamese state officials and 
institutions with the strategic imperatives of the ‘global’ anti-trafficking machinery. 
In its proposal to the HSF in 2002, the ILO argued that trafficking is “inevitably linked” to 
the significant movement of people across economies and markets within the Mekong 
subregion in search of livelihood. Women and children who live in “particularly vulnerable 
to trafficking” communities “live at or below the poverty line,” are ‘likely’ to have little or 
no access to basic services, and have “little or no chance of expanding their livelihood 
potentials” (ILO/IPEC, 2002:3). They migrate and are “vulnerable to trafficking”. The sites 
and forms of exploitation are said to vary considerably including services provided to the 
commercial sex industry, street begging, labouring in the manufacturing sector, and 
domestic services. Since the HSF was argued “to aim at helping most disadvantaged 
groups of people, victims of trafficking and those at risk of trafficking are obviously among 
those”. As such, the ILO’s ‘trafficking project’ was considered “very much along the line 
with the goal at which the Fund is aiming, namely, to create and sustain societies that 
enable individual human beings to realise their potential” (ILO/IPEC, 2002). The 
difference between TICW and the human security component, according to an ILO officer, 
lay in the emphasis on providing ‘direct assistance’ to people, that is people-centrism, 
rather than assistance to the government or state-centrism.  
Specifically, the human security project was to extend on the TICW’s Mekong Challenge56 
to prevent human trafficking in the Mekong subregion by creating the conditions under 
which people are “empowered to take greater control over their lives” (ILO/IPEC, 2002). 
In the words of an ILO officer, “While there are many approaches to fight what is now 
commonly referred to as ‘modern-day slavery’ ideally, the best way to tackle the 
trafficking of children and women is to prevent it from happening in the first place”.57  In 
Vietnam, on the one hand, this involved raising awareness about trafficking and providing 
the credit and skills training to ‘at risk persons’ to set up businesses, on the other hand, 
this involved providing the training to governmental organizations to develop coordinated 
responses to prevent trafficking (Bowen et al., 2006:2). In effect, while the problem of “a 
growing market for clandestine migration services, including smuggling across borders, 
faking travel documents, and arranging marriages,” is symptomatic of a violent politics of 
exclusion in the “ever more restrictive immigration policies and tighter border controls by 
                                                             
56 Human Trafficking. The Mekong Challenge. It’s about prevention... is the title of a brochure by the 
International Organisation of Labour, published as part of the Mekong Sub-regional Project to 
Combat Trafficking in Children and Women (TICW) of which the human security project discussed 
here was a component. 
57 Interview with ILO officer, Bangkok, October 2008 
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affluent, migrant-receiving countries” (O'Connell Davidson, 2008:9), the solution to the 
problem of human trafficking in Vietnam was seen lying mainly with persons ‘at risk’ and 
their government. They were to become alert entrepreneurs and their government a 
better manager.   
A primary concern highlighted in the logframe related to the “dearth of reliable 
information and data on trafficking and migration” in the two targeted countries in the 
human security proposal (ILO/IPEC, 2002). Effectively, the reality of human trafficking is 
stabilized with the perpetual production of scientific knowledge by experts including 
statistics, analyses, and guidelines on which ‘logical’ interventions are based.58 Scientific 
knowledge is difficult to come by in Vietnam. On the one hand, “very few statistics are kept 
by the local government or police forces about internal or cross-border trafficking” 
(Cacioppo, 2006); on the other hand, owing to its sensitivity, human trafficking is a 
notoriously difficult phenomenon to research in Vietnam.59 Indeed, a significant part of the 
‘trafficking’ work carried out by intergovernmental and transnational non-governmental 
organizations in Vietnam relates to mapping the problem of human trafficking and 
developing the expert knowledge based on which ‘logical’ interventions are conceived.  
Hence also the ILO’s development of a portfolio of ‘good’ prevention practices out of TICW 
(IPEC/ILO, 2008). Work of this kind includes the influential Save the Children UK report 
on A Rapid Assessment of the Situation of Migrant Children in Vietnam (Scott, et al., 2006) 
and the ILO rapid assessment of Can Tho City, Hau Giang Province, and Tay Ninh Province 
in Southern Viet Nam. The Situation of Migration and Trafficking of Children and Women 
(Cacioppo, 2006). As mentioned already, the IOM is currently awaiting the outcome for a 
proposal submitted to the European Commission for the Development of Migrant Profiles 
and a Comprehensive Migration Database.  
It is on the basis of ‘reliable’ information that ‘evidence-based’ interventions are designed 
and planned. ‘Evidence’ on the nature and whereabouts of the “most disadvantaged 
groups of people” are used to select the target sites and populations for intervention. Thus, 
the “dearth” of reliable information and data on human trafficking in Vietnam led the ILO 
to rely on a situation analysis and on the activation of ‘local knowledge’. The situation or 
baseline analysis of trafficking in children and women in Vietnam was based on a 
comprehensive review and collation of the literature on TICW issues produced by various 
Vietnamese and international organizations in Vietnam over the preceding decade 
                                                             
58 Conversations with members of other organisations suggest the lack of reliable data is 
considered a chronic problem to containing and controlling human trafficking in Vietnam and the 
GMS more generally. Interviews in Bangkok, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, September-November 2008 
59 Interview with a European academic, Ho Chi Minh City, October 20, 2008 
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(ILO/IPEC, 2002:24). Although not noted or made explicit in the logframe, this information 
was complemented or influenced by international conventions and standards60 as well as 
expert knowledge on the dynamics of human trafficking in the GMS available at the time 
(e.g. Skeldon, 2001).61   
The ‘local’ knowledge was gained through stakeholder ownership exercises which involved 
the participation of ‘local’ people in the project design and planning process. Indeed, as 
Triantafillou and Nielsen have argued, “through the intertwinement of anthropological 
knowledges and radical action research, knowledge about the local has become an 
authoritative mode of veridiction (regime of truth) in development interventions” 
(2001:63). The National Stakeholder Ownership Exercise (NSOE) was carried out in 2002. 
The exercise was held with wide participation of members of “state departments, mass 
organizations, and NGOs (Vietnamese and international)” who selected the provinces “for 
project intervention” (ILO/IPEC, 2002:21). The three provinces selected for intervention, 
namely Can Tho, Hau Giang, and Tay Ninh, were classed as “high risk migrant sending and 
receiving areas”. Based on this, further Provincial Stakeholder Ownership Exercises (PSOE) 
were conducted in the selected provinces in 2002. The selection of 10 communes and 
wards in these provinces for intervention  was argued to be based on the “knowledge and 
experience of local members” (Cacioppo, 2006). The activation of ‘local’ knowledge 
constitutes a recasting of governance in which the target population including 
governmental officials experience governing based on the logic of human security.    
                                                             
60 The ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour adopted in 1999, and the first World 
Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in Stockholm in 1996 
61 Interview with ILO officer, Bangkok, November 2008 
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Figure 5: Map of project locations in Vietnam (Bowen, et al., 2006:4) 
Can Tho City is the Mekong Delta’s largest city, located 170 kilometres south-west of Ho 
Chi Minh City. It is the hub of Southern Vietnam’s transportation network, including “its 
paved roads to Cambodia”. Tay Ninh Province, already mentioned in the Viet Nam News 
reports in the introduction, borders Cambodia to the west and Ho Chi Minh City to the 
east, providing the main link between Phnom Phen, the Cambodian capitol, and Ho Chi 
Minh City, the largest urban area in south Vietnam. Hau Giang province lies 240 kilometres 
south of Ho Chi Minh City in the centre of the Mekong Delta. The province is divided into 
five districts, including Phung Hiep, and one provincial town, Vi Thanh. The majority of 
Hau Giang residents belong to the mainstream Kinh ethnic group. Four-fifth of Hau Giang 
residents depends on rice farming to generate income. Less than twenty percent of the 
population is engaged in small-scale industries, trade, or services (Cacioppo, 2006). 
Research for this chapter was conducted in this province.  
The integration of ‘local’ people in the design, planning as well as managing of a project 
has become ‘good’ practice since the emergence of the participatory and sustainability 
logics in development discourse. Under the human security project, apart from the SOEs, 
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the ILO involved members of targeted populations in monitoring processes. The 
measurability of project progress and impact for monitoring and evaluation purposes is 
assured by pre-determined performance indicators. Participatory monitoring, according 
to the ILO, is “not just monitoring as in ‘checking’ for impact”. Local participation is seen as 
beneficial since “‘learning’ at the lowest possible level by project stakeholders” may “lead 
to better future interventions” (ILO/IPEC, 2005:39, 2002). In fact, the conceptualization 
process of the human security project itself was beset with practices common to the aid 
community. These practices are suffused with the same techno-scientific and managerial 
logic upon which the subsequent community-based prevention activities of the project 
were predicated. 
The ‘target recipients’ identified were “children and women at high risk of trafficking along 
with their families and communities”. Their risk profile presented in the proposal locates 
them in areas at high risk – as identified by the SOE – and “in circumstances that render 
them vulnerable to trafficking for labour exploitation”. Children aged 10-14 and 15-17 
were considered “particularly at risk of entering exploitative labour, leaving home or, in 
the case of the younger group of children, at the point of doing so within the next few 
years” (ILO/IPEC, 2002). In fact, the ‘at-risk of trafficking person’ is not an a prior, 
objective or legal category of persons (O'Connell Davidson, 2008:12) but functions as an 
object of biopolitical governance. This object is subject to an array of ‘corrective’ 
programmes discussed below which aim to contain human trafficking by normalising the 
mobility behaviour of ‘at-risk of trafficking persons’. The biopolitical subjectivity of 
persons ‘at risk of trafficking’ is first written and contextualized in the logically framed 
project proposal. The expert knowledge “about probable futures in the present” that is risk 
(Aradau, 2004:269) and the prevention of what are considered probable aberrant futures 
is characteristic of the logic of risk (Dean, 1999, O'Malley, 1996). The preventive 
intervention in human trafficking of the human security project was at the point of the 
mobility behaviour of persons ‘at-risk of trafficking’.  
Indeed, a “positive outcome” of the intervention was when persons ‘at risk’ have become 
“alert to traffickers,” and the number of ‘blind migrants – “those that accept carelessly an 
offer to leave the village for employment opportunities elsewhere” had been reduced 
(ILO/IPEC, 2002). The success of the project was measured according to numbers in 
output performance. As one ILO officer conceded, “We always want to measure things, so 
we can measure and report to donor, and we can measure the impact”. The Vietnamese 
component of the project was successful if ten existing People’s Committees were 
strengthened, 360-400 families received direct assistance, 1,400-2,000 families (7,000-
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10,000 individuals) were aware of the risks of trafficking and teachers made regular use of 
awareness raising materials, and a minimum of 200 girls and boys have been prevented 
from being trafficked.  
In the space of a few paragraphs, a technical assemblage interlinking various officials of 
‘global,’ ‘regional,’ and ‘local’ organizations with the women and children targeted under 
this project was programmed and framed logically with a discreet problem, target 
population, evidence, strategies, methods, tools, funds, and intentions. The 
conceptualization of this human security project was contingent on multifarious 
microphysical problematizing activities. It involved embedding and defining, specifying, 
delimiting, categorizing, and linking disparate elements such that the intervention could 
be considered ‘logical’. It is in this sense also that stakeholders and ‘persons-at-risk’ were 
invited to participate in the designing, planning, and project managing process with the 
aim not only of gaining data – local ‘evidence’ – but also training in how to manage. As in 
the case of migrant health in Thailand, politics was foreclosed in favour of technical 
measures. Managing human trafficking through the logic of risk involved the 
normalization of the dynamics in the behaviour towards mobility of ‘at risk’ populations as 
is discussed below. Put differently, the aim was to decrease the number of ‘blind’ subjects 
and increase the number of ‘alert’ and self-caring subjects.  
 
THE FLIGHT OF THE SPIDERWEB 
 
Given that the problem of human trafficking was introduced into Vietnamese 
governmental discourse only recently, much of the time, funds and energy that flow into 
activities relating to the prevention of human trafficking are dedicated to training people 
in the ‘reality’ of human trafficking as well as in the ways of governing this reality. This 
endeavour has not been without difficulties. Indeed, the human security project was beset 
with specifically Vietnamese political and governmental obstacles as I go on to detail 
rendering the effect of the intervention minimal. Unlike the migrant health assemblage, 
then, through which ran a multitude of lines of segmentarity that territorialized the 
assemblage, lines of breakage and fracture, “causing asignifying particles or pure 
intensities to pass or circulate,” have threatened to dismantle an otherwise seemingly 
consolidated human trafficking assemblage. The deterritorializing processes resulting 
from the clashes encountered by the assemblage leave the multiplicity of constituted 
subjectivities such as the ‘risk-averse migrant,’ with  “nothing more than a name as the 
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trace of an intensity” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:4). It is in this sense that human security 
appears as a body without organs plugged into the human trafficking assemblage.  
Specifically, the human trafficking assemblage was plagued by lines of breakage which 
materialized in the struggle between the language of social evils and the language of 
human trafficking. The project implementation process which was planned for a three-
year period (2003-2006) as per common aid short-termism was severely reduced due to 
the ideologically problematic language of labour exploitation used in the project plan. As 
mentioned, the Vietnamese government issued in 2004 an Approval of the National Plan of 
Action against Crime of Trafficking in Children and Women during the period of 2004-2010. 
The first National Plan of Action (NPA), however, was not issued until 2007. In spite of this, 
the human security component of TICW, scheduled to run between 2003 and 2006 as per 
the proposal submitted to the HSF, went ahead before the issuance of this first NPA, 
incurring severe delays. For one, the timing of the human security project coincided with 
the drafting of the Approval of the NPA. In fact, due to political sensitivity with the 
language of labour exploitation employed in the discussion about trafficking pushed for by 
the ILO, the project was not approved until 2005.  
Secondly, lines of deterritorialization emerging from the clash between standard project 
short-termism and government reorganization threatened the actualization of the 
intervention in Vietnam. The aid sector in Vietnam is highly controlled. Development 
agencies must work with allocated government partner agencies. By 2005 and following 
the Approval of the NPA in 2004, the ILO was forced to change its main government 
partner the MOLISA for the mass organization the VWU which had been appointed to lead 
the prevention programme point in the NPA.62 Having previously developed good 
relations with MOLISA, the ILO had to start anew developing a working relation with its 
new partner organization.63 The actual project implementation period was for just a little 
over a year, 2005-2006. Activities on the ground ran for approximately 10 months 
(Bowen, et al., 2006:13). Two years (or two thirds of the project life span) were spent 
waiting for approval from the Vietnamese government(Bowen, et al., 2006).64 Thus, the 
ILO encountered in Vietnam a difficult, complex and highly political field in which the 
conditions of operation were largely found wanting.  
                                                             
62 This manoeuvre followed the 'recommendation' of the Ministry of Planning and Investment 
which also manages the Vietnamese international aid scene. 
63 Interview with an ILO official, Hanoi, October 7, 2008 
64 Interviews with ILO officials in Hanoi and Bangkok, September-November 2008 
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The reality of human trafficking is knowable only through expert (i.e., scientifically 
verifiable) knowledge, and governable as intervention through management (framing 
logically). In order to ensure the management of the problem of human trafficking, 
Vietnamese state officials were to be aligned with mechanisms standard to governing 
through the lens of human trafficking.65 This involved a lot of training. Training, according 
to the ILO, is the “process of acquiring knowledge, skills and attitudes that are needed to 
fill the gap between what people want to do, and what they are able to do now” (ILO/IPEC, 
2005). “When we say training, actually it’s rather saying training the trainers,” that is 
conducting training for trainers. ILO/IPEC operates under the ‘cascade training’ scheme, 
whereby knowledge and skills are argued to be passed on from one level to the next. 
‘Direct’ is more adequately understood as ‘subcontracting’ the work of training to local 
service providers who in turn train other trainers: “when we do trainings and workshops 
and things like that, [...] we give them the tools, develop the tools, which might be 
guidelines or whatever it is, or training manuals and so on that they can use”.66 Eventually, 
knowledge and skills are thought to trickle down to the people that the project targeted.  
In the human security project, training was to strengthen “technical and implementing 
capabilities for all partner organizations and managerial and technical skills among 
community level mechanisms”. In the Guidelines for Practitioners in the Fight against 
Human Trafficking. A Tool to Tackle Human Trafficking, trainers are encouraged to use a 
variety of communication methods including a range of visual aids, plenary discussion, 
group work, role-play and so on: use ‘ice-breakers’ if “you do not know participants well,” 
for example games, songs etc. For contrast and clarity, “play a bad facilitator versus a good 
facilitator” in role-plays. Be sure to “have eye contact, stand up and move around, speak 
slowly, use your voice (intonation)”; “use humor if natural for you, and smile”; be sure to 
calm participants “who are over-excited, particularly children” and so on (ILO/IPEC, 
2005). In this way, communities considered ‘at risk’ of human trafficking were trained 
about how to manage effectively the problem of human trafficking. 
The human security intervention proceeded with the governmentalization of the state by 
linking human security with the Vietnamese National Plan of Action (NPA) to combat 
trafficking. The project management was based within existing structures concerned with 
trafficking and child labour prevention. In fact, the provincial project steering committee 
was built on the structure of the NPA provincial steering committee. Members of the 
                                                             
65 For a similar argument in relation to China’s attempt to control national demography, see 
Greenhalgh, Susan, and Edwin A. Winckler. (2005) Governing China's Population: From Leninist to 
Neoliberal Biopolitics. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press ; [London : Eurospan distributor]. 
66 Interview with ILO officer, Bangkok, September 4, 2008 
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NPA/project steering committee were officials from a range of government agencies 
including the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), MOLISA and the Department of Social 
Evils Prevention, Border Guard Command, Ministry of Education and Training, Committee 
for Population, Families and Children, Vietnam Youth Association, Ministry of Culture and 
Information, Social Policy Bank, Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Vietnam 
General Confederation of Labour, Vietnam Cooperative Association. Members of these 
organizations were trained in the management of the problem of human trafficking.  In 
principal, to “implement effective and multi-sectoral anti-trafficking interventions” 
(Bowen, et al., 2006:1). They were trained to develop their own Action Programmes based 
on their situation. Similar processes also occurred at the community level through local 
community decision making on anti-trafficking activities and beneficiary selection.  
In October 2008, two years after project conclusion, the Phung Hiep Commune Steering 
Committee assembled following a call by the VWU. Over twenty members attended. Two 
years earlier members of this committee had been trained in ‘project management and 
participatory monitoring and evaluation.’ However, the material produced in this training 
session, namely, the spidergram in Figure 6 – the graph in which the Committee was 
assembled – was discarded from the assemblage. It was no longer, if ever it held that 
position, in line with the strategic imperative of human security to govern aberrant 
mobility. This is because its power to set up the order of governance for preventing human 
trafficking was weakened the moment the village community stopped referring to it. It had 
been locked away in a drawer until the day of the 2008 assembly of the Phung Hiep 
Commune Steering Committee where it re-entered the assemblage to attract funds 
through this researcher to develop the infrastructures of the village more generally. The 
spidergram is a managerial tool through which the elements in the human trafficking 
assemblage are assembled and the relationality between the elements inscribed and 
transferred in training sessions with the target population itself. In other words, it is a tool 
which sets up the assemblage according to the dominant strategic imperative, in this case 
the biopolitical governance of human trafficking.  
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Figure 6: Reproduction of the Phung Hiep Commune spidergram (2008)  
The inscription in the very left corner of the original spidergram read: CECEM. The Center 
for Community Empowerment or CECEM is a private training organization based in Hanoi, 
whose training services are subcontracted by local and international organizations. The 
spider web was material left behind by the trainer of CECEM who had run a course on with 
some members of the steering committee. The spider tool, as this management tool is 
referred to by Save the Children UK, is “intended to promote reflection, analysis, sharing, 
dialogue and action planning within organisations” (Feinstein and O'Kane, 2005). Indeed, 
it is a tool that is gaining momentum in measuring ‘capacity building’ across the global aid 
assemblage (Gibbon et al., 2002, Smith et al., 2003). The name comes from the use of a 
graph in the shape of a spider web. It is a managerial mechanism by which villagers in this 
human security project were trained to assemble the commune steering committee for the 
prevention of human trafficking. It was to assist them in organizing themselves through 
‘networking and coordination’, ‘village planning and decision making processes’.  
CECEM is the product of an initiative by eight mostly UK-based NGOs operating in Vietnam 
to meet their own training needs. When funding for the training centre dried out in 2002, 
the Centre went private. The organization provides training, “consultancies and 
implementing projects in the fields of adult learning, participatory project management, 
organization development, and small and medium enterprises development”. Their 
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clientele include INGOs and Vietnamese NGOs. They are trainers in bilateral and 
multilateral projects as well as development projects funded by the embassies, public 
organizations, and small and medium enterprises in the rural area. Trainers hold Masters 
degrees in Organisational Change and Development, Small Enterprise Promotion and 
Training, Development Management, Economics and Business Administration from the 
University of Manchester, Leipzig University and other centres of expertise. The list of 
courses on offer is long and varied. This year, the organization offers training in the 
management of consultants, project management, conflict management, training for 
trainers, need assessment for development projects, presentation skills, effective 
leadership skills, customer relation management, project design, planning and proposal 
writing, organizational strategic planning, social dialogues facilitation, supervisory 
management skills and behaviour change communication.67  
Participants at the CECEM course included staff from different levels of the VWU, 
Department of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (DOLISA) – the provincial arm of MOLISA 
–, the  National Committee for Population, Family and Children (CPFC) and the police. The 
objective of the course was to train participants in how to design a project, write a 
proposal and plan monitoring and evaluation (for which the professional acronym is 
M&E). After providing participants with the “necessary skills and methods in 
project/action plan management/implementation and M&E”, the participants were 
considered ‘capacitated’ to develop their own action programmes on preventing 
trafficking as part of the human security project (Ngo and Nguyen, 2005). Apart from 
practicing the use of the spider web tool, the selected group was trained also in mapping, 
semi-structured interviewing and monitoring meetings. Villagers were trained also in 
‘pooling of resources’ and improving access to existing services. The general focus was on 
‘good governance’. They were trained also in data collection and analysis. Finally, it 
involved ensuring effective linkages and networking to higher level authorities (at 
provincial and national levels).  
Effectively, members of the project steering committee were instructed in the art of 
organizing and analysing “their knowledge in a manner that enables an inscription of 
reality susceptible to a certain level of calculation, priority-setting and intervention” 
(Triantafillou and Nielsen, 2001:73).  Much like the Migrant Family Health Folders by 
which MCHWs in Thailand were disciplined to interpret, map, and order the health of the 
lives of fellow migrants in a way amenable to biopolitical regulation, spidergrams were 
introduced in targeted communities as the tool through which task units were to be 
                                                             
67 For more information, see http://www.cecem.org/   
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assembled.  In contrast to Thailand, where the folder was utilized regularly to an extent 
that it was and it became MCHWs, the spidergram in Vietnam was a dead inscription device 
insofar as it seemed without purpose and lifeless. Its physical presence meant little more 
than the end of the human security logic. Here was a governmental device through which 
the governmentality of human security traversed and reached a momentary dead end. 
Training commune staff in using the tools was difficult according to the project staff.68 The 
Project Coordinator in Vietnam found the need to assist considerably in the training 
process although “the process was helpful for the participants to better understand the 
project  and improve ways of working, but that reporting and analysis was a great 
challenge” (Bowen, et al., 2006:31).  
In the manner that Vietnamese state officials take technical training in managing the 
problem of trafficking, beginning with their participation in the designing, planning, and 
project managing process discussed earlier, they are assembling the governance of human 
trafficking according to the biopolitical imperative to which they have become subject. The 
art of organizing the elements comprising a problem space such as human trafficking in 
Vietnam in fact highlights the way the human security strategy is underscored by both an 
emphasis on integrating the target population itself in self-governing activities and a  
cosmological realist approach to problem-solving, that is, emphasizing calculability and 
precision, as identified by Grayson (Grayson, 2008).  
 
VIETNAMESE FEMININITY AND HYBRID FORCES 
 
Under the human security project, a broad range of awareness raising activities was 
organized by dedicated teams of women of the governmental Vietnamese Women’s Union 
(VWU).  The role of the VWU in alerting target populations about the dangers of trafficking 
and labour exploitation, and guide individuals in their choice to migrate is substantial. The 
Vietnamese organization was considered ideally placed to oversee awareness raising 
activities. Firstly, the VWU’s intricate structure for community development work, with 
networks extending from national to village level, stretched deep into communities. It 
claims a membership base of “nearly 11 million belonging to 10,331 local women's union 
in communes and towns throughout the country”. It is “divided into 4 levels, comprising 
the Central level (Hanoi), the Provincial and Municipal level (61 units), the District level 
                                                             
68 Interview with ILO officer, Hanoi, October 11, 2008 
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(601 units), and the Commune level”. Secondly, the propaganda69 or IEC (Information, 
Education, Communication) units of the VWU are experienced campaigners. Coupled with 
its extensive network, the VWU is able to mass mobilise. Thirdly, as arbiter of Vietnamese 
femininity, the VWU bears significant moral authority over the women targeted in the 
trafficking project. Interestingly, in the human security project discussed here, the VWU 
operated under a hybrid logic of social evil and human trafficking. Finally, although a 
union, the VWU is a state organization with links to the highest political office. Thus, the 
structure and facilities of the VWU allowed the message of human trafficking to trickle 
through various levels of Vietnamese society.  
The VWU campaigned for responsible and risk-free migration. They carried out a wide 
range of awareness raising activities. Under the guidance of the VWU, the IEC networks 
utilised traditional IEC and awareness approaches at mass level including using multiple 
TV broadcasts, radio, columns in local newspapers, leaflets, posters, traditional cultural 
performances such as poetry and folk songs, competitions, morning assemblies under the 
flag, and communal loudspeakers (Figure 7).70 
                                                             
69 Propaganda in Vietnamese does not carry the same negative connotations as in other places. 
Interview with VWU members of Vi Thanh Town in Hau Giang province, October 7, 2008 
70 The regular chatter of the governmental loudspeaker across rice paddies or in the busy centre of 
Hanoi is a traditional IEC technique keeping people abreast with latest propaganda subjects. People 
hear but do they listen? 
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Figure 7: Communal loudspeaker located amidst rice paddies in Hau Giang Province (October 
2008) © Voelkner 2008 
The mass organization also campaigned at the local level through family visits, children’s 
forums in schools and small group discussions in communities. The issue of human 
trafficking was integrated in school curricula.71 The VWU was also trained by ILO staff in 
innovative approaches including programmes made to fit specific audiences such as the 
ILO’s Supporting Children’s Rights through Education, the Arts and the Media (SCREAM). 
SCREAM was widely used in secondary schools in both target and non-target communes 
(Bowen, et al., 2006). Through these large scale campaigns and minuscule activities, the 
                                                             
71 Interviews with members of the Phung Hiep Commune Steering Committee, head teacher and 
pupils of a commune school, Hau Giang Province, October 2008 
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VWU teams attempted to imbue the reality of human trafficking throughout ‘at risk’ 
communities.72  
In its propagandistic efforts to promote responsible behaviour and risk-free migration, the 
VWU operated under a hybrid logic in which it collapsed the fault line between 
governance through social evil and governance through human trafficking. Throwing the 
weight of its moral authority behind the campaign to prevent human trafficking, the VWU 
disciplined ‘at risk’ women through what Foucault referred to as ‘normalising judgements’ 
(Foucault, 1979). The VWU promoted an image of a “healthy, knowledgeable, skilful [sic], 
dynamic, innovative, cultured and kind-hearted Vietnamese woman” (VWU, 2010) against 
the ‘loose minded’ and irresponsible woman that it presented as particularly ‘at risk of 
trafficking’.73 Indeed, it is the traditional role of the VWU to “raise women’s awareness and 
encourage them to preserve and develop cultural traditions and morality” (ILO/IPEC, 
2002:32). As the VWU president said at the Eight Congress in 1997: “we preserve the 
traditional role of women” (as quoted in Nguyen-vo, 2008:137). This is emphasised also in 
the Vietnamese government’s Nation Plan of Action against trafficking, where the role of 
the VWU as leader of the prevention programme is, amongst other, to develop “cultural 
families, healthy communes, streets without social evils” (Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia 
Khiem, 2004:7).  
The emphasis on ‘healthy communes’ is also stressed in the VWU’s widely distributed 
leaflet about trafficking in women and children prepared under the human security 
project. In a society which values social cohesion highly, the leaflet reminds that it is not 
only individuals but also communities that are affected by trafficking. Accordingly, 
individuals bear a responsibility to themselves and their communities to be risk aware 
and to migrate safely.  Similarly, communities are responsible to look out for risks in their 
midst. This is a culture in which government agencies reward actions for social cohesion, 
such as the absence of prostitution in a family or dedicated commitment to VWU 
campaigns, with certificates of commendation that are proudly born.74 In this respect, the 
role of the VWU, as set out in the NPA, involves “communication and education on laws 
and policies, tricky practices of traffickers in order to enhance the local people’ awareness 
and vigilance” (Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem, 2004:4). Indeed, the campaign to 
prevent human trafficking through social evil is played out at the level of identity, tradition 
                                                             
72 Indeed, according to the evaluation report of the human security project, commune leaders 
believe that community awareness of the risks of exploitation facing migrants has improved.  Local 
people had become more alert to recruiters and have changed their practices when they consider 
migrating to other provinces or abroad. 
73 VWU leaflet  
74 Interview with WVU officials, Hau Giang Province, October 10, 2008 
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and culture. As part of the human security project, an anti-trafficking leaflet was prepared 
in cooperation with the VWU.  
 
Figure 8: VWU anti-trafficking leaflet in Hau Giang Province (October 2008) Image © Voelkner 
2008 
The campaign to prevent human trafficking in Vietnam promoted in the ILO’s human 
security project also operated under the logic of human trafficking to promote the tenets 
of safe, read ‘normal’ as opposed to aberrant, migration within the country and across the 
border. As the ILO argues: “TICW aims to end trafficking, not migration”. The freedom to 
move, especially for the sake of livelihood, is a fundamental right which the ILO intends to 
protect “through programming that makes migration safer”. Such programming relates to 
the campaigning of risk-aware behaviour in the migration process carried out by the VWU 
for which members of the organization were trained-as is discussed below. The desire to 
migrate, according to the ILO, becomes a risk factor when the conditions under which 
people can move freely are not established. For example, the risk of trafficking is high 
when “legal migration channels are closed, inaccessible, or unknown to the person seeking 
to move” and they seek out “irregular channels” which are “brokered by recruiters, illegal 
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transporters, unscrupulous employers or other intermediaries” (IPEC/ILO, 2008:13). 
While conditions to move freely remain inadequate,75 ‘persons at risk’ are to be made 
aware of “legal and protected migration channels”. This reduces the likelihood, read risk, 
that “they are deceived by recruiters or trafficking brokers” (IPEC/ILO, 2008:20). Thus, 
the ILO was seeking to normalize migration.  
As the social evil gradually is brought into and formative of the transnational assemblage 
of human trafficking, it is transformed into the technical problem of human trafficking. In 
operating under the logics of social evil and human trafficking, the VWU rendered 
governable the women and children targeted as ‘at risk’ persons under the human security 
project. Constituted as responsible and risk aware subjects, the women and children were 
brought under control of the transnational assemblage of human trafficking oriented to 
containing and normalizing aberrant migration. The solution to the problem of human 
trafficking was seen lying with persons ‘at risk’ themselves. Apart from campaigning to be 
responsible and risk-aware subjects, targeted populations were trained to become 
entrepreneurs, “empowered to take greater control over their lives” (ILO/IPEC, 2002). The 
constitution of entrepreneurial selves proceeded on the basis of a series of training 
‘modules’. ‘At-risk’ persons were to train for life. The kind of life for which they were 
trained was the life of an entrepreneur under the dictate of the logic of market.  
The type of life skills required were determined “based on local market 
demand”(ILO/IPEC, 2002:iii). Vocational training programs were provided by local 
training schools and employers coordinated by the DoLISA, and contracts with training 
providers were signed with the People’s Committee. The main types of training offered 
were dressmaking, hairdressing/beauty, motor repair, animal raising and handicrafts. 
Under this scheme, for example, a new cottage industry of mat weaving was set up by the 
VWU in Hoa My commune of Hau Giang, selling to overseas markets they had identified 
through a similar enterprise in Can Tho city. The group of 30 original trainees has 
expanded to 60 through trainees transferring skills to others, including adult family 
members and children working in the home of the trainer (Bowen, et al., 2006:27). 
                                                             
75 The ILO recently developed Recommended Guidelines for Migrant Recruitment Policy and Practice 
in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region  
164 
 
 
Figure 9: Hairdressing training corner at Vi Thanh VWU premises, Hau Giang Province (October 
2008) © Voelkner 2008 
The 'community-based model' to combat human trafficking at the level of communes in 
the human security project also involved providing the alternative of receiving credit for 
household production. New economic opportunities were identified based on market 
analysis. The training involved included training in income generation including in rural 
skills such as in farming, animal husbandry and food-processing for ‘food security’. The 
provision of credit was carried out through the Bank for Social Policy which handed out 
loans based on approved business plans. Loans were provided to families with children in 
the target age range and considered to be ‘at risk’. The local poverty criteria were used to 
select and focus on ‘poor’ or ‘near poor’ families. The project used an existing government 
loan source, subsidised by the state as part of its poverty reduction strategy. Students 
were trained by the bank on bank loans regulations and received skills training in 
technical production skills and business skills. For instance, if a family planned to raise fish, 
training was provided by local agriculture department staff. Animal husbandry (e.g. cows, 
pigs, poultry), fish raising and small trade were common income generating activities 
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(Bowen, et al., 2006). Finally, it included also training and services for ‘group formation 
assistance’ and small business development and improving access to credit and markets. 
These activities were intended to increase ‘economic security,’ which was reasoned as 
decreasing the pressure for women and children to leave. 
“As a result of combined awareness raising, village mobilization, income generation 
interventions,” according to the ILO, “target beneficiaries are now alert to traffickers and 
the number of ‘blind’ migrants-those that accept carelessly an offer to leave the village for 
employment opportunities elsewhere” – had decreased” (ILO/IPEC, 2002:i). Implicit in the 
bias towards the entrepreneurial self in ‘combating human trafficking’ is the 
epistemological grounding of the human subject in the market in which ‘rational’ decision-
making behaviour is endorsed. The constitution of self-governing selves in the reality of 
human trafficking does not, however, indicate a transfer of power from the Vietnamese 
state to the individual. Rather, these Vietnamese women and children are invested in a 
microphysical field of power-knowledge or governmentality in which they are governed 
primarily through the logics of risk and the market. This is significantly different from 
governance in the reality of social evil in which the emphasis is put on propaganda and the 
constitution of moral subjects of femininity. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter traced the emergence of human security as a situated political strategy within 
the human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam. Specifically, as I have done in relation to 
migrant health in Thailand, the chapter acknowledges the role of the human and 
nonhuman forces which helped to bring forth and shape the vernacular micropolitics of 
human security in this site of practice. Much like in Thailand, this involved a multiplicity of 
forces including market, social, international, governing, viral and chemical forces which 
mutually interacted, helping to shape the emergence of the assemblage. Here too, 
biopolitical mechanisms were developed to assemble the assemblage in such a way that 
the occurrence of human trafficking is prevented biopolitically. The complex world of 
Vietnamese women and child migrants was enframed, ordered and depoliticized in terms 
of simple dichotomies in which the ‘unruly’ life of those earmarked as at risk of human 
trafficking was contrasted with human techno-scientific ingenuity. In so doing, these 
mechanisms attempted to order the elements of the assemblage in such a way that the 
illicit circulation of women and children could be made amenable to biopolitical 
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governance. Yet, in contrast to the Thai migrant health assemblage, the intervention was at 
first resisted by the Vietnamese state authorities. Moreover, the conditions of possibility 
for the successful enactment of biopolitics were found wanting: specifically, Vietnam did 
not operate according to the form of cosmological realism underpinning the knowledge 
practices of human security. Finally, and partly in relation to this, central elements such as 
the spidergram and the leaflet critical to the rearrangement of the assemblage presented 
as de-territorializing elements either escaped or were discarded from the assemblage. 
Consequently, the assemblage clashed and, following a creative readjustment, hybridized 
and re-territorialized with the situated precepts of ‘social evil’.  
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6 CONCLUSION: HUMAN SECURITY AND GLOBAL POLITICS 
 
 
 
Like any word, human security slips and slides. It escapes any singular grip or definition. It 
does not command that of which it speaks, or what is spoken through it. Indeed, the 
concept of human security conveys both more and less than what it is to signify. It does 
this both, because it has a history and because when we use human security we set it off 
again on its historical way, “in the unpredictable ways in which anything which lives in the 
way that it is received through time remains intractable to the designs that might be made 
upon it” (Dillon, 1996:114). Indeed, though the dangerous designs that were made upon 
human security as I discuss in chapters one and two could be traced in the assemblages 
and associated orders of governance to which it gave rise, this thesis has also shown the 
way its multiple materialization in the world is situated, messy, contingent, and only 
partially a successful mode of governance. Nonetheless, though the assemblages are 
circumstantial and contingent, the thesis also demonstrated the way this did not render 
them ineffective. On the contrary, I contend, human security is effecting a reconstitution of 
global order which, however, is not total but particular, concentrated in the assemblages 
scattered around the globe.  
The thesis began by examining the taken-for-granted truths of human security’s 
dangerous enframing which pass through sites of practice. In chapter one, drawing on 
Foucault and some of the poststructuralist literature in International Relations, I argued 
that the regime of truth that is global governance sets up the political subjectivities 
(heterarchical order, the state, the ‘international community’, and the individual) which 
advocates take to be real and act upon.   This was important in order to set the stage for 
examining the particularities of human security. Chapter two examined the 
presuppositions which direct and circumscribe narratives and practices of human 
security. Specifically, I argued that human security, in aiming to foster life, is a form of 
biopolitics which has the goal to regulate targeted populations globally through the notion 
of global governance. As such, I suggested that human security operates on a 
metanarrative of ‘complexity’ which helps to constitute a specific kind of imaginative 
geography. This dangerous geography informs the kind of problematizations, spaces, 
agents and mechanisms through which human security governs. Indeed, it necessitates a 
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heterarchical order in which self-governing networks and trained subjects manage human 
insecurity. Specifically, I argued, human security engineers systemic self-governance 
through learning and training. Moreover, I argued that its dangerous ontology commits 
human security to a re-configured Hobbesian state which operates on contingent 
sovereignty.  In so far as this narrative is carried forward into its practices, human security 
is a form of statecraft. Finally, I examined the logframe as a governmental thing which sets 
up the multiplicity of situated human security assemblages.  
In chapter three, I considered how interpreting human security as an assemblage entails 
considering its open-endedness which always somehow escapes the biopolitical 
imperative within it. Drawing on Foucault’s own materialism, I argued human security is 
not only partly generated by the intermingling of dispersed material and other 
(spatiotemperal) processes but is also dependent on the corporeal world which it 
comprises. Drawing on Deleuze and Guattari as well as Bennett’s materialist conception of 
assemblage, I argued that human security’s relation with material and other forces 
renders it, and the intended effects produced out of it including the political subjectivities 
it engenders, always transient and subject to unintended and unforeseen change. I 
concluded that a focus on assemblages demonstrates the ways the world cannot be 
explained only by analysing human intentions, omissions and programmes. Only rarely 
does the human have the power to tame contingencies. This interpretative framework 
informed my field analyses in chapters four and five in which it became possible to pin 
point where creative adjustments to the political strategy took place. I concluded that 
human security is never a coherent, stable and totalizing logic but emerges in multiple and 
transient guises in the world. 
As I suggested in the thesis’ introduction, governmental notions which invoke the ‘global’ 
such as human security operate along dramatic distances. Tracing its workings beyond 
governmental categories such as the state helps to locate the dynamic mechanisms and 
effects of human security. When the object of analysis is the global, a focus on the 
materiality of events helps to explore how the global is localized. At the same time, a focus 
on materiality opens up the opportunity to explore how the local materializes. This 
interplay between localizations and materializations disrupts the logics that underlie 
governmental processes. By looking at the emergence of the complex assemblages that 
human security comprises, tracing the multiple transactions and relations that assemble 
the heterogeneous elements including the material objects into nearly stable 
organizational and institutional practices, it becomes possible to capture where and how 
power operates and where human security is performatively produced. It helps to 
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understand the distinctive interplay between the micro- and macropolitics of global 
human security. Chapters four and five are two narratives of human security’s dispersed 
emergence with and in the corporeal world.  They engage with materiality in the form of 
viruses and technological artefacts such as logframes, software, and spidergrams that 
constitute contingent orders of governance in global politics.  
This concluding chapter offers some reflections on the political and biopolitical 
implications for analyzing human security through the notion of machinic assemblage. In 
what follows, the chapter draws on the field-based analyses carried out in chapters four 
and five in order to conclude the thesis with a reflection on the political implications of 
human security for global politics. By constituting orders of governance comprising a set 
of political subjectivities, human security is reconstituting global order at the molecular 
level. Specifically, the chapter analyses the sets of biopolitical processes which aimed to 
render dangerous circulations manageable and the implications these have for the 
understanding of global order. These include processes of technicalization and 
depoliticization, ordering, enframing and mapping, authorizing knowledges, and training. 
By drawing out the differences between the biopolitical enframing of human security 
prepared at the outset and the processes and effects in the materialization of human 
security, the chapter notes how a focus on the materialities of the assemblages of power 
allows for an understanding of human security at the molecular level.  
 
INSTABLE ENFRAMINGS 
 
Enframings of the world such as the biopolitical imaginary of human security discussed in 
chapter two serve to map the terrain upon which debates and activities are intended to 
occur. In the case of human security, this concerns an ontology of othering inextricably 
linked with the production of identity, that which is to be secured, and alterity, that which 
is to be eliminated or regulated. In human security, this is expressed in a governmental 
concern with ensuring, but also with controlling for dangers inherent to the contemporary 
‘complex’ reality in which the state remains central to resolving the problem of political 
order. However, as I argued in chapter three, if debates and activities are inextricably 
enmeshed with nonhuman agencies, and if the intentions of those endorsing and/or 
applying human security can be enforced only if accompanied by a vast entourage of 
nonhumans, then it seems pertinent to analyse the politics of human security not in terms 
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of the intentions of the programmatic enframing and agenda but in terms of the “public” 
coalescing of actants around a human security problem.  
To begin with, the Burmese migrants in Thailand and the women and children designated 
as ‘at risk of trafficking’ in Vietnam (and in four other Mekong subregional countries) are a 
case in point. They constitute, since at least the 1990s, as I demonstrate in the preceding 
chapters, contingencies of circulation. On the one hand, the steady flows of displaced 
Burmese to Thailand and of Vietnamese women and children as well as men allegedly 
trafficked in and out of Vietnam are seen as humanitarian catastrophes. Their journeys 
represent flows of survival, loss, sorrow, (un)fulfilled dreams, violence and uncertainty. 
On the other hand, their journeys are handled also as flows of unskilled labour feeding 
booming industries, for example, the fish-processing industry in Samutsakorn, the sex 
industry in Bangkok, Manila or New York, the garment or hooking industry in Ho Chi Minh 
City, the mail-order brides to Taiwan, South Africa and the United Kingdom. In this 
context, Burmese migrants and Vietnamese women and children constitute flows of 
monetary capital, finance, remittances and laundered money as well as flows of goods 
(food, garment, brides) and services (domestic helper, factory worker, sex worker). At the 
same time, they are dealt as flows of viruses and disease (HIV, Avian flu), of crime and 
social disintegration (drug abuse, separatism), as flows of social evil and immorality 
(prostitution).  
These flows stream through and across provincial, national, regional and global 
infrastructures, boundaries, sovereignties and imaginaries. They do so in the figures of the 
refugee, the displaced person, the victim, the shrimp peeler, the sex worker, the bride, the 
daughter sending a salary home, the sale, the shirt, HIV carrier,. Thus, the multiplicity of 
flows also presents a multiplicity of subjectivities which speak to different but overlapping 
cultures of circulation. As noted by Lee and Lipuma, each circulation has “its own forms of 
abstraction, evaluation, and constraints, which are created by the interactions between 
specific types of circulating forms and the interpretive communities built around them” 
(Lee and LiPuma, 2002:192). Finally, and importantly, the flows connect the lives of 
people in remote Thai and Vietnamese villages with lives in places as close as Bangkok and 
Ho Chi Minh City and as distant as Taipei, Adelaide and San Francisco.  
Enframed as such, the Burmese in Thailand and the Vietnamese women and children 
attracted vernacular variants of human security including mutations in statecraft. In both 
cases, human security appears as an ideal condition for an entrepreneurial form of life in 
which the circulation of humans and nonhumans is regulated by governmental 
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assemblages. With this condition as the template, human security entails the creation and 
displacement of subject positions, relations and institutions, sometimes disturbing, 
sometimes reinforcing, existing links and imaginaries of the self, the state and the world. 
Specifically, this has involved the extension and transnationalization of the state.  
 
ARRANGING HUMAN SECURITY 
 
It is always at the level of materiality that human security takes effect – even when it is 
‘merely’ a policy discourse as shown in chapter two. To paraphrase Foucault, human 
security has its locus and it consists in the relation, the coexistence, the dispersion, the 
overlapping, the accumulation, and the selection of material elements (Foucault, 1981: 
69). It is not the act or the property of a body; human security is produced as an effect of, 
and within, a dispersion of matter including materially different tracings of phonemes, 
‘sense-perceptive elements’ and ‘someone’s memory’. To be clear, the materiality of 
human security does not correspond to the individual materials or substances of artefacts 
or sounds through which it is articulated or expressed, though as I demonstrate they are 
nonetheless important. It refers to, amongst others, the set of materials, material 
processes and relations which come to define what is (im)possible in human security 
practice. While following Foucault’s observation that “trying to define with the 
documentary material itself unities, totalities, series, relations” (emphasis added, Foucault, 
2002:7),    it is possible to argue that the political imaginary of human security co-emerges 
with documents such as the HDR 1994 and the CHS’s report Human Security Now. Equally, 
as the accounts in the preceding two chapters show, the materiality of the assemblages 
both enable and disrupt the potential for human security to take effect in the way 
programmed or intended.  
Human security only materializes in the moments when it responds to specified problems. 
These are presented as contingencies of circulation which connect elements in vernacular 
ways, albeit ‘logical,’ as illustrated in the preceding two chapters (Appadurai, 1996, Oke, 
2009). This raises the question, what makes up the materiality of the assemblages? The 
answer is multiple. The material objects that human security comprises include both 
humans and nonhumans; inscription devices such as the logframe and the spidergram; 
built or information infrastructures such as filing cabinets, computers, systems and 
software; as well as nature, geography and culture. Some of the material objects 
embodying human security are developed in other geographical places and are dropped 
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by the circuits of global human security governance into situated sites to manage 
contingencies of human life. Recall the email that was sent from a computer connected to 
the internet at the office of the HSU in New York to an online computer at the ILO 
headquarters in Geneva. The same process occurred in the communication between the 
HSU and WHO concerning the problem of migrant health in Thailand, only here, the email 
was bounced back between New York, Geneva, India, Philippines, Bangkok, and Ranong 
and Samutsakorn. Other examples were the transfer of funds from New York to Geneva to 
Bangkok; the logframe, the template of which can be downloaded from a central server; 
the virus; the MHIS; and the spidergram. Some of the material objects are reassembled 
from existing repertoires and habits, they are accretions, bricolages (Li, 2007:265, Scott, 
1999). These actants connect in unique vernacular ways to resolve the problematics 
embedded in migrant health in Thailand and human trafficking in Vietnam.  
The strategic imperative of governmental assemblages, or as Foucault put it, what is “the 
right way of arranging (disposer) things in order to lead (conduire) them?,” is ultimately to 
govern populations (Foucault, 2007:96). In human security, the best way to arrange the 
scriptures, actors, things, images, fantasies, strategies, states, techniques, methods, and so 
on, comprising the assemblages, is to order, enframe, connect, and map the elements, as 
well as to authorize the ‘right’ knowledges and train the humans involved. This is so to 
depoliticize the problem identified, for example migrant health and human trafficking, as a 
way to realign objectives in alterity with the governmental aims of human security. Many 
of these processes depend on, but are also rendered contingent upon, the differential 
dynamism of the material objects. In this sense, it can be said that the governmentalization 
of assemblages is not “a process in which rule extends itself unproblematically across a 
territory [geographical or otherwise], but a matter of fragile relays, contested locales and 
fissiparous affiliations” (Rose, 1999:51). As Li argues in relation to community forest 
management in Indonesia, much hard work goes into “drawing heterogeneous elements 
together, forge connections between them and sustain these connections in the face of 
tension” (Li, 2007:264). It is these tensions that are “the energies and countercultures,” 
which Bennett contends, “exceed and confound” an assemblage (Bennett, 2010:445).  
This also invites the question of who or what is to be rigorously policed, warred-against 
and excluded to secure human security? In other words, who is targeted? Thinking or 
imagining space, time, and people of human security, as one geography, is a governing 
process  suffused with ontological preconceptions, desires, and fantasies about what 
constitutes defensible and indefensible life, ‘human’ life, and the ‘not human enough’ life. 
In chapter two, I suggested that the exercise of mapping, a process in which identity and 
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alterity are constituted, in fact says more about the thinkers than the nature of that which 
is being thought or imagined. Mapping encloses identity and difference. It is already in this 
process that the boundaries of forms of life, between self and other, are constituted. It is in 
differentiation with the other that human security constitutes the ‘human’ that it sets out 
to secure and the ‘not-human enough’ that it sets out to tame. In this way, maps are 
abstractions  which invest bodies and populations with properties, rendering them legible 
and amenable to control (Scott, 1999).  In the field, logframes, situation analyses such as 
the National and Provincial Stakeholder Ownership Exercises, Migrant Health Folders, the 
MHIS as well as awareness-raising leaflets are maps whose preparation involved 
gathering and ordering specific types of information in order to determine specific spaces, 
times, and people that must be targeted to secure a specific form of life. In this sense, maps 
circumscribe how one is to think and act upon a specific imagined field of intervention.  
Human security maps, of whatever kind, rely on expert and statistical knowledges which 
are indispensable for the strategic differentiation of what counts as defensible and 
indefensible life. Indeed, as Grayson has argued, there is a salient belief that “Human 
security and the conditions that generate human insecurity – material, ideological and 
discursive – can be discovered, identified, classified and transformed into unmediated 
knowledge within appropriate contexts” and made amenable to global governance 
(2008:393). Accordingly,  the complex realities of problem fields such as migrant health 
and human trafficking, are stabilized with the perpetual production of scientific 
knowledge by experts including statistics, analyses, and guidelines on which ‘logical’ 
interventions are subsequently based (Porter, 1995). In fact, fields that are marked out for 
intervention such as migrant health and human trafficking are considered ambiguous and 
dangerous, partly because of a lack in verifiable knowledges. As the Thai and Vietnamese 
cases illustrate, while the emergence of new problems also demands knowledges, the only 
knowledges which ‘count’ are statistical and scientific, expert knowledges rendering ‘local’ 
and other knowledges unreliable unless sieved through scientific mechanisms. Moreover, 
human security is charting territories yet unmarked. These are territories that are vacant 
or anonymous in which sensitive information, such as intimate health details of 
populations or migrant movements considered illegal, is difficult to come by or missing 
altogether. In this sense, mapping exercises convert the vacant or anonymous reaches of 
distance into meaning for us (Said, 1978:55).  
Importantly, statistical knowledges including indicators (devices which indicate a value or 
a change in level, speed, or similar) and indices (values, which enable comparability) 
delineate the target populations. These are statistical cohorts such as ‘women in the age 
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group 18 to 24 in Can Tho province, Vietnam’, and ‘registered/unregistered migrant men 
of Burmese origin in Ranong, Thailand’. Populations in this case are cohorts, not 
communities, although this is not to say that they do not simultaneously constitute 
communities and overlapping subjectivities which undermine the properties with which 
bodies and populations are invested by human security mechanisms. A case in point is the 
Vietnamese women and children who decide to take the risk and migrate through informal 
and risky channels in order to fulfil filial duties and the desire for a better life. The 
simultaneous power and fallacy of statistical knowledge is that it reflects ‘truth,’ that it 
produces observable facts, when everyday encounters with complex worlds such as 
migrant health and human trafficking as I demonstrate not only expose the subjective and 
lax gatherings of ‘facts’ but also belie the statistical values on which interventions are 
designed and violently pushed ahead.  
The logical framework or logframe paramount to circumscribing thought, planning, and 
practices in the field, as the Thai and Vietnamese projects show, depends on a variety of 
forces including the ‘truth’ represented in statistical information and the desire to plan. 
Moreover, the process of completing a logframe is contingent on a multiplicity of foregone 
negotiations, considerations and translations, on state of the art mechanisms, approaches 
and logics, on organizational mandate and political contexts. For example, there is the 
donor to please. As an ILO officer argued, there is a political reason for why donors are 
involved, “why they spend money”. Regardless of whether a project is articulated in terms 
of human security or other, donors, according to this officer, are tied to expectations at 
home, national or regional security considerations. But then, “we cannot think only in 
terms of donors”. Considerations must be given to available technical expertise, to 
organizational mandate, to existing good practices, and lessons learned from other 
projects.76  
It is through the logical framework or logframe that a section of the messy field is 
circumscribed, the alleged variables determining the dynamics as well as related 
knowledges of this particular field established and problematized, thus preparing for 
managed intervention. While being a management tool, the logframe provides the 
structure for the design and planning of an intervention. It calls for defining not only the 
human security context based on which intervention is rationalized but also for 
determining the target populations, strategies, outputs and more, as well as the expert 
partners (agencies, institutions) involved. As such, it is already at the point of completing a 
logframe that the perimeters are set for what is the problem, what are the areas and the 
                                                             
76 Interview with an ILO officer, Bangkok, September 3, 2008 
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accepted means of intervention and so on. Put differently, the logframe sets out what is 
possible and permissible in relation to the human security intervention. 
As I illustrated in chapters four and five, logframes are the epitome of a project 
management logic by which the demand to manage effectively establishes an exclusive 
claim to politics. As an inscription device, a logframe is the site where the properties of 
Burmese health and Vietnamese women and children ‘at risk of trafficking’ are written and 
contextualized. It establishes an exclusive claim on a specific class of subjects, e.g. migrants 
(mostly Burmese and illegal in Ranong and Samutsakorn), on whom it writes forms of 
subjectivation in pursuit of managing indefensible or dangerous circulations. To technical 
experts, then, migrant health and human trafficking presented a technical problem 
requiring effective public management.  Through the governmental thing that is the 
logframe, human security presented in the space of a few paragraphs the migrant health 
and human trafficking assemblages with a discreet problem, target population, evidence, 
strategies, methods, tools, funds, and solution. Yet, the discreetness in which the problems 
of migrant health and human trafficking were presented obscures the multifarious 
microphysical problematizing activities including embedding, defining, specifying, 
categorizing, delimiting and linking disparate and spirited elements such as viruses, 
render the discreet narrative and functionality of the logframe contingent. In this sense 
also, the emergent properties that logframes delineate are contingent upon the modes of 
relationality productive of and mediated by them. 
Mapping carries on in the field through the activation of ‘local knowledge’ collected by 
those targeted themselves. It involved the participation of ‘local’ people in the project 
design, planning process, and implementation which provided interventions with a 
powerful mode of veridiction (regime of truth) for its differentiation between defensible 
and indefensible life in mapping exercises. In Thailand, MCHWs were recruited to map the 
unmapped social, making legible the usually covert existence of Burmese migrants in 
Thailand in order to render this population governable. As members of these evasive 
communities, MCHWs prove invaluable to cartographers for the purpose of gathering 
‘informative evidence’ including intimate details concerning the complex health world of 
migrants including migrant movement, health and residence, the numbers of migrants and 
their relations to one another, living conditions, as well as the types of diseases circulating. 
Much like the logframe, by collecting and ordering this knowledge, target populations 
were made amenable to governance: the information gathered, the ‘data,’ was fed to the 
computerized MHIS through which the health regularities of migrants could be monitored 
and interventions into the health regularities peculiar to migrant communities planned.  
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In Vietnam, stakeholders and ‘persons-at-risk’ were invited to participate in the designing, 
planning, and project managing process with the aim not only of gaining data – local 
‘evidence’ – but also training in how to manage in terms of ‘rational decision-making’. As 
Ralph Pettman has argued, human security must be cast “first of all in the politico-cultural 
terms that are dominant in our day, namely, the terms set by Rationalism. […] it means 
articulating human security set by the analytical languages that Rationalism provides” 
(2005:139). On the basis of risk profiles – not originary or self-evident categories but a 
function of governance – a first round at the national level resulted in the selection of 
target provinces in which a second round at the provincial level established the communes 
which were considered particularly at risk of human security. 
In fact, even if ‘local knowledge’ is drawn in, these various mapping exercises say more 
about the preconceptions, desires, and fantasies about what constitutes defensible and 
indefensible life for those promoting human security at the centres of power such as the 
UN, the WHO, ILO and IOM than it does about the target subjects. As Grayson (Grayson, 
2008:394-5) has argued,  
the obsession with unmediated precision directly relates to a far-reaching fetish 
within (human) security studies for a vulgar understanding of ‘policy-relevance’. 
The intended audience for research remains the policy community – primarily 
defined as those in positions of authority within state, interstate structures and/or 
the civil society institutions that have been acculturated within them. [...] the field 
of human security has been shaped by the perceived needs of the intended 
audience.  
Indeed, the differentiation between self and other evident in every map produced in either 
intervention is more meaningful to the geographer than it is to those for whom it is meant. 
These maps help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself by creating a chasm between 
the values to be protected and the experiences of targeted subjects, i.e. Burmese migrants 
in Thailand and Vietnamese women and children. It is in this way that one can read the 
hasty affixing of anti-trafficking leaflets onto living room walls in a local farm house along 
a Mekong canal in Vietnam upon the arrival of myself and the entourage of government 
officials minding my steps. My arrival was interpreted as an inspection visit from an 
associated member of the international organization ILO which had invested capital in the 
area to promote preventive mechanisms against human trafficking. The leaflet symbolized 
a bygone intervention for which appearances must uphold.  
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A similar push can be observed in the variety of training mechanisms developed in the 
fields of migrant health and human trafficking. The emergence of new problem fields and 
governing solutions in Thailand and Vietnam through the advocacy of international 
organizations meant that, much of the time, funds and energy that flow into human 
security activities relating to the regulation of the health dynamics of Burmese 
communities and the prevention of pathogenic circulation in Thailand, as well as the 
prevention of illicit mobility in Vietnam, are dedicated to training people in the alleged 
‘reality’ of these circulatory problems as well as in the ‘right’ ways to govern circulation. In 
particular, targeted populations are trained in the logics of science and management. 
Training was arranged among a strategic spread of people identified under the ‘cascade’ 
training scheme to establish a network of control points where knowledge and skills could 
be passed on from one point to another.  People identified included government officials, 
professionals, consultants, police, NGO workers, village elders and other representatives, 
as well as members of populations. Training facilitated “concerted articulation of the 
elementary parts” comprising these assemblages with the effect of realigning the 
objectives of those in receipt of the training. In this way, differential forces were composed 
to obtain an efficient machine to maximise effects such as self-governing Burmese or 
Vietnamese women and children, as well as state officials, as circulatory managers.    
In Thailand, MCHWs were trained in basic health knowledge, recording data, as well as 
emergency preparedness and response. They were trained in awareness raising 
campaigns in order to disseminate ‘facts’ about health care among Burmese communities, 
for example, the benefits of maintaining growth and vaccination schedules of their 
children. There were also scientific methods such as survey data gathering for baseline 
surveys used later for the assessment of project impact – “a learning process in itself 
worthy of notice” (WHO, 2004). In turn, MCHWs acted as trainers training Burmese 
migrants in basic health objectives such as hygiene. They utilized dramatization 
techniques and tools dropped by the circuits of human security governance to convey 
health messages and learning via entertainment in order to effectively ‘internalise and 
disseminate’ the message. Thai provincial health workers based at health centres in 
villages and towns were trained in recording the intimate data collected by MCHWs on 
Burmese migrant communities on the newly developed MHIS also dropped from 
elsewhere. Thus, training proceeds through a range of material objects. 
In Vietnam, a wide spread of mainly government officials take technical training in 
managing the problem of human trafficking, beginning with their participation in the 
designing, planning, and project managing process, thereby learning that the object of 
178 
 
governance is knowable only through expert knowledges. Management tools like the 
spidergram are introduced. The spidergram was to be a way for officials to come together 
and organize as a steering committee and realign their objectives in unison to preventing 
the occurrence of human trafficking.  They are introduced to a variety of communication 
methods including visual aids, plenary discussion, group work, and role-play developed 
elsewhere to increase the efficacy of learning the global method of governing human 
trafficking. Women are trained to develop entrepreneurial skills to release them from the 
supposed burden of migrating for labour opportunities.  Training mechanisms tend to be 
narrated in terms of a  top-down and consequent vertical flow, in the sense that 
professional trainers are dispatched from the centres of power like the ILO regional 
headquarters in Bangkok to instruct ‘local’ trainees who forward skills in how to manage 
‘their’ problem such as human trafficking into the depths of communities. Yet, experience 
in the field is often marked by encounters with clashing logics of governing. As is evident 
in the dynamics of the Vietnamese human trafficking assemblage, the imported logic of 
governing through human trafficking gradually incorporated elements of the logic of 
governing through social evil.  
The analyses of the migrant health assemblage and the human trafficking assemblage 
discussed in chapters four  and five not only illustrate the way human security’s dangerous 
geography materializes, they also show how the material as well as spatio-temporal 
coordinates of the assemblages render the effects of situated human security processes 
always transient and subject to unintended and unforeseen changes. Indeed, the lens of 
machinic assemblage demonstrates that the success of grand theories and totalising policy 
initiatives such as human security rely on the ability of contemporaries to recognise some 
determinate rule of constitution and differentiation that allows them to identify what 
counts as human security and what as human insecurity. Failing to speak to this common 
language, the dangerous discourse that is human security would collapse under the 
ambiguities and indeterminacy surrounding any totalizing representation including 
conflicting interpretations, transgressed boundaries, disputed boundaries, resistances, 
and exceptions. In this sense, the perspective of human security, to quote Ashley, is “no 
more powerful than claims to the effect that the world is, say, a machine, an organism, a 
communication web, or a spaceship Earth-or a plate of spaghetti, for that matter” (Ashley, 
1989:292-3).  
Through the lens of machinic assemblage, human security materializes as a “living, 
throbbing grouping whose coherence coexists with energies and countercultures that 
exceed and confound it” (Bennett, 2005:445). Since it is not governed by a central power, 
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“no one member has sufficient competence to fully determine the consequences of the 
activities” of the assemblage (Bennett, 2005:445). As illustrated in Thailand and Vietnam, 
the contingency of these ad hoc groupings does not, however, render it lacking in efficacy.  
Unlike the migrant health assemblage through which ran a multitude of lines of 
segmentarity that territorialized the assemblage, lines of breakage and fracture, “causing 
asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate,” have threatened to dismantle 
an otherwise seemingly consolidated human trafficking assemblage. The deteritorializing 
processes arriving from outside the assemblage leave the multiplicity of constituted 
subjectivities, e.g. the ‘risk-averse migrant,’ with  “nothing more than a name as the trace 
of an intensity”  (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004:4). It is in this sense that human security 
appears as a body without organs plugged into the human trafficking assemblage. Firstly, 
the human trafficking assemblage was plagued by lines of asignification which 
materialized in the struggle between the language of social evils and the language of 
human trafficking. In fact, due to political sensitivity with the language of labour 
exploitation employed in the discussion about trafficking pushed for by the ILO, the project 
was not approved until 2005. Secondly, lines of deterritorialization emerging from the 
clash between standard project short-termism and government reorganization threatened 
the actualization of the intervention in Vietnam. The ILO encountered in Vietnam a 
difficult, complex and highly political field in which the conditions of operation were 
largely found wanting.  
 
EMERGING ORDERS OF GOVERNANCE 
 
The migrant health assemblage in Thailand and human trafficking assemblage in Vietnam 
show the way the governmental logic of human security is concretely redrawing the 
boundaries of the contemporary global order. Considering the mutations in Thai and 
Vietnamese statecraft discussed in the previous chapters, the challenge of human security 
cannot be explained “within the conceptual antinomies offered by territorial sovereignty 
and supra-territorial globality” underpinning the debate about the state in human security 
I presented in chapter two (Coward, 2005:856). First, the state is not the source of 
governmental power but is inserted into governmental assemblages concerned with the 
management of transversal flows, for example the double circulation of low-skilled labour 
and microbes in Thailand. As such, the state appears as the conduit for global governance. 
Second, sovereignty within the space of these assemblages is not gained through territory 
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but is conditional on population. This is not to say that these states do not elsewhere still 
draw their legitimacy from territory such as in relation to the mentioned border issue 
between Thailand and Cambodia. However, it is fast becoming human security’s legacy 
that contemporary problematizations of security are not simply about seizing territory or 
controlling resources but about “securing the changing and manifold processes of global 
circulation as such”(Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:284).  
On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the migrant health and human 
trafficking assemblages operate among a multiplicity of other assemblages with which 
they are liable to clash. Stefan Elbe, for example, has differentiated between three kinds of 
security regimes which operate on different logics and mechanism including traditional 
national security, human security, and risk management (Elbe, 2009). Taking further the 
interpretative framework developed here, human security assemblages will inevitably 
clash with either of the other heterogeneous regimes, resulting in readjustments and 
hybridizations and the emergence of novel practices.  
An implication of the redrawing of global order is that human security operates as a vector 
for governmental power. This is evident, for example, in the use of human security 
discourses and practices in order to reconstitute relations, subjectivities, and institutions 
when moving through the fields of migrant health and human trafficking. An implication of 
this process is what can be called the foreclosure of the political. Human security was 
plugged into the assemblages cleansed of politics; technocratic strategies were put 
forward to deal with the problems of migrant health and human trafficking. By foreclosing 
politics to the exclusion of important but difficult and highly political questions such as 
legality, refugee status, labour exploitation, racism, citizenship, emigration and 
immigration policies, the problems of migrant health and human trafficking were 
rendered as technical problems for which a technical solution applies. While local 
government institutions remain one of the key elements in these assemblages, activities 
are negotiated with and through various other elements including international 
(non)governmental organizations.  
The exclusion of sensitive political matter from proposed interventions was a necessary 
condition for the intergovernmental organizations to negotiate their entry into the field. 
Not only did this move enable these organizations to work alongside and with the relevant 
government institutions in the management of these situated moments of dangerous 
circulation. Importantly, it also allowed the institutions to work with evasive communities 
to which they otherwise had little access. The reduction of migrant health and human 
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trafficking to ‘merely’ technical questions in which disparate datasets and expert 
knowledges, strategies and practices are assembled saw the objectives of the MOPH in 
Thailand and the VWU, MPS and other Vietnamese government institutions converge with 
the intervening IGOs. This transnationalization of the Thai Ministry was seen as necessary 
in order to tame the circulation of pathogens said to originate in Thai migrant 
communities and of illicit mobilities said to originate from Vietnamese women and 
children. 
What is at stake in this mutation in statecraft that human security entails is the shift from 
an exclusive focus on sovereign control of the territory towards a governmental concern 
with circulation. The state as a way of governing (Foucault, 2007:277) in global politics is 
reoriented towards managing circulation in order to create human security. Circulation, as 
Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero suggest, “is concerned with flows, but flows have to be 
monitored and regulated” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008:268). This involves changing 
the basic routines, transactions and practices of governing institutions, as is evident in the 
two empirical chapters of this thesis. The resulting assemblages are not controlled by any 
one actor, state or supra-national organisation. As the Thai and Vietnamese cases have 
shown, the state is only one of many elements which figure in these governmental 
assemblages. Within this context, the process of mapping self and other undergirding 
human security mechanisms, becomes a problem of the West managing the form of life for 
and of those marked as the other. The implications of such a project concerns the 
subjectivation of key populations, the modification of minds, behaviours, and mechanisms 
in order to contribute to the regulation of dangerous circulations through their good 
health, safe migration, and so on.  To achieve this, in contrast to the geopolitical 
spatialization of power concerned with demarcating the boundaries of government 
around a fixed territory, the geo-biopolitical spatialization of power is concerned with 
demarcating the boundaries of government around shifting and de-territorialized 
populations. 
By thinking and studying key categories of emerging global politics as mobile effects of 
power, this thesis calls for a mode of critique that can describe the historical, discursive, 
and material conditions of possibility for principles and practices of contemporary global 
politics. The thesis finds that the governing processes and their effects are only partially 
apparent in the policies designed at centres of power such as the Human Security Unit at 
the United Nations headquarters in New York, the Ministry of Public Health in Thailand, or 
the Ministry of Public Security in Vietnam. More so than at these institutional centres 
which regularly attract the eye of political scientists, the governing processes are 
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localizing, as Appadurai has suggested, insofar as they take effect in the encounters with 
the everyday of communities targeted by the policies. The everyday events unsettle, 
disrupt even, the governing activities of actors, rendering the self-evidence of power 
questionable. The frameworks of thought used to make sense of the world inform, 
legitimize even, policies and practices which intervene, sometimes violently, in the 
different forms of life of individuals and communities around the world such as the 
Burmese in Thailand and the Vietnamese women and children targeted under human 
security.          
The material I gathered on site in Vietnam and Thailand disrupts in many important and 
exciting ways the image of a logical and coherent rationality at work as is the subject of so 
many analyses of governmentality. In my opinion, many such analyses are able to posit 
rationalities (liberal or other) as logical and coherent only by largely excluding the 
multifaceted ways that rationalities are lived. Experience is one way to approach this. 
Indeed, although the obligatory claim is made that rationalities are products of and always 
subject to contingent events, experiences and practices, only rarely is this fully 
appreciated and taken further analytically. By not taking up this challenge, however, the 
lived experience comes to be thought as something outside or beyond governmental 
rationalities that leads us into the old binary trap of the programme/practice or 
theoretical/practical. In fact, the vague conceptualization of human security encourages 
multiple actors at various levels ‘to own’ the concept, thus, giving rise to a whole array of 
loose networks of actors, institutions and organizations with distinct, possibly 
contradicting, intersubjective norms, analyses and reflections as well as procedures of 
operationalizing human security. 
 
HUMAN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
 
What are the political implications of human security for global politics? As I have shown 
in this thesis, the publication of Foucault’s lectures series, Security, Territory, Population 
and The Birth of Biopolitics, has further opened up the possibility for the critical analysis of 
governmental assemblages and their relation to broader questions of power and world 
order. As I demonstrated in relation to human security in chapters four and five, the 
analysis of power in the sites where power is thought to emanate, namely, at headquarters 
of international agencies, is limited if not complemented by an investigation of sites of 
practice where power operates and is performatively produced – at the molecular level. 
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Specifically, by shifting attention away from the agents brandishing sovereign power 
(states, politicians, bureaucrats) to their constitution through micro-practices of power, it 
is possible to return to the general problem of political sovereignty and global governance. 
Unlike the tendency of governmental accounts in International Relations to reflect only on 
programmatic rationalities and top-down flows of power, deemphasizing the incoherence 
and contingency of power as well as the invention of governing practices from below, this 
thesis has shed light on the variability and precariousness of governmental flows. 
Specifically, it demonstrates the way governance, and the governance of life in particular, 
in spite of the sustained confidence in human mastery, is but a telos. Life always somehow 
exceeds governmentalization (securitization). On the other hand, it is this excess of 
governance that engenders creative readjustments. In this sense, (global) governance is 
always ‘merely’ becoming.  
By suggesting human security is a specific logic which is to be disseminated throughout 
UN activities, the Chief of the HSU inadvertently drew attention to the subtle ways that 
order is created, maintained and transformed in and beyond formal institutions. In the 
field, I observed the way human security emerged as a messy, contingent and at times 
absurd political strategy which was in the process of setting up and arranging a set of 
heterogeneous elements around specific problems such as migrant health and human 
trafficking including situated knowledges and expertise, programmes, technocratic 
processes, mechanisms of ordering, recording, presenting, and, crucially, their materiality. 
Thus, analysed in terms of governmentality, human security is a more or less calculated 
and rational activity, carried out by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a 
variety of techniques and forms of knowledge which aim to shape behaviour by working 
through desires, interests and beliefs with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable 
consequences, effects and outcomes (Dean, 1999:2). Put differently, within the de-
territorialized governmental assemblages it comprises, human security needs to be 
considered as a productive network that traverses whole social bodies comprising the 
assemblage such as Burmese communities in Ranong, Thailand and the targeted hamlets 
in the Mekong delta. Indeed, human security does not merely speak for but applies itself to 
the immediate everyday life, categorizing individuals and communities, imposing regimes 
of truth on them. Human security, then, is an all-pervasive enabling process in which 
subjects and objects are constituted. 
In order to understand the political implications of the problematization of the governance 
of global spaces as presented by human security, namely, as governance beyond the state, 
I chose to adopt an analytics of assemblages by drawing particularly on the Deleuzian 
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conception of machinic assemblages in which the materiality of collective wholes is 
particularly emphasized. Rather than taking for granted existent categories of political 
rule such as the state and the inside/outside divide, an analytics of governmental 
assemblages sheds light on how such articulations emerge from the elementary dynamism 
inherent to the assemblage. When the object of analysis is the global, tracing the 
materiality of events, as this thesis has done, helps to explore how the global is localized 
in, for example, articulations of political sovereignty such as the state and the human. At 
the same time, tracing materialities opens up the opportunity to explore how the local 
materializes. While it helps to see the way the micro and macropolitical logics and 
processes of governance are intimately related, it also highlights the way the interplay 
between localizations and materializations disrupts the logics that underlie governmental 
processes. For example, it points to the need to take into account the differences in 
interpretive environments otherwise obscured as was evident in the emergence of 
migrant health in Thailand and human trafficking in Vietnam. Not only do ‘global’ 
programmes only tangentially become adaptable to ‘local’ settings but governance is 
frequently also invented from below, producing hybrid forms of governance in which 
‘global’ and ‘local’ governance (security) cultures become intertwined. Consequently, by 
drawing attention to the diverse human security assemblages that seek to order reality, 
the thesis demonstrates aspects of global governance usually occluded in the discourse of 
global governance. Specifically, it shows the way human security gives rise to precarious 
political subjectivities including the human and political order.  
Succintly, this thesis shows how the political effects of human security are circumstantial, 
unstable, always in the process of becoming, forever absorbing new elements. These 
effects invite reflections on what can International Relations learn from the mutations of 
statecraft that result from the operation of human security strategies. First, there is a clear 
lesson in terms of the study of biopolitics. The thesis has demonstrated that the life that 
biopolitics seeks to regulate always exceeds as well as adapts the strategies of regulation. 
This implies, as is generally accepted by Foucauldian scholarship, that studies of 
biopolitics must be attentive to the microphysics and capillaries of life. Such attentiveness 
must focus in particular on the precarious nature of life, as its referent of analysis, and the 
contexts within which it develops. By focusing on the materiality of human security, this 
thesis has contributed to such an enquiry in showing that if human security is inextricably 
enmeshed with nonhuman agencies, and if the intentions of those endorsing and applying 
human security can be enforced only if accompanied by a vast entourage of nonhumans, 
then, it seems pertinent to analyse the political implications of human security not in 
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terms of the intentions of the programmatic agenda but in terms of the collectivity 
coalescing around a human security problem. 
Second, International Relations can learn more by giving credence to the materiality of the 
vernacular. In terms of the political implications on global relations, the thesis has shown 
that initiatives like human security, which problematize the governance of global space, 
engender governmental assemblages that give rise to emerging relations of power in the 
vernacular. Based on the field research, it was demonstrated here that while narratives of 
the global appear coherent, totalizing and successful, their materialization in vernacular 
contexts gives rise to circumstantial and precarious assemblages of power. This entails an 
encounter between contending ways of imagining what it means to govern life. 
Thirdly, there is a contribution that arises from the use of materiality as a category for 
analysis. An emphasis on materiality allows for a shift in the traditional emphasis of 
international relations, from the state to a relational ontology of power. As used in the 
analysis of human security presented here, a focus on machinic assemblages makes it 
possible to problematize the empirical ground upon which political analysis is conducted. 
This relational ontology poses questions to the theory of International Relations that 
deserve to be explored in further work.  
Finally, I would like to identify some emerging lines of research to further develop a 
research agenda on the assemblages of human security within International Relations. 
This project has opened up, for example, the opportunity to explore in greater detail the 
localization and materialization of other forms of global governance. It also enables 
analysing in more detail the productive excess which results from the enactment of 
governmental strategies. As the thesis has demonstrated, the excess prompts a 
readjustment of strategies which help produce innovations in policy, science and art. It has 
also opened up the possibility of exploring the governance of the human, particularly of 
other narratives of the human in global relations such as the localization and 
materialization of migration management, human rights and the governance of vitality 
such as neglected diseases like elephantiasis and leprosy, stem cells, human genome and 
so on.   
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